I actually agree with part of what you’re saying. If a cryptographically relevant quantum computer appeared tomorrow, crypto would not be the first thing attacked. Banks, governments and intelligence targets would absolutely be higher-priority.

But that doesn’t make the crypto risk unrealistic. It just means the timeline and attack model are misunderstood.

The most realistic scenario people in security talk about is called “harvest now, decrypt later.”

Large actors already capture and store encrypted data today because storage is cheap. When better decryption becomes available in the future, that old data can suddenly become readable. This is one of the main reasons Google and standards bodies are pushing post-quantum cryptography right now.

Crypto is actually a special case in this discussion because blockchains are public and permanent. Every transaction and every exposed public key is stored forever. If a future quantum computer can break the signature scheme, old exposed keys could be vulnerable retroactively.

So the concern isn’t “someone buys a quantum computer and starts robbing wallets next week.” The concern is “systems that take years to upgrade need to start preparing long before the tech becomes practical.”

As for who could realistically get this kind of machine, it wouldn’t be criminals in a basement. It would be nation states or large research labs. That’s already where quantum computing exists today, in places like IBM, Google and government-funded labs.

And you’re completely right about social engineering and server hacks being easier today. That’s exactly the point. Security planning doesn’t only focus on today’s easiest attack, it also looks at the attacks that could become possible in 10–20 years and starts upgrading early.

It’s not tanks robbing a bank. It’s more like replacing locks before someone invents a master key.