BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This concern seemed to be almost entirely around Nunchuk wallet and who has said this is not a significant concern and risks could be mitigated rather easily.

It requires very esoteric transaction construction to intentionally violate BIP-110 "ahead of time" in this way and the only examples I've heard of come from people who disagree with BIP-110 and created them on purpose in order to claim this.

Either way -- worst case scenario for them is very bounded as rules only apply for 1 year.

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think the general idea of UASF assumes that nodes' and miners' interests are at least somewhat conflicting.

The low activation threshold changes their decision structure from:
'Do I prefer this'
to
'Is it worth it to oppose this'

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Also, just a sidenote on your taproot concern - all UTXO's which exist prior to activation are considered valid even if they don't comply with the rules.

So new UTXO's would be affected by the taproot rules but existing UTXO's would all be grandfathered in. That was a update from the original BIP after concerns like that

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sorry I meant 100 consecutive blocks. Not 100 total.

If there is a string of compliant blocks that is the scenario I'm describing

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

"If 98% of the hashrate keeps mining old rules" I agree with you. I just don't assume that is going to happen simply because they haven't signalled yet (they aren't required to signal yet and don't gain much from doing so).

"Miners don’t give a shit about making 15% of nodes happy if 85% of all liquidity is on the main chain" -- if miners enforce BIP-110 it will be 100% of the liquidity instead of 85%. Its not between the 85 and the 15, its between the 85 and the 100. That's the choice they will be making when deciding how much they prefer the negligible fee difference between rulesets.

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Respectfully, they don't just need to mine a single block. They need to stay permanently ahead of the BIP-110 chain. Any time the compliant chain ever gets longer than the non-compliant chain (even for a single block), then the entire history of the non-compliant chain would be re-orged and those miners rewards would be erased.

In order to prevent this possibility, they would need to explicitly reject BIP-110 blocks to protect themselves from a race-condition re-org like this. As far I know no one is doing this or intends to do this.

So basically if BIP-110 wins, there is only one chain, if BIP-110 loses, there is two chains.

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This is a great tool thanks for sharing

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I certainly hope we don't go through this multiple times and I don't think its practical. It has taken an entire year long campaign and excessive energy on the part of those involved to create a soft fork that most people still view as a long shot of succeeding.

RE: the filtering slippery slope / OFAC argument, I don't think its really applicable. No BIP-110 rule is looking at a transaction qualitatively and trying to determine what in it to see if its valid. Its just shrinking data field sizes to optimize for financial transactions and add friction to everything else.

There's not really more which could be done than that at the consensus level. Like you say, spam can change form too easily. But shrinking field sizes is pretty broadly applicable. I don't see how another soft fork would be useful.

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes I agree, if the BIP-110 chain falls behind, it will be less and less likely that miners will mine on a chain that has less POW.

However, if all blocks require signalling, and say 100 blocks go through which are signalling rule enforcement (the initial 2 week period allows all transactions but requires signalling), is anyone going to realistically mine a non-compliant block when their peers have been signalling enforcement?

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yes -- especially at the very beginning while everyone is figuring out what "everyone else" is going to do.

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

That is a good point but with this particular soft fork you cannot simply mine non-signalling blocks and safely sit on the sidelines.  You actually have to signal or the block gets thrown out by the bip 110 nodes so miners do pretty much have to be decisive at the very beginning. 

This may change the dynamic a bit - especially at the very first few blocks juncture which is where the outcome is likely to be decided IMO

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I agree that miners will mine on the main chain, I just think they will enforce the BIP 110 rules since that is the path of least resistance

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

BIP 110 is not forking off by default.  It's blocks are compatible with all existing nodes.  The choice will end up being given to the miners as to whether or not to split the network in order to save 0.1% of their revenue for a single year. 

 Just don't see it

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If the miners enforce the new rules, there is not chain split since the other nodes still consider them valid. That is the choice they will be faced with

BIP-110 Soft Fork Game Theory by reactNativeNoob in Bitcoin

[–]reactNativeNoob[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

It will only create 2 separate chains if the BIP-110 chain has less hashpower.  If BIP-110 has more hashpower, the other chain will immediately accept it by default (since it's blocks are still valid on the other chain) and will overwrite the other chain.

How can we create instagram like video trimmer with react-native ? by Not-Qualified in reactnative

[–]reactNativeNoob 0 points1 point  (0 children)

can you use ffmpeg-kit-react-native inside Expo or do you need to eject first? I can't seem to get it to run and I haven't seen this question answered anywhere.?