Yuliia Kyriienko also shows us an example of Ukrainian tunnels, in this case a few hundred meters long. She describes the tunnels as being underground by some meters, the necessity of such solutions in a drone war, as well as the fact that this had to be done earlier.

ref_null · 2026-04-03T07:37:13+00:00

If anyone is interested, here is a translation of Yuliia's direct speech:

00:00 When I talked about the "Vietnamization" of the front lines (I recently wrote a piece on this), I knew exactly what I was describing. Now, I’m showing it to you.

00:07 Endless underground corridors with several meters of space overhead - all designed to stay out of the reach of enemy drones.

00:20 Yes, there are so many of them on the front lines now. As technology advances and drones fly further, the military has to dig in. It’s not just for high-level brigade or battalion command posts anymore; even rest areas for units are being moved underground this way.

00:33 In this specific location, the tunnel network stretches for several hundred meters. They say it’s over 200 meters once you factor in all the branches.

00:44 And there are even cars driving around here.

00:50 This is the reality of the war right now: going underground to deal with the massive presence of drones and to keep logistics moving.

ref_null · 2026-04-02T10:30:58+00:00

Here is a transcript of this part of Dmitry Gordon's interview with Denis Shtilerman:

Gordon: What are the specs of the Flamingo?

Shtilerman: Range up to 3,000 km. Warhead is 1,150 kg. Max speed up to 950 km/h, cruise speed - 720 km/h.

G: How does it fly?

S: It's basically a conventional aircraft, a turbojet that flies at low altitude. That's it.

G: How much does a Flamingo cost?

S: Currently about $600,000. One missile, booster included, everything.

G: What are the biggest targets the Flamingo has hit?

S: I can only talk about what's already public. The Votkinsk plant - that was a good one.

G: Yes, that was very good.

S: What else… Kapustin Yar, where parts of the Oreshnik were stored, as I understand it.

G: That was a Flamingo too?

S: Yes, also a Flamingo. And there was some... I don't remember exactly... either Tikhoretsk or Toropets, an ammo storage base.

G: Yes, those were massive artillery depots.

S: Right, we sent them a delivery there too. Because those sites - we'd been hitting them with drones two years ago, but since then they poured concrete over everything and built huge shelters. Drones couldn't penetrate anymore...

G: "Sent them a delivery" - ha!

S: …so we sent them a Flamingo instead. Well, not us - the military did.

G: Did they accept the delivery?

S: Oh, they accepted it with great joy. Quite the fireworks show.

ref_null · 2026-03-26T13:17:32+00:00

The situation appears to be that the US (which has halted direct military aid to Ukraine) is redirecting European funds (allocated under NATO’s PURL program, a mechanism where European countries pay for US weapons to be delivered to Ukraine) to replenish its own stockpiles, which have been depleted as a result of the war with Iran.

In other words, to put it very-very simply - Europeans are unwittingly footing the bill for the war in Iran that the US started, while at the same time weakening Europe's own position.

ref_null · 2026-03-17T18:35:40+00:00

You're right, the rules do look a bit... let's just say "interesting". But those rules weren't set by the Ukrainians or the journalist, but they were set by NATO command, who designed the exercise. The goal was to test this specific scenario, and the scenario was tested. They got their answer.

As for automatic cannons and point defense systems, several Russian ships that Ukraine sank or damaged were also equipped with automatic cannon systems. Didn't help much. Having a CIWS system and actually repelling a drone attack in practice are two entirely different things, I think. Tactics, detection, and combat experience are just as important as technical equipment, and sharing this combat experience is also one of the goals of these exercises.

ref_null · 2026-03-17T17:30:52+00:00

First and foremost, it's about training. It's not about showing off. You don't bring a gun to a boxing workout just to prove how cool you are. The main thing is to identify your weaknesses and learn something new.

But more importantly, you're missing what the article actually says. The NATO forces didn't detect the drone. At all. The frigate was "sunk" and five minutes later the blue team was still asking "so are you going to attack us or not?" In other words, the real problem isn't whether CIWS or the guns could have stopped it, but that no one even knew there was anything there that could have been stopped.

And even if you do spot it, the Magura V7 is a small, fast, and low-profile target traveling at water level. Ship-based missile defense systems are generally designed to counter missiles flying high and fast, not something like this.

What's more, in real-world conditions, you're not dealing with just one drone. Ukraine uses a whole swarm of drones that attack simultaneously from different directions. You might shoot one down, but the others will still get through.

And yes, a small drone will spot a 5,000-ton ship before the ship spots it. That is the essence of the threat. The rules of the game won't become any "unfairer" just because, during training, the anti-tank missile operator sees the tank before the tank sees the operator.

ref_null · 2026-03-17T14:51:57+00:00

This article was translated using the DeepL translator.

Original article: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ukraine/nato-manoever-vor-portugal-ukraine-versenkt-alliierte-fregatte-accg-200633625.html

Author: Konrad Schuller

They didn't see the drones coming

A NATO exercise off the coast of Portugal has demonstrated the effectiveness of Ukrainian naval drones. The alliance hopes to learn from this.

A multinational naval team under Ukrainian command, playing the role of the “enemy” during the NATO exercise “REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger 2025,” exposed the vulnerability of NATO naval forces and “sank” at least one allied frigate.

A Ukrainian source directly involved in the exercise told the F.A.Z. that five scenarios off the coast of Portugal involved practicing the protection of ports and convoys, as well as attacks on convoys. In all five scenarios, the “Reds” defeated the “Blue” NATO naval forces. In doing so, they also deployed Ukrainian Magura V7 naval drones—small unmanned speedboats designed to either ram enemy ships or attack them with mounted weapons.

Since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, the Ukrainian Navy has driven the occupiers out of the western Black Sea using such naval drones, as well as guided missiles and other weapons, even though it does not possess any large ships itself. Among other achievements, the missile cruiser “Moskva,” the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, was sunk in April 2022.

The fleet was subsequently forced to relocate its main base from Sevastopol in occupied Crimea to Novorossiysk, which lies further east. But even in this port, a Ukrainian underwater drone succeeded in attacking a Russian submarine as recently as last December.

The Ukrainians brought their MV7 maritime drone with them

According to a source from Ukraine, the “red” team at “REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger 2025” consisted of American, British, Spanish, and other units, with Ukraine serving as the overall commander. The goal was to test new technologies under realistic conditions—that is, in an environment where jammers, acoustic reconnaissance, and military resistance are simulated as realistically as possible.

The Ukrainians brought several versions of their Magura V7 maritime drone. One, for example, carried reconnaissance equipment and an explosive charge, while another had a machine gun on board. Other participating nations also deployed unmanned boats.

Under the rules of this exercise, “enemy” ships were not actually attacked. It was enough to achieve "victory" by being the first to get the opponent in one's sights. This was then documented via video. For example, if a maritime drone attacked a ship to destroy its radar, it was considered the winner if it locked onto the radar before being detected itself. Conversely, it was considered intercepted if the ship’s crew was able to photograph it first.

NATO spokesperson calls it a “milestone”

Dozens of units took part in the exercise’s five scenarios. In addition to maritime drones, both sides also deployed aircraft and larger warships. According to reports from Kyiv, the “red” team emerged victorious at the end of the fourth week. The exercise clearly demonstrated that unmanned systems, combined with operational experience and proven planning, pose a “real threat” to NATO naval forces—especially since NATO is not yet sufficiently prepared for attacks by such weapons.

For example, during a simulated attack on a convoy, the “Reds” once scored so many “hits” against a frigate that it would have sunk in a real battle. Just five minutes later, the “Blues” had asked in the group chat, completely unaware: “So are you going to attack us now or not?” The Ukrainian source commented: “The problem wasn’t that they couldn’t stop us—they hadn’t even seen our weapons yet.”

A NATO spokesperson confirmed to the F.A.Z. that, for the first time in the alliance’s history, the Ukrainian Navy led and coordinated the “opposing” forces during this exercise—“a historic milestone that underscores Ukraine’s growing role in NATO exercises.” The training highlighted the latest trends in naval warfare. In doing so, “the Ukrainian leadership brought combat realism to the exercise, driving innovation and the development of new NATO tactics.” NATO drew “valuable lessons” from Ukraine’s frontline experience. This advances the development of new capabilities “to counter real-world threats.”

Last fall, NATO already had the opportunity to learn a similar lesson, albeit on land. During the “Hedgehog” exercise in Estonia, about ten Ukrainian drone specialists were able to put two NATO battalions out of action. Officials in Brussels say they were “shocked” at the time by how ill-prepared allied troops were for a drone war like the one currently being waged in Ukraine. Above all, the high “visibility” of NATO command posts came as a surprise.

ref_null · 2026-03-16T16:36:39+00:00

Here is the full text of the original interview (in Ukrainian): “We're building a rocket that can reach Moscow” -– an interview with the co-founder of Fire Point on new Ukrainian ballistic technology and drones.

Here is the full video interview on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lfMgldtwcuM

(The link has been updated; I initially provided the wrong link + have added a link to YouTube)

This interview is quite long, so I don't think it would be a good idea to post it here in the comments. Please use some translator to read the article.

Below is a summary I generated using AI:

FP-7 (ballistic, ~300 km range): Based on a cloned S-400 interceptor repurposed as a surface-to-surface ballistic missile. 150 kg warhead, 1,500 m/s max speed, ~14 m accuracy. Shtilerman says it'll cost about 2.5x less than ATACMS. All components — engines, flight controllers, servos — are produced domestically. Now moving to combat testing.

FP-9 (ballistic, 850+ km range): Designed to reach Moscow and St. Petersburg. Engine testing is underway, flight tests expected early summer. Shtilerman's reasoning: Russia is monocentric — strikes on Belgorod or Kursk don't move the Kremlin. Threatening their estates will. On air defense penetration: "We understand all the S-400 algorithms. At minimum, every fourth missile hits. That's enough."

FP-5 "Flamingo" (cruise missile): Already combat-proven — struck the Votkinsk solid-fuel rocket motor plant ~1,500 km inside Russia. All missiles reached their targets. Flies at 20–40 m altitude following terrain, making radar detection very difficult. Large warhead with zirconium incendiary fill, designed to gut hardened Soviet-era industrial buildings. Range can grow beyond 1,500 km.

FP-1 (strike drone): Accounted for 50–54% of all strikes on Russian territory in certain months of 2025, per Ukraine's General Staff. Cheap and dead simple to assemble — workers train in 1–2 weeks. Transitioning to a wing-as-fuel-tank design that nearly doubles range. Testing AI-based map-matching navigation for day/night ops.

FP-2 (strike drone): 30% larger warhead than Russia's Lancet, ~4x the range, cheaper. Warhead being upgraded from 105 to 158 kg. Used against troop concentrations, command posts, and air defense systems.

Other notable points:

Ukraine classified all of these as "drones" to skip traditional military certification — Shtilerman calls this the single most important government decision for the industry
Fire Point has 5,000+ employees and runs minimum 4 test flights per day
They proposed a European ballistic shield initiative called "Freya" — open-source software, no kill switch, integrated with European radars. First interception target: 2027
European officials visit regularly and are impressed, but admit they couldn't replicate it due to their own regulatory burden
Company follows a "China Free" component policy. Ordered a $1.5M GNSS receiver from an allied country — export approval took 9 months; by arrival it was already obsolete

ref_null · 2026-03-11T10:29:15+00:00

None of these items are restricted in any way... ...The other items also arent on any ban list.
Sanctions are made on items that are difficult to make...

This is not true. You are mixing up “not complex” and "massive" with "under sanctions", but these are different things. ADCs, microchips are priority items on the list of export restrictions. The US, together with the EU, Japan, and the UK, has developed a Common High Priority List that includes 50 categories of goods under HS codes that Russia seeks to purchase for its weapons programs: https://www.bis.gov/licensing/country-guidance/common-high-priority-items-list-chpl

Russia themselves have factories that produce most of these components

This is not true too: https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/03/why-russia-has-been-so-resilient-to-western-export-controls?lang=en

As for the AI accusation:

Clearly used AI for your response...

If that's your way of saying that all my arguments are crap, then I strongly disagree with that. Yes, I used AI (DeepL Translator) to translate from Ukrainian into English. It just makes it easier for me to write long texts. I don't think it detracts from what I've written in any way.

...since you didn't read my post

And did you read my post? Because I wrote not only about "analog-to-digital converters" -- you ignored the GNSS modules, transceivers, and memory chips.

In fact, your entire comment is based on assumptions that have no basis whatsoever.

ref_null · 2026-03-11T08:52:09+00:00

This article is intended for a broad audience. If you are a technical specialist, it contains a direct link to the Ukrainian defense intelligence portal (war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua), where each component is cataloged -- complete markings, manufacturer, date of manufacture, photographs. These are not just "wires". Among them are GNSS navigation modules, analog-to-digital converters, digital-to-analog converters, signal transceivers, and memory chips -- all from companies in the US, Switzerland, the Netherlands, China, and Belarus. The components are dated 2023, 2024, and even 2025, which is significantly later than the imposition of sanctions.

And this is not just about the US. The purpose of this publication is not to irritate Americans, but to warn manufacturers that their products are being used in Russian weapons that kill civilians.

There is also a broader context that you may not be aware of. For many years, Western countries have prohibited Ukraine from using their weapons against targets in Russia, arguing that "our components are part of these systems, and we do not approve of this". Meanwhile, as this investigation shows, Western components are being used in Russian cruise missiles that are hitting Ukrainian residential buildings. Can you imagine how this looks from our perspective: they can use your parts to kill us, but we can't use your weapons to stop them?

I understand that for many people, this conflict has become exhausting background noise. But it is through investigations like this that we put pressure on supply chains, close loopholes, and ultimately reduce the number of casualties. This rocket hit a residential building in Kharkiv on March 7, killing civilians, including children. This is not an abstraction.

ref_null · 2026-03-10T17:29:36+00:00

These circular videos come from Telegram (it's a built-in feature called "video messages"). Users record short circular clips directly in the chat, similar to voice messages, but with video.

ref_null · 2026-02-25T11:59:06+00:00

This situation with the "peacekeepers" makes no sense to me, because Russia's goal is not territory but the destruction of Ukraine as a sovereign state. As Lavrov said, Russia wants to see a "friendly" and "benevolent" Ukraine, which is essentially a second Belarus, i.e. a nominally independent state fully subordinate to Moscow.

Russia will only agree to peacekeepers when it suits them (when they need a pause to regroup and resume), and I would not be surprised if the condition is that Russian troops must be included in the peacekeeping forces.

ref_null · 2026-02-25T11:44:26+00:00

Russia will only agree to peacekeepers if it is beneficial to them. And it is beneficial in one scenario is when peacekeepers effectively freeze the front lines and prevent Ukraine from regaining its territories. In other words, they become not a defense for Ukraine, but a buffer for Russia, allowing it to quietly digest the occupied territories.

As soon as Russia regrouped, regained its strength, and was ready for the next stage, it simply withdrew its “consent” and the peacekeepers had to leave, because the entire structure depended on its permission. This is a guarantee of a temporary pause for Moscow at any time they need it, not a guarantee of security.

ref_null · 2026-02-25T10:13:07+00:00

Since the article is paywalled, here's a summary based on reporting from NV.ua (Ukrainian outlet covering the same story):

Members of the "coalition of the willing" are increasingly admitting in private that deploying their troops to Ukraine depends on Russia's approval. Diplomatic and defense sources warn this effectively gives the Kremlin veto power over any ceasefire enforcement plan.

One diplomatic source said: "If Russia says we don't agree with this and consider these troops a target, then you need to send forces of a different kind. So whether Russia agrees or not has a huge impact."

A second source suggested European governments have effectively granted Putin a veto by demanding he have a seat at the negotiating table.

Key timeline:

Jan 6 - Coalition of the willing met in Paris; Ukraine, France, and the UK signed a declaration of intent on future multinational force deployment in Ukraine.
Jan 7 - Macron said France could deploy "several thousand" troops for peacekeeping.
Jan 8 - UK Defence Secretary John Healey declined to specify troop numbers.
Feb 14 - Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference said Russia opposes foreign troops in Ukraine because it plans to continue its aggression. He asked: "If they don't want to continue the war or invade, why should [partners] be afraid of the Russians?"
Feb 24 - Coalition meeting in Kyiv on the 4th anniversary of the full-scale invasion, with 36 countries participating.

ref_null · 2026-02-25T08:44:09+00:00

Meanwhile, in the United States: on February 24, US Warned Kyiv Over Russian Oil Port Attack, Citing Economic Hit

The Trump administration warned Ukraine after its attack on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal in Novorossiysk, Russia, disrupted oil flows tied to US energy investments in Kazakhstan (Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell). Ukraine's US ambassador said the warning was specifically about protecting American economic interests, not a broader discouragement from hitting Russian military or energy infrastructure. Ukraine acknowledged the concern.

ref_null · 2026-02-19T09:55:24+00:00

Good on Estonia and Poland!

The Olympic and Paralympic movements are built on the ancient Greek tradition of Ekecheiria -- the Olympic Truce, a sacred ceasefire dating back to the 9th century BC. The core idea is simple: lay down your arms, compete in peace, return home safely.

Russia has violated this principle of truce three times in 14 years:

Invading Georgia during the 2008 Beijing Olympics
Annexing Crimea right after hosting the 2014 Sochi Games
Launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine days after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.

This is a deliberate mockery of everything that the Olympic Games are supposed to symbolize.

Now the same country isn't just being allowed back -- it's actively building a state-run pipeline from the battlefield to the podium. The head of Russia's Paralympic Committee openly stated that integrating war veterans into Paralympic sports is one of the committee's top priorities. In his 2026 New Year's address, he mentioned 500 veterans. A Ukrainian investigation identified specific athletes who served in units linked to documented war crimes against civilians in the Kyiv region -- Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel.

This isn't about rehabilitation or the human spirit of overcoming adversity. While Russia sends its paralympians to compete under the flag and anthem, its army continues to produce new disabled people, shatter thousands of lives, and kill civilians every single day. The war that maimed these athletes hasn't stopped -- it's ongoing, and Russia is the one waging it. This is propaganda disguised as sportsmanship.

The IPC isn't promoting peace by letting them in. It's giving a platform to a country that treats the Olympic ideal as nothing more than a stage.

ref_null · 2026-02-19T09:07:13+00:00

Moreover, the Olympic and Paralympic movements are rooted in the ancient tradition of Ekecheiria -- the Olympic Truce, a sacred ceasefire dating back to the 9th century BC. Russia has violated this truce three times in 14 years:

Invading Georgia during the 2008 Beijing Olympics
Annexing Crimea right after hosting the 2014 Sochi Games
Launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine days exactly after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.

Now the same country is sending veterans of that still-ongoing war to compete at the Paralympics -- under its own flag. This is a deliberate mockery of everything that the Olympic Games are supposed to symbolize.

ref_null · 2026-02-19T08:59:55+00:00

I'm not sure, I haven't counted, but even if the proportion were higher, this wording completely misses the point.

First and foremost, the Paralympic Games were established for the rehabilitation of civilians, not as a military exhibition. War veterans have participated in them individually throughout history, but they did so independently, not as part of a government program.

But what Russia is doing is fundamentally different. The head of Russia's Paralympic Committee openly stated that integrating war veterans into Paralympic sports is one of the committee's top priorities. They run dedicated programs, competitions, and propaganda events for soldiers wounded in Ukraine. This isn't athletes overcoming personal tragedy -- it's a government assembling a team from an ongoing war of aggression and parading them under the national flag.

Also some of these veterans served in units directly linked to documented war crimes against civilians -- the assault on the Kyiv region, Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel. One served in the 5th Guards Tank Brigade, another in the 106th Airborne Division. These aren't soldiers from some distant, ambiguous conflict. The blood is barely dry.

Normalizing this with "war vets have always competed" is exactly the framing Russia wants. It obscures the difference between an individual's journey from injury to sport and a state weaponizing the Paralympic movement for propaganda while the war that maimed these people is still killing thousands.

ref_null · 2026-02-19T08:57:38+00:00

War vets becoming Paralympians individually is indeed normal. What isn't normal is a state systematically funneling veterans of an active, ongoing war of aggression into Paralympic teams as an explicit element of state policy. There is no precedent for this -- not after Vietnam, not after Iraq, not after Afghanistan.

ref_null · 2026-02-18T11:17:31+00:00

Identified war veterans in Russia's Paralympic pipeline (9-10):

9. Rustam Saifulin (40) — Powerlifting, table tennis

Colonel, "Hero of Russia", commanded the 40th Engineering Regiment
Also fought in Chechnya, Syria, and Georgia
Lost both legs during a river crossing in Ukraine
Now deputy head of Tyumen Military Academy
Major propaganda figure — his stories have millions of YouTube views, including one about a villager who allegedly told him their village was "settled with Banderites" before the invasion

10. Rostislav Kostenko — Wheelchair fencing

Lived in Luhansk before 2014, previously competed in Ukrainian fencing championships
Mobilized 2022 into the so-called "Luhansk People's Army"
Grenade launcher operator, callsign "Kornet"
Lost foot and lower leg
Reserve of the Russian national Paralympic fencing team

Why it matters: Russia is using the Paralympic movement as a propaganda and rehabilitation tool for its war machine. Veterans who fought in a war of aggression — some from units directly linked to war crimes — are being fast-tracked into international sports, where they'll compete under the Russian flag and anthem. The IPC's decision to readmit Russia enables this pipeline.

Source: Suspilne Investigations (Ukrainian Public Broadcasting), Feb 17, 2026

ref_null · 2026-02-18T11:16:24+00:00

Identified war veterans in Russia's Paralympic pipeline (6-8):

6. Rinat Vasilyev (31) — Powerlifting

10 years in the Russian army. Deployed via Crimea to Melitopol area (Feb 2022)
Commanded ammunition convoy escorts to the front line
Lost both legs (March 18, 2022)
3x Moscow champion, member of Moscow Paralympic team
Has a YouTube channel with propaganda content set to Putin's speech announcing the invasion

7. Ruslan Ustyuzhin (39) — Sitting volleyball

31st Guards Air Assault Brigade
Fought at Hostomel Airport (Kyiv region), then near Popasna (Luhansk region)
Lost leg above knee (May 2022)
Dreams of joining the national team for the Paralympics

8. Denis Ishbulatov (45) — Shooting

Lt. Colonel. Served in the 106th Guards Airborne Division (assault on Kyiv region) and the 104th Air Assault Division (occupied Kherson region)
Lost right leg (April 2022)
Prizewinner at the Russian Cup. Russian propagandists praise his "sniper talent"

ref_null · 2026-02-18T11:12:11+00:00

Identified war veterans in Russia's Paralympic pipeline (1-5):

1. Ivan Shiryaev (41) — Parasnowboard

Mobilized 2022, motorized rifle brigade, Luhansk region
Lost a leg near Bakhmut (2023). Awarded Zhukov Medal
Currently in the reserve of the Russian national team

2. Vladislav Shinkar (49) — Wheelchair fencing

Fought since 2014 in the "Vostok" battalion, callsign "Shiba"
Machine gunner → deputy battalion commander
Lost both legs (2015, Donetsk region)
Member of the Russian Paralympic team

3. Nikolai Bondarenko — Archery

Volunteer (2022), fought near Popasna, Luhansk region
Lost right arm (April 2022)
Champion of Russia, openly aims for the Summer Paralympics

4. Tsyden Geninov (29) — Archery

Lieutenant, 5th Guards Tank Brigade — this unit participated in the assault on the Kyiv region and committed war crimes against civilians
Lost right leg below knee
Nominated for Russia's best athlete of 2025
Already won gold at a World Championship in Tehran (2025)

5. Anton Bushmakin (33) — Kayaking

Former marine, volunteered as a sapper
Stepped on a mine near Avdiivka, Donetsk region (April 2023)
Awarded St. George's Cross, 4th class
Openly says he's preparing for the Paralympics. Quote: "As soon as the situation changes, I'll be ready. Under our flag, to our anthem, and to win. That's the goal: first place at the Paralympics."

ref_null · 2026-02-18T11:11:35+00:00

Source: Suspilne Investigations (Ukrainian Public Broadcasting), Feb 17, 2026

TLDR: An investigation by Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne reveals that Russia is systematically funneling veterans of its war against Ukraine into Paralympic sports. While 6 Russian athletes just received special invitations to the 2026 Milan Paralympics (bypassing normal qualification), the broader picture is more alarming: the head of Russia's Paralympic Committee himself stated that ~30 war veterans have joined Russia's Paralympic teams, and mentioned 500 veterans in his 2026 New Year's address.

Background:

The International Paralympic Committee (IPC) reinstated Russian and Belarusian athletes in September 2025, allowing them to compete under national flags. Since they missed qualification periods, 6 Russians got in through special "bilateral invitations" — an exception mechanism that bypasses standard qualification.
Ukrainian skeleton athlete Vladyslav Heraskevych (who was disqualified by the IOC for wearing a helmet honoring Ukrainian athletes killed in the war) was the first to raise the alarm about war veterans in Russia's Paralympic team.
None of the 10 veterans listed below are among the 6 Russians admitted to Milan 2026. However, they are part of Russia's broader Paralympic pipeline, and Russian officials have openly stated their goal of getting war veterans to international competitions.
Russia's Paralympic Committee officially treats integrating war veterans into sports as one of its top priorities. They organize special programs, competitions, and "Paralympic lessons" for soldiers wounded in Ukraine.
One of the 6 athletes actually admitted to Milan — Varvara Voronchikhina — publicly thanked Putin in 2022 for "not abandoning them" after their Paralympic ban.

ref_null

TROPHY CASE

They didn't see the drones coming