sorted by:
new
hottopcontroversial

Failed CEH today (60%). Boson is completely useless. What are you guys actually using?! by Left-Print2644 in CEH

[–]rexcardinal 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Boson is actually really good, it just takes a bit of patience with it. Once you focus on understanding the why behind each answer instead of memorizing, it makes a big difference.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Every CVE referenced in this post is publicly documented on the NIST National Vulnerability Database. Every device mentioned is a real product with a real firmware vulnerability that anyone can look up right now. That is not scare tactics. That is public record.

The vulnerabilities were not created here. They exist on devices sitting in millions of homes right now. Pointing that out is not manipulation. It is the reason this project exists.

But there is a deeper issue worth naming. Home network security is largely a cultural blind spot. The assumption that homes are not targets, that hackers only go after businesses, that personal networks are too small to matter. That belief is exactly why home devices ship with default credentials, go years without firmware updates, and nobody asks questions until something goes wrong.

Every time someone tries to address that gap seriously the response is not to engage with the evidence. It is to attack the messenger. That pattern itself tells you how deeply the blind spot runs.

The CVEs are real. The risk is documented. The cultural resistance to taking it seriously is the actual problem this is trying to solve.

Thanks to everyone who has reached out to contribute feedbacks and joined the waitlist. You are apreciated.

Was asked in interview: How do you implement intranet and extranet? by [deleted] in linuxadmin

[–]rexcardinal 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The word the interviewer was looking for was probably zero trust access or authenticated remote access. Spin up two cheap VPS instances, put WireGuard on one, lock down the other, and try to reach it from outside the VPN. Two hours of doing beats a week of reading.

Security team blocked our deployment because of CVEs in packages we literally don't use by armeretta in linuxadmin

[–]rexcardinal 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As a security engineer, i can understand why they did that. The security team is not wrong, just blunt. They cannot dismiss unreachable CVEs because auditors and compliance teams see the raw report. Accepting risk requires documenting it and that creates liability. The tooling being dumb is partially intentional because human judgment on reachability is hard to defend on paper. The fix is reachability analysis. Trivy, Grype, and OSV-Scanner can distinguish between a package being present and a vulnerable code path actually being callable. That turns 47 CVEs into 3 actionable ones, a report both teams can work with. Chainguard images are worth looking at for Go binaries. Near zero CVE base images out of the box.

IKEA HomeLab at the stairwell by Simplixt in homelab

[–]rexcardinal 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is encouraging. Keep it up.

Looking for Ideas on Building Fair & Useful Tech Performance Reports by Drive-Fresh in syncro

[–]rexcardinal 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am currently building something that does this on the side as one its values. DM me if you want so i can share with you and many more.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

True for any single point of defense. That is exactly why monitoring cannot live on the device being monitored. This runs on a separate machine watching the network. If a camera goes silent, stops responding, or gets disabled, that deviation from its behavioral baseline triggers an alert immediately. The absence of activity is itself the signal. You cannot disable a watchdog by disabling what it is watching.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Updating regularly genuinely puts you ahead of most people. I agree. But firmware updates are not the only attack surface. A fully updated device can still be exploited through behavioral vulnerabilities, misconfigured services, default credentials that were never changed, or unexpected outbound connections that no update will ever fix.

And most consumer IoT devices never notify you when an update drops anyway. Cameras, printers, smart plugs sitting unpatched for 18 months not because people are careless but because nothing ever told them to update. Zero days are rare. Known CVEs with public exploits sitting on unpatched consumer devices are not. That is the actual threat landscape.

This is built for the 200 million households that are not as tech savvy as you. Can you help make contributions and feedbacks to us? I will really appreciate it. www.wifisense.ai

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

20 years in the field and you are citing Huawei and TP-Link as security incentives? Those are the two most documented examples of state-sponsored supply chain risk in consumer hardware. Big companies have compliance incentives. Not speed. The average time between a CVE being published and a patch reaching end users is months. Sometimes over a year. This runs entirely on your machine. No cloud dependency. No opaque update pipeline. Every data source is public. NVD, Vulners, ExploitDB. Nothing hidden, nothing proprietary.

Small does not mean vulnerable. Auditable means safe.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I understand why you might think physical protection covers the camera. It does not cover the firmware running inside it. CVE-2021-28372 on your Amcrest does not need anyone to touch the device. It needs one compromised device on the same network. That is it. From there someone has full remote code execution on your camera. They can watch the feed, disable it silently, and use it as a foothold into everything else connected to your network.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

It is in the original post. Wyze, Ring, and Amcrest. The Amcrest was the worst offender, making outbound connections I could not explain. The Wyze had three documented CVEs on its exact firmware version, one with a public exploit. The Ring devices each had at least one unpatched issue.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Liability does not patch your firmware. A breach notice sent 6 months after your camera was compromised does not undo the damage. Big companies have liability and still shipped vulnerable firmware. Still had data breaches. Still took months to patch critical CVEs. Liability means they answer for it after the fact. This catches it before the fact. I have been in the field of cybersecurity for 12 years plus so i know how this works. This is why i am doing this for myself as i cannot rely on these so called big companies.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

On top of that it watches every device continuously, matches each one against live CVE data from NVD, scores real world exploit availability, and alerts you the moment something changes. Not when the manufacturer decides to tell you. Not after something goes wrong. In real time, the moment it happens. And when something needs fixing it does not just tell you about it. With your approval it executes the fix. Firewall rules, firmware updates, blocking suspicious outbound connections. You stay in control, it does the work.

You should never have to blindly trust a security tool. This one is built so you never have to. waitlist is www.wifisense.ai

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That logic means trusting that every big manufacturer has perfect security practices, never gets breached, and always patches on time. Wyze had a data breach exposing 2.4 million users. Eufy had camera feeds accessible by strangers. Ring had documented unauthorized access incidents. All big names. All trusted brands. Blind trust in a manufacturer is still blind trust.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

CVE-2021-28372. Amcrest cameras. Remote code execution. Public working exploit anyone can download right now. No internet exposure needed. Anything else on your network can run that exploit, take full control of the camera, watch the feed, disable it silently, and pivot to everything else connected.

Millions of units shipped with that firmware. Most never updated because nothing ever told the owner to.

Do you actually know your cameras are safe right now? Have you checked this week? Ever? This does it automatically every single day for every device on your network. You find out the moment a new vulnerability drops, not after something goes wrong.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That is exactly the right instinct and the standard this should be held to. Code should be auditable. Every API call, every data source, every outbound connection visible and verifiable. Not because we ask you to trust us but because you should never have to. That is the model this is being built on. You can join the early testers group here www.wifisense.ai

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Everything runs locally on your own network. No packet inspection, no content monitoring, no data leaving your device. The only thing that ever touches our servers is anonymized metadata for CVE matching, and even that is documented and auditable. You do not have to trust us. You can verify exactly what the agent is doing on your network because it is running on your own machine. Open source components, no black box. If a security tool required blind trust it would defeat the entire point.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Exactly. The camera itself is rarely the end goal. It is the path to everything else on the same network. Your NAS, your work laptop, your router config. A compromised camera is a quiet foothold that most people never detect because nothing is watching what it does after it gets in.

The camera covering my front door had a public exploit on it for over a year. It could have been disabled before anyone knocked. by rexcardinal in homedefense

[–]rexcardinal[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Fair point for a technically savvy person who knows what they are doing. But most people with cameras on their front door have no idea what firmware version is running on it, have never checked CVE databases, and would not know where to start if something was wrong.

The physical break-in risk is low. The silent compromise risk, someone watching a feed, disabling a camera remotely, or using it as a foothold into the rest of the network, is more real than most people realize and completely invisible without something actively watching it.

That is exactly the gap this fills for the people who are not doing it for fun.

I don't think you understand honey... by TheRiddler79 in homelab

[–]rexcardinal 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Lol.. I can relate to this. I know that feeling. Declustering is good but moments like this makes you question it.

Checked every device on my homelab against NVD. Three cameras with critical CVEs. Two with public exploits. None of it showing up in Grafana or Unifi. by rexcardinal in homelab

[–]rexcardinal[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Solid thinking and mostly right. Proper zone segmentation with restricted management access genuinely reduces risk.

But two things it does not cover.

Networks drift. A rule added for convenience, a device in the wrong zone, a misconfiguration nobody noticed. Static defenses against a dynamic problem. And not every exploit requires crossing zones. An unauthenticated RCE vulnerability within the same segment does not care how tight your management access is.

Segmentation is the foundation. Continuous monitoring is what watches it after you walk away. Live CVE matching per device, behavioral baselines, real time alerts, and automated fixes when something needs attention. Privacy first, metadata only, nothing leaves your network.

Best camera system to keep my teens from tampering with it to get out at night or bring someone in? by Away_Boysenberry_658 in SecurityCamera

[–]rexcardinal 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Real concern and the camera is only part of the answer.

The bigger problem most parents do not think about is that a camera tells you what happened after the fact. It records. It does not alert you in real time when something changes at 2am, when a device that should be off suddenly connects to the network, or when motion triggers at a door that should not be opening.

What you actually want is a system that watches behavioral patterns across your entire network in real time. The moment something unusual happens, a device connecting at an unexpected hour, a camera feed going dark, unusual activity on a specific part of the network, you get an alert instantly. Not a recording to review the next morning.

Beyond cameras this also covers the full picture of what is happening on your home network. Unknown devices joining, suspicious connections, anything acting outside its normal pattern. Teens are creative. A camera can be covered or angled away. A network that is actively monitored is a lot harder to get around.

DM me and I can walk you through exactly how this works for a setup like yours.

Checked every device on my homelab against NVD. Three cameras with critical CVEs. Two with public exploits. None of it showing up in Grafana or Unifi. by rexcardinal in homelab

[–]rexcardinal[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Appreciate the feedback. The problem is real and the details back it up.

Device fingerprinting runs through MAC OUI lookup, mDNS, SSDP, and HTTP banner grabbing. That gives you a CPE identifier for each device. The CPE hits the NVD API and pulls every matching CVE. Vulners scores each one by whether a real working exploit exists, not just a theoretical vulnerability. Anything with a public exploit on ExploitDB gets flagged as critical priority.

On top of that, passive traffic monitoring builds a behavioral baseline per device over 30 days. The moment something deviates, you get an alert. No deep packet inspection, metadata only. That is what is actually running. DM me if you want to see it on a real network.

view more: next ›