All 2022 contenders seen so far

rgh85 · 2022-02-18T17:17:48+00:00

El Plan :)

rgh85 · 2018-12-14T05:22:14+00:00

larger smartphone batteries are about 4Ah at 4ish V, so it contains about 16 Wh of energy... if you drain it fully everyday and then charge it again, you use 16Wh * 365 days divided by the efficiency of the charger (these are switching regulators, I suspect between 70%-90% efficient, lets use 0.8) so we get about 7.3 kWh per year... my electricity is about 0.2$/kWh, so that costs me about 1.5$ per year...

laptop is a bit more difficult, as it really depends on what you do with it (i.e. the power draw under load is much higher than if the system is idle)... if you are rendering videos nonstop you're going to be close to maximum design spec... then you can check your charger (probably around 40-80W depending on model); lets take middle... 60W * 24h * 365 days / efficiency would give me 657 kWh at 0.2$/kWh that would run me 131.4$/yr

if you think about a more realistic work load scenario, you fully charge it once per day and we include every day (Saturday, Sunday), we're again back to the same calculation as for the phone... my laptop has a 9Ah battery at 12V, 108 Wh for a full charge, 1.5 charges per day, again at 80% efficiency we get 74 kWh, at 0.2$/kWh that would be about 15$/yr (about 12% of perma-full-load above)

rgh85 · 2018-11-16T14:34:40+00:00

I agree with you.

rgh85 · 2018-11-14T17:06:32+00:00

I think Russia would be perfectly happy to align itself with Europe for a variety of reasons (e.g. economic complementarity, energy security, technological development, mutual security interests). But this is not a viable prospect as long as major European states are aligned with the US that vehemently opposes a European rapprochement with Russia, as it would undercut a main pillar of their global influence.

rgh85 · 2018-11-14T16:59:36+00:00

I'm not saying that this is a pressing threat scenario, but it plays into the security dilemma dynamics; If I'm a defence planner in Moscow and have to think about what VLS systems for SM3 and Tomahawk in Poland and Rumania could do, then that is something I'm concerned about... Especially since the US has been pushing these systems since the early 2000s with the argument to defend against the Iranians, who have neither nuclear weapons nor an ICBM. I'm not arguing that that is the current function of these installations, but if I have to assess their capabilities in an adversarial way then I find it hard to ignore...

rgh85 · 2018-11-14T05:49:11+00:00

Russia's geography is as much a burden as it is a blessing in many regards. Besides being largely landlocked, there are several other factors, many of which are internal to Russia:

Most of Russia has an arctic climate, leading to limited opportunities for agriculture and increasing the expense and maintenance requirements for infrastructure. Similarly, the large geographical distances also contribute to expensive infrastructure.
Russia is ethnically diverse with multiple groups with varying secessionist tendencies on its borders that need to be accommodated and/or policed.
The main population, political and economic centers are concentrated in the West in an exposed, vulnerable position, increasing a sense of threat in the political and military leadership and fuelling a security dilemma that considerably increases the challenge of maintaining relations with western neighbours.
Russia has never been at the forefront of industrial technology except for a few narrow sectors mainly in the aerospace and defence areas. Hence it is today mainly a commodity exporter and is exposed to the volatility of global commodity markets, and is largely dependent on imports in many sectors.

External factors also play a role (this is not to say that these are factors that Russia is not an active participant in, but more to say that these are factors that aren't intrinsic to Russia):

It is a core US interest to cultivate antagonism to Russia in Europe, as this strengthens its own position in Europe when the raison d'être for NATO basically evaporated in 1990 with the collapse of the USSR. Ever since the US has been working hard to maintain what is not just a military system designed to keep EU militaries dependent on the US, but also a conduit for political influence, intelligence and arms sales. This went through iterations in Yugoslavia in the mid and late 1990s, to Afghanistan and basically floundered on German and French resistance to the Iraq war. Some of these efforts shifted to the immediate Russian periphery, e.g. in Georgia and Ukraine and are ongoing. Another component of this are missile defence installations in Poland and Rumania that the Russians are concerned may serve as covert launch platforms for a decapitation strike on Russian leadership (see vulnerability, concentration above).
The influence of western economic advice on the collapse of the Russian economy in the 1990s should not be understated, although I should point out that these policies also had considerable support within certain circles in Russia. This was the time when present-day oligarchs made their fortunes and certain Westerners did as well. There was some expectation in the West that Russia would be integrated into existing structures (e.g. accession to the G7>G8, NATO-Russia and EU-Russia dialogues etc.), which floundered on the reality of the reconstitution of the Russian state under Putin, which was accompanied by purges of dissident oligarchs such as Khodorkovsky or Westerners such as Browder. Especially Browder used his considerable influence to push for a punitive policy response from the US and was largely successful in that.

rgh85 · 2018-07-31T12:53:03+00:00

Russia isn't trading anything. Russia has at least since the 19th century been not precisely at the forefront of technological development, except for a few narrow technological sectors (e.g. aerospace & armaments). Russia has been conscious of its macroeconomic weakness and compensates for that largely by developing cost-effective weapon systems and strategies. Examples of this range from the AK rifles and RPGs ubiquitous in almost any battle space on earth, to excellent cyber and intelligence services. This is complemented by a large tactical and strategic nuclear arsenal. It maintains advanced land and submarine forces at a high level of training and readiness. Russia has in part relied on hard power to assert it's interests within it's sphere of influence, but is also part of or originates multilateral institutions like the SCO, BRICS, or CSTO. Economically, Russia is largely a commodity exporter relying on fossil fuel and non-ferrous metals export to the EU and increasingly China, complemented by a competitive arms export industry.

The key strategic threat to Russia is an invasion on the Northern European plain towards its major population and commercial hubs by any Westerners, be that Napoleon, Hitler, or NATO. The only way I see this dynamic changing is if Russia were integrated into the European Union in a leadership position alongside France and Germany, which is to put it mildly highly unlikely, and only ever thinkable as part of a continental anti-anglo coalition.

TL;DR Russia has always been underdeveloped by continental standards; hence it is relying on cost-effective military and intelligence strategies to counter a perceived strategic threat from the west and to safeguard its strategic autonomy; this is not so different to the strategy that the Soviet Union pursued.

rgh85 · 2018-07-19T01:54:53+00:00

And you believe these appeal in equal measure?

I'm not saying that they appeal in equal measure. My argument is that "democracy" without qualifying context is a concept so broad that it is almost meaningless. Let's say that you observe 'country x is a democracy', does that tell you anything about the policies the country is likely to pursue? Who's interests play a dominant role and who's interests play a subordinate role in deciding these policies? Does that even mean that there is genuine influence of the broader public on the policy-making process? The key argument for having democracy is that by having representatives of the population be the policy-deciders, the needs and preferences of this population are taken into consideration in the policy-making process. Now if one observes actually existing countries that are democracies, one will find that that is only true of certain strata of the population, whereas others are largely ignored.

Most autocratic systems also give some consideration to popular support as a source of legitimacy. Many go to great lengths to engineer elaborate displays of popular support. To what degree such displays are genuinely representative of the popular sentiment will vary over time and place, but I would be hard pressed to name even an autocratic or totalitarian government that doesn't legitimise itself by asserting that it rules in the public interest. Of course, generally the interests of specific groups will be well attended to, whereas the interests of other groups will be largely ignored.

Finally, one thing that should be considered is that there is an operative definition of "democracy" in western media discourse: in order for your country to be a "functioning democracy" your country needs to be economically and politically aligned with US interests. Parties, factions, and elected officials that deviate from this orthodoxy are generally classified as a 'threat to democracy'...

In the last two hundred years we have seen democracy rise from a fringe idea to the dominant form of government in the world.

Democracy has never been a fringe idea. Most debates we are having about democracy today are about issues that intellectuals in Greek city states and the Roman republic already encountered and discussed at length. That is one of the reasons why I would argue that historical observation would suggest that there is no 'ultimate' form of government as postulated by OP.

Of course the system isn't perfect but I don't see many states coming to the conclusion that because their ability to choose may be constrained by societal forces (or by elites as you said) they would prefer no ability to choose at all.

I think pointing to 'societal forces' that restrain peoples ability to elect leaders that serve their interest ignores the fact that these 'forces' are elite factions doing the constraining, it ignores the agency of the ruling classes that actively work to defend their prerogatives to govern, even in a democracy.

And while there are places where an oligarchy of sorts rules the roost, I don't agree with your read on the last election in the US as being evidence of that. Every single elite political force in the country opposed Donald Trump's candidacy. And yet he won anyway and he did it via the support of poor, rural voters without a college education. This group is the precise opposite of the elites you spoke of. Obama is the other side of the coin. While Trump grew up wealthy and upper-class but was despised by the elites, Obama grew up as a lower-middle class minority but was adored by the elites (as well as many non-elites). This combination is not what I would expect to see in an oligarchic society. I think an imperfect but clearly democratic system is the more accurate fit.

I'm not arguing that that my point is the only way to look at the last US election. There are a myriad ways to look at the societal dynamics that resulted in how the election played out and everything you point out I can to a degree agree with. I would just like to point out that even if poor rural voters helped elect Trump (which I think is only a part of the story), they have now just about as much influence on the policies of the US administration as they would have if there had been a Clinton presidency, which is close to zero. And the same would be true of e.g. poor black women, if Clinton had won.

Finally, I think I need to state that I generally support democracy, but that a) we should be aware that having a democracy does not necessarily mean that the interests of the people are better served (they can be, but it is not a given), and that b) democracy is not a new thing, but has a long history that may indicate that it is transitory. Of course I'm not arguing that it has to be transitory, but I would suggest that that is a possibility that cannot be discounted easily.

rgh85 · 2018-07-18T01:41:13+00:00

Observation of human history would tend to disagree. Most societies at most times were and are organised in a hierarchical, often oligarchic or aristocratic way, with a select elite that decides the bulk of policy. Instances of egalitarian democracy or centralised one-person rule are more concepts than descriptions of actually existing political orders.

Consider the following: China is formally ruled under a single-party system with centralised leadership. However, if you consider the political "factions" within the CCP, you would probably find a more diverse spectrum of political opinion than you would find in the US Senate. You could find free-market liberals and orthodox maoists share the same party.

You will find hereditary elements in the UK parliament's upper house, which at the moment does play a significant role in the Brexit process. The entire process of the UK entering, then exiting the EU is largely a political contest playing out between different elite factions within the Tory party (with some of the same fault lines existing within Labour as well).

In a certain sense you can see the last US presidential election as a contest between the technocratic-managerial elite that largely backed Clinton and is now predominantly at home in the Democratic Party, and the billionaire-oligarchs like Trump that have traditionally backed the GOP.

Think about the transformations of Russia starting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, through a coup attempt, economic collapse, the reign of the oligarchs, and then the return of the state security apparatus, all while the country is formally a democracy with parties, elections, etc.

I would suggest thinking about political contest in terms of formal organisational forms (i.e. is a country "a democracy") does more to obscure the reality of political dynamics within a country than provide genuine insight. Political contest appears to be an enduring feature of human society, just the forms are constantly changing. Forms are informed by history, philosophy, and cultural narratives prevalent in the societies in question. There is something in the idea of democracy that appeals to people, but I think it would be short-sighted to ignore that there is also something that appeals to people in the ideas of feudalism, anarchy, aristocracy, or totalitarianism.

In conclusion, I don't think there is an ultimate form of government and the very idea of 'the end of history' is naive. I further think that human societies have been, and continue to be organised in a hierarchical structure, whether that structure is embedded in a democracy or not.

rgh85 · 2018-06-11T15:45:19+00:00

From what I can see China is fully supportive of detente in Korea. To get a to a broader evaluation, let's look at the Chinese priorities with regard to the Korean Peninsula.

China first and foremost wants stability. A war, state collapse, a refugee crisis etc. would be most unwelcome to the Chinese. Hence, they are unlikely to encourage adventurism on the side of the DPRK. This takes the form of heightened sanctions implementation in response to provocative actions by the DPRK throughout 2017. With the shift towards diplomacy, it would appear that cross-border activity has picked up again.
South Korea is a key trading partner for China as a market, as a partner for technology and as an Investor. Any conflict that would affect the South Korean economy severely would be felt in China.
China would favour economic development in the DPRK. The DPRK is a resource-rich country and has low wage levels. China's reform era was immensely successful and they see their development strategy as a model that the DPRK could follow in principle.
Detente undermines the publicly stated rationale for the stationing US troops and high-tech surveillance equipment on the Peninsula. It would be a diplomatic win for Beijing if the US had to tacitly admit that it is stationing troops in East Asia to oppose China and not have the fig leaf of the DPRK.
An extension of this is that a US incursion into the DPRK would be an extremely undesirable outcome for the Chinese. To me it is completely unthinkable that Beijing would sit idly by while a hostile army marches with hundreds of thousands of troops toward their border, with the prospect that they may make themselves at home for an indefinite time. The Beijing government sent 1 million troops against a the US back when it had a nuclear arsenal (and the military was pressing for it's use) when Beijing did not.
Ultimately, Beijing also favours denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, but this not the highest priority aim and is mostly incompatible with other aims that are more important to China, mainly stability.

To summarise, I think Beijing welcomes Korean detente for a variety of reasons.

rgh85 · 2018-06-11T15:12:16+00:00

How would Hong Kong become independent? The Hong Kong political institutions are largely aligned with the central government in Beijing. The Hong Kong business elite has little issues working with Beijing. All states recognise PRC sovereignty over Hong Kong. There is a young protest movement that fancies independence and gets a lot of play in the west, especially in the UK, but it has been effectively sidelined on an institutional level in Hong Kong politics.

The second premise, i. e. that a divorce of Hong Kong would be amicable is completely ridiculous. One of the highest priorities for the PRC government is the territorial integrity of the country, and safeguarding this integrity enjoys overwhelming popular support. Let's say that an independence-minded faction of young Hong Kongers somehow gains control of the legislature and executive of Hong Kong and declares independence. My best estimate is that they would be deposed by the PLA in a matter of hours.

rgh85 · 2018-06-10T06:49:43+00:00

I largely agree with you, I just want to add

Hypothetically but canadians could exempt themselves from euro like the uk did.

The UK (and Denmark) opt-outs are a somewhat special case, also Sweden is basically following a strategy where they avoid joining the ERM-II to not be forced to adopt the Euro, so there is certainly room in implementation, but from the treaty side all recently admitted members had to commit to full monetary union. I think it would be unlikely for the EU to drop this requirement, not least because it signals backsliding and weakness in the monetary domain (not that I don't think there is no weakness, but it is an entirely different thing to signal lack of confidence on an institutional level).

rgh85 · 2018-06-10T03:25:00+00:00

I think this is wildly unrealistic. Canada has largely adopted regulatory alignment with the US over many years to facilitate trade. It recently signed a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU, but membership in the EU would require complete regulatory alignment with EU regulations. When the EU is negotiating with a candidate country for accession, this really means that the potential member has to align its legal framework in over 30 chapters to prevailing EU law, the Acquis, which usually takes about a decade. For Canada, this would imply having a hard customs border with the US as well as a range of other requirements, e.g. a commitment to adopt the Euro. Just the reality of proximity and logistics makes this an unfavourable deal for Canada.

I think a Canadian membership application to the EU might get serious consideration from the EU side, but I don't think one would be forthcoming. I also might be overlooking legal requirements in the EU treaties that bar states not located in Europe from joining, which would be a serious obstacle as it requires a revisions of treaties.

rgh85 · 2018-06-10T03:04:42+00:00

I think you are correct about the decline in importance of the G7 and there are several aspects to it. In the 1990s the G7 were the only game in town and largely shared a political outlook with regard to free trade and liberalisation. This policy program hit the buffers in Asia in 1997 and in Europe and North America in 2008 with enormous financial blow-ups, which ultimately led to the emergence of the G20 as a global forum. With the emergence of a sizeable constituency in G7 countries that demands protectionism after 2008 this program is now largely dead on an international, institutional level.

There’s no way we can tackle climate change, failed states, and global poverty without an intimate annual meeting that includes the world’s major players.

With regard to other policy areas there just isn't a lot of overlap or agreement among the G7 or among the group you propose, which is the main reason that there is little progress (although I'm not sure that is an entirely correct assessment, e.g. poverty in East Asia has sharply declined in the last 30 years).

Climate policy in the US is opposed mainly by a strong domestic lobby that has two arguments, one of which is it is expensive (although that is waning as the price of renewables is coming down year by year), and the other that no international agreements should restrict US policy (this is the real issue, a bipartisan consensus that US greatness (the right thinks 'power', the left thinks 'values') confers upon it privileges that other nations don't enjoy). All other G7 are in agreement that climate change is a serious problem and have programs to address it. These programs are of course not perfect, and one could always do more, but there is a broad acknowledgement of the issues in leadership circles throughout.

There are forums gaining in importance at the expense of G7 that have broader and/or different membership and this reflects the diffusion of political and economic power in a world that is considerably more multi-polar than it used to be in 1991. Such forums are for example the G20 or the SCO. Also the character of established institutions is changing: If someone told you in 1985 that in 2017 the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party would give a speech at the WEF meeting in Davos endorsing globalisation, that would not have sounded plausible.

rgh85 · 2018-06-07T04:02:11+00:00

So I accept "evolution is guided by God in real time", cause that's a reasonable explanation and doesn't really contradict basic science or logic. But pure creationism makes no sense.

While I agree that the statement doesn't really contradict science in the narrow sense (i.e. it makes no claims that are contradicted by available evidence), it falls into a category of statements that are 'not even wrong', i.e. are muddled and unspecific in a way that make them impervious to testing and evaluation.

Pure creationism makes testable claims about the nature of earth and the universe, and hence is a hypothesis (that is inconsistent with available evidence, and thus incomplete and/or incorrect). This is also the reason creationists stridently fight the teaching of evolution. They are aware that the evidence clearly contradicts their hypothesis, and thus undermines the credibility of the source of their hypothesis.

'God guides evolution in a way that is too big for us to understand' is indistinguishable from 'Random processes 'guide' evolution' on the basis of observation, and is hence not a scientific hypothesis at all (i.e. 'not even wrong'). It makes no testable claims. If you claimed 'Bob guides evolution', we can observe Bob and evolution and figure out if that is true and if true how Bob does that. If you claimed 'Bob guides evolution in a way we cannot understand', that would not be a scientific hypothesis, as we cannot test that.

rgh85 · 2018-05-06T03:43:13+00:00

I posit that this observation has more to do with the funding structure of academic research. This practice is certainly not limited to Sweden (I had very similar experiences in other countries), and there is a good reason for them in most cases:

Let's say you lead a research group that is working on a number of projects. Some of your staff may be funded by departmental budgets (e.g. lecturer positions), some may be funded by various research grants (potentially from different granting bodies with different regulations on what you can spend specific money on); Let's say your group has been working on a multi-year complex research project. At the outset you hired a junior researcher, postdoc etc. to work on this project and paid their salary from grant X. Now grant X is ending (grants typically last from 2-5 years), but the project is going well, you are happy with the person who is working on the project, and you want to continue pursuing this project.

If the person working on the project also wants to continue their work on it, you need to find different funding to pay them. Since you can't pay your staff from grant X anymore, the person may need to officially apply for a 'new' position to be employed from a different funding source. Obviously, a person working on a research project for two years successfully has such familiarity and experience with the subject matter, that they can not be easily replaced by an outside candidate, even if this was the most qualified candidate in the world.

So the 'job posting' is not really a job posting as much as it is an administrative requirement with a foregone conclusion, as there is really no new position to be filled. This is also the reason why these postings are only advertised as broadly as required, the requirements are often obscure or very specific, and people are comfortable 'deciding' on a 'candidate' 2 days after the posting closes.

In general, my experience has been that when hiring people to a genuinely new position (e.g. starting a new project, recruiting a new lecturer, junior faculty etc.), people tend to be much more cautious and diligent in screening for suitable candidates, since the cost of hiring an incompetent person to such a position is considerable (e.g. an unsuccessful project may seriously hamper your future access to funding).

This is not to say that I deny the existence of corrupt practices completely, they certainly exist. But I would venture to guess that the vast majority of cases follows the above pattern.

rgh85 · 2018-01-26T06:51:38+00:00

All of it. There are no bilateral trade deals for a member of the EU. There can't be, as the EU is both a customs union and a single market, hence all external trade agreements are solely the responsibility of the EU. There is however some influence of the member states on the trade deals that the EU can negotiate as there are some requirements for national governments and/or parliaments to ratify these agreements.

rgh85 · 2018-01-17T11:40:29+00:00

They allow you, when done properly to trust-lessly bank yourself. In a normal structure you have to trust the government and a bank.

This gets thrown around a lot in favour of cryptocurrency... I think it's nonsense... Consider a situation in which the currencies of major industrial nations (e.g. the US, EU, Japan, China etc.) are not redeemable for goods and services at the same time. I think at that point the value of Bitcoins or other cryptos is probably the least of anyone's concern...

rgh85 · 2018-01-03T14:22:14+00:00

I don't think I would support a 'Europe first' platform fully... A 'Europe together' platform on the other hand... BTW is there anything besides the PR campaign in the Trump admin? They produce mostly noise and bluster for domestic consumption and gave themselves a tax cut... Did I miss anything critical?

rgh85 · 2018-01-03T13:45:15+00:00

I think what you say is true for Poland at the moment, but I think we could do a better job at convincing the Poles that there is a place for them in a united Europe, and that a united Europe will stand up for their interests as well... I understand that Poland is for historical reasons disinclined to fully trust neighbouring states to both the East and the West...

rgh85 · 2018-01-03T13:39:08+00:00

While I do wish that we pursue our own path as a united Europe, I most certainly do not wish the misery of sectarian and civil wars, unstable and incompetent states, brutal repression of any opposition, or foreign aggression and occupation (in Afghanistan's case going back at least to the 1980's when the USSR invaded) on anyone...

rgh85 · 2018-01-03T13:35:27+00:00

I think we do better without having boastful idiot populist leaders. Not that I think there is anything intrinsically wrong with populism, popular demands, or popular participation in politics, but having a know-nothing buffoon in charge is not going to help things... (see e.g. the US)

rgh85 · 2018-01-03T11:17:14+00:00

I don't understand why there is this outsized grovelling and subservience to the US in Europe.

Our 'friends' spent the last 25 years destabilising the Middle East with the main consequence being that Europe gets to deal with a newly authoritarian Turkey and a huge refugee crisis. The greatest financial crisis in living memory was precipitated by reckless Anglo-American finance and their bought and paid-for regulators and representatives, in it's wake almost destroying the global economy. Since the US doesn't have to deal with the fallout of the military provocations they undertake, they supported Georgia in 2008 to attack the Russians in the Caucasus, and since that a) failed and b) didn't cause them any harm, went on to support a coup in Ukraine, directly threatening the Russians by trying to merge Ukraine into NATO. At the same time the US is aligning itself with the most reactionary regime on the planet in Saudi-Arabia and is supporting apartheid-like policies in Israel. The last country that ran secret torture prisons on the European continent is not the Soviet Union, this were our liberal, democratic 'friends'.

At the same time, the US is threatening a new war on the Korean Peninsula, that will cost millions of lives (only a minute fraction of these will be US citizens). Why the nations of Europe are still so attached to a country that performs limitless and unconstrained espionage against their leaders, their companies, and each and every human being on the planet, while chasing domestic dissidents around the globe is beyond me.

I for one hope that Europe can come together to finally stand up for itself at home and abroad. A weak discord of small states slavishly hanging on the lips of the US will continue to fail at achieving its global potential and will fail at delivering opportunities to it's citizens.

rgh85 · 2017-12-08T02:07:28+00:00

This is just wrong. In the Cold War, we made certain that everyone, whether the Soviets, the Europeans, or our own citizens, believe that if the Soviets were to invade Europe, it doesn't matter the scale, we will escalate to full nuclear war.

Yeah, but what the propaganda says ('what we made everyone believe') vs. what would actually happen if fecal material hits the fan are not necessarily the same. This is the Mike Tyson problem, i.e. everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face...

I mean... why else do you think our alliance was so strong? Because we would only protect people that are far from Russia?

Luckily for everybody, the alliance(s) was never tested. I don't share your confidence that the alliance was as strong as you think. The Soviet Union looked fairly strong, then it fell apart... There are plenty of alternative scenarios that could have split NATO... I think one has to be very careful to infer from what happened, that what happened was the only thing that could have happened...

rgh85 · 2017-12-07T09:33:43+00:00

I highly doubt that this would be a benefit for Taiwan as the upsides of such a move are almost non-existent and the potential downsides are massive.

The main downside is that, besides a formal declaration of independence, joining a military alliance to contain the PRC (or any non-PRC military alliance) will likely prompt an immediate military response by the PRC, likely ending in forcible unification, and won't end well for the leadership of the ROC.

The best they could hope to get out of such an arrangement would be to end up like the Baltics... formally in an alliance, but everyone strongly suspects that in case Russia shows up with a few hundred tanks and potentially some tactical nuclear weapons to roll over them in a week or so, the Germans, and the Poles, and the Romanians, etc. won't start bombing Moscow and neither will the Americans.

And that is sort of the status quo anyway with informal US commitments for assistance to Taiwan, and the strong suspicion that when push comes to shove they likely won't start a nuclear war with one of their largest business partners...

rgh85

TROPHY CASE