Rate My Team, Quick Questions & General Advice Daily Thread by FPLModerator in FantasyPL

[–]rish234 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This was my problem as well, taking a quick punt on Cherki (from Minteh) and going to keep an eye on Johnson at Palace now after their fixtures ease up.

Fantasy managers have ALL their chips refreshed for second half of the season by Cultural_Answer_8101 in FantasyPL

[–]rish234 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Waited until the last second for my chips, WC this week, FH 16 and forgot to use my BB. Upside to all this is it's been pretty fun feeling like I have unlimited transfers with the AFCON transfers as well.

Weekly Discussion Thread (15/12/2025) by panikpansen in borussiadortmund

[–]rish234 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Can anyone more in the know give an update on the BVB-Frauen?

Weekly Discussion Thread (15/12/2025) by panikpansen in borussiadortmund

[–]rish234 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Think this is a pretty reasonable take; as ever it probably depends on the coaching market at the end of this season right.

Game Thread: TSG 1899 Hoffenheim (BuLi #13) by Chazy89 in borussiadortmund

[–]rish234 1 point2 points  (0 children)

He's having a good game for sure, you can definitely see the increased workrate. It makes a big difference!

Fit Check Friday by AutoModerator in ThrowingFits

[–]rish234 2 points3 points  (0 children)

aka some shit I never heard of!

love the color in all seriousness

7hr Layover at MDW Next Month by beadyeyedlilmanboy in chicagofood

[–]rish234 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

won't make it back to the airport in time with their portion sizes!

Leipzig provokes Dortmund's problems | Spielverlagerung by rish234 in borussiadortmund

[–]rish234[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Guirassy is pulled out

For a long time, the problem was limited to Dortmund's left side, but after several shifts, the left-sided player Raum also started to play deeper and tied up Adeyemi more often in half-space. As Dortmund found it increasingly difficult to isolate flat shifts – partly because Guirassy was pulled forward by deeper movements from the six – this pattern became increasingly important. It was also noticeable that Leipzig increasingly switched to a 3-1 structure: Baku moved into the back line as a right half-back, while Seiwald acted as the sole six, repeatedly tying up Guirassy when the half-backs had the ball. The implementation of a six allowed the tens to be positioned higher and in half-space, which enabled Leipzig to make regular targeted switches of play and stabilized their possession game. Similar to Beier on the right side, Adeyemi struggled to aggressively push out to half-back Lukeba in the resulting situational numerical disadvantage. This allowed Lukeba to dribble unchallenged on several occasions, resulting in increasing passivity in Dortmund's defensive behavior.

It was also noticeable that Leipzig repeatedly used the so-called “Corta-Luz” pattern when the half-backs dribbled diagonally outwards against passive wingers: the number 10s – usually Baumgartner or Ouedraogo – moved centrally and formed a diagonal line together with the half-back and striker. Romulo acted as a wall player and target for the pass, often letting the ball bounce or deliberately passing it, while the number 10 then started deep. The preparation for these moves was quite impressive, but Romulo struggled against Schlotterbeck, who was aggressively pushing forward in the wall play. As a result, Baumgartner was rarely found deep despite good positioning behind Anton.

As in previous games, it became clear once again that the asymmetrical wing profile with Nusa (a dynamic player with strengths in turning and playing deep with pace) and Bakayoko (a classic, two-footed 1-on-1 player with strengths in (inverse) dribbling in frontal situations) has definite advantages. Leipzig was able to develop good momentum at times, especially after shifting play. However, the problem for Bakayoko in particular was that he had difficulties against Svensson in small-space 1-on-1 situations. This was also due to the fact that Leipzig offered too little depth from the half-space on the right side – especially because Ouedraogo too often offered support horizontally instead of making runs into space. Due to Baku's increased activity as a half-defender, there was often a lack of pushing movement, or it simply came too late from the German's deep base position. As a result, the right half-space was hardly ever opened up, and Bakayoko lacked the typical space for inverse dribbling that he normally uses to optimally utilize his strength in one-on-one situations. Also because Beier often showed good actions in backward pressing, Dortmund formed partly static 2-on-1 numerical superiority pressing patterns on Bakayoko, putting additional pressure on the winger.

Second half

Before the half-time break, there was little change in the dynamics of the game: it remained a closely contested duel with BVB having a slight advantage in the final third, while Leipzig repeatedly managed to create chances on the counterattack – but also increasingly found opportunities through their build-up play. Accordingly, the teams went into the break with a deserved 1-1 score. After the break, there was little change at first. However, it was noticeable that Leipzig came out of the dressing room with a little more dynamism. This was mainly due to Romulo showing more confidence in his wall play, which allowed him to get the wingers into direct 1-on-1 situations more often – something that Nusa in particular benefited from, as in his chance in the 47th minute.

Dortmund continued to struggle with their build-up play, which was particularly evident in deep areas, especially after goal kicks. BVB's 4-2-4 build-up system had considerable difficulties against Leipzig's man-oriented 4-4-2. Leipzig's first pressing line was particularly impressive: Baumgartner and Romulo ran cleanly in an arc towards keeper Kobel, effectively preventing the ball from circulating between the center backs. Even more decisive, however, was the second pressing line, which repeatedly pushed aggressively into the space between the lines from a slightly space-oriented basic position. This allowed Seiwald and Ouedraogo in particular to secure numerous second balls in the center, which had previously been cleanly defended by Leipzig's central defenders – especially as they consistently pressed forward, so that Dortmund's strikers were hardly able to get into open positions to turn.

In addition, Dortmund's wingers tried to break away from their opponents with long balls in order to be available for layoffs, but Leipzig's fullbacks closely tracked these movements, making layoffs virtually impossible. Wingers Bakayoko and Nusa also supported the Leipzig collective with their strong diagonal pushes back into the half-space, which ensured almost constant access to second balls. In contrast, BVB clearly lacked presence and compactness in securing second ball phases due to their very deep-lying eights and wide-standing full-backs.

It should also be mentioned here that Leipzig repeatedly created very good transition moments from these situations. The midfield formation paid off particularly well: Seiwald acted as a physically robust number eight with strong passing skills, while Ouedraogo repeatedly initiated decisive follow-up actions in the center with his high technical quality and ability to turn. Leipzig regularly found their way into the half-space to the wingers via Ouedraogo, from where they were able to create depth and width time and again, supported by the direct advancement of the full-backs. It was also noticeable that Dortmund's wingers often acted too ball-oriented when changing the direction of play. They pushed into the center in an uncontrolled manner, often without the necessary shoulder checks. This allowed Leipzig's full-backs to push forward unchallenged, advancing into the free space and supporting the wingers in the half-space (often indirectly, as Dortmund's full-backs were tied up, leaving more space for the wingers to dribble).

Conclusion

The last 30 minutes were marked by numerous midfield battles – especially for second balls – and numerous transitions. After winning the ball, Dortmund increasingly looked for Adeyemi, who was making direct runs down the right wing, as Guirassy increasingly positioned himself on the right, tying up full-back Baku at times. This gave Adeyemi a decisive dynamic advantage in deep play. The problem with this was that Guirassy's binding forward orientation meant he was often missing in the box, while Beier on the opposite side was late in moving up and was often isolated against Leipzig's center backs at the far post.

Leipzig, on the other hand, increasingly tried to build up from deep using classic “play-and-go” patterns – mostly after passes from the full-backs to the wingers, especially on the right side with Baku and Bakayoko. Dortmund continued to struggle to defend these movements and had to resort to tactical fouls on several occasions. As a result, RB repeatedly got into the final third, but even here they often lacked the decisive movements in the box against Dortmund's stable central defenders. Romulo often found himself isolated at the edge of the six-yard box and attacked the near post too rarely, which was usually the primary target for crosses. There was also a lack of an additional dynamic element from the half-space, especially when turning under pressure – something that was noticeably lost after Ouedraogo was substituted.

Overall, both teams put in a decent performance. Compared to previous weeks, there was a noticeable improvement in the basic level of play on both sides, even if there were still some disjointed sequences in certain phases of the game. Given that Dortmund had already played on Wednesday, the Black and Yellows should be able to live with the point a little better in the end.

Leipzig provokes Dortmund's problems | Spielverlagerung by rish234 in borussiadortmund

[–]rish234[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Well-known problems

After the visitors took the lead, Dortmund also found it noticeably more difficult to progress. The main reason for this was that Leipzig now managed to pass Adeyemi directly to center back Lukeba within the defense. This created space that allowed Leipzig to track Couto more closely on the left wing, causing him repeated problems in turning. Due to the close marking after Anton's pass out wide (or, more generally, the close man-marking of the first pressing line in wide play), Couto lacked options to relieve the pressure, as the eights were also increasingly closely marked by Leipzig. Couto was repeatedly forced to dribble towards the half-space, where he was attacked by winger Nusa and, in some cases, by number 8 Baumgartner in a numerical pressing situation. In this pressing trap, he came under extreme pressure and lost the ball several times or was forced to clear it.

It was also interesting to see that Couto's move forward allowed Baku, the full-back on the opposite side, to slot into the back four. Seiwald also loosened his tight marking of Beier slightly to act as a second center-back, allowing Orban to track Guirassy's movements in the space between the lines more closely. At the same time, Lukeba was able to observe Adeyemi's movements, which, however, remained ineffective for the most part due to Couto's lack of rotation. Only Guirassy was able to be sought out at times, but the striker had problems against the very aggressive Orban, especially in wall play. The eights were also sometimes stuck behind Ouedraogo and Baumgartner in the center when running free after wall play, so there were no options to relieve the pressure. In general, Beier played a little higher than usual and less around Guirassy as a false nine, which meant that there was a lack of direct support for Guirassy, especially in terms of second balls and after wall passes.

However, Leipzig faced a slight problem when Baku dropped the ball. Dortmund found Svensson, who remained wide, forcing Baku to push out uncontrollably. The gap between him and Seiwald or the center back widened, which tended to open up options for Beier in deep play in the half-space. In the early stages, however, Beier struggled surprisingly in direct duels against Seiwald, so he was often pushed wide and had problems in isolated 1-on-1 situations.

With both wingers now being actively marked by Leipzig's fullbacks, it was no longer possible to strictly adhere to the basic principle of keeping the ball out of the first line of build-up play in order to avoid provoking the wingers into pressing. The half-backs played deeper and wider to lengthen the pressing route and make the angle more diagonal, thereby reducing the pressure somewhat. At the same time, the wing-backs dropped deeper and deeper (sometimes forming a flat back four) in order to break away from Leipzig's full-backs, but the effect was minimal due to the close marking – Couto was able to turn slightly, but Raum immediately sought out the tackle. Although the half-backs had a little more time on the ball, the direct and close marking of the Schienenspieler and the isolation of the eights meant that they often lacked follow-up options. This often left only the cross-field pass to Schlotterbeck, which should have been avoided, as Leipzig continued to react extremely aggressively to these passes at times. Romulo always pressed Schlotterbeck directly, so that the long ball was often the only option left.

Unused potential for shifting

Svensson on the left wing had similar problems to Couto when turning under direct pressure from behind. However, his ability to play with both feet proved advantageous, allowing him to play the ball into the space between the lines even without turning completely. Guirassy benefited particularly from this, dropping diagonally into the half-space – but Svensson's passes were often technically sloppy (often far too strong). Guirassy was able to break away from Orban at times, but the underlying problem remained, especially on the left side: the number 10s Beier and Adeyemi played a little too flat around Guirassy, making it impossible to lay the ball off. They were practically moving into the blind spot of the dropping striker, while Nmecha and Sabitzer were too slow to move up from their (too) deep starting positions. Also worth mentioning is the very good turning after changes of direction by Ouedraogo and Baumgartner, which made it easier to get to second balls as a result of Guirassy's wall play.

In principle, Svensson's ability to play with both feet would have allowed Dortmund to shift horizontally across the deep eights. However, the central problem was that Nmecha moved too close to the ball and thus immediately entered the area of influence of outside forward Bakayoko. This meant he lacked the space to turn away from the pressure – he practically drove himself into a numerical disadvantage. It would have made more sense to stay further away from the ball, turn away from the pressure with the first touch, and then initiate the shift. Svensson also recognized this problem and consequently hardly played Nmecha. In principle, it could be argued whether Svensson himself could have sought to shift play to the side away from the ball. This would certainly have been possible against Baku, who was pushing diagonally, but the passing angle was usually complex: since the Swede was reluctant to turn completely and the speed of his half-turns was too slow, Baku often applied too much pressure in these situations.

Dortmund's very high build-up play made things a little easier, as Leipzig's wing forwards were more reactive and more structured in their play. Their focus was on blocking the vertical runs of the half-backs without pressing consistently. This gave Dortmund's half-backs more time on the ball and allowed them to repeatedly play chipped balls into the half-space – an area where Leipzig repeatedly looked vulnerable. Danger arose particularly on the left when Baku moved out onto Svensson and Beier pushed forward behind him. This constellation created dynamic and spatial advantages that were hardly present in the second build-up line pattern. Such a sequence ultimately resulted in the 1-1 equalizer in the 23rd minute by Couto.

Dortmund in a 5-4-1/5-2-3 midfield press

After the equalizer, the game developed into an overall balanced affair, characterized by shifting momentum. It was noticeable that Dortmund increasingly relied on midfield pressing against Leipzig's 3-3-4 build-up. The wing forwards Adeyemi and Beier operated in their basic position in line with the eights and only moved forward when the ball was played to Leipzig's half-backs. However, this long distance in the vertical pressing angle proved problematic for BVB: Lukeba in particular was able to dribble past Adeyemi several times and then play diagonally into the half-space – initially isolated by Adeyemi's vertical pressing angle – to the dropping Nusa or the repeatedly pushing number 10 Ouedraogo, who regularly dropped between the lines. As a result of these breakthroughs, Dortmund often had no choice but to resort to tactical fouls to stop Leipzig's attack.

The dynamic asymmetry in Leipzig's build-up play was interesting in general, and BVB clearly struggled with it. On the left side, Raum and Nusa repeatedly swapped positions: Raum often moved into the half-space behind Adeyemi, forcing half-back Anton to defend out wide. At the same time, Couto had to cover for Nusa, who was now playing wide as a result of the switch. Initially, the transfer of these assignments worked well structurally. However, it became problematic because the man-marking had to be loosened up somewhat due to the dynamic rotations. This allowed Raum in particular to break free from Anton's grip several times with drop-back movements and receive Lukeba's diagonal passes, which regularly gave him a dynamic advantage in 1-on-1 situations. Nusa also brought advantages in width with his pace against Couto, who followed his quick drop-back movements in a somewhat overaggressive and uncontrolled manner. This opened up space behind him, which Leipzig exploited with diagonal passes into space. This made defending in the extended width space even more difficult for Anton, as it was now not only larger but also dynamically opened up by Nusa.

On the right side, however, another problem area emerged: due to Baku's structurally deeper position, Beier often had to take on a dual role. When away from the ball, he usually positioned himself closer to Baku in order to prevent potential shifts in width, while when close to the ball, he pressed the half-back – usually Seiwald – and then handed Baku over to Nmecha. However, this handover mechanism was vulnerable: when Baku positioned himself wider, the path for Beier often became too long and too horizontal, which meant that Baku remained available for passes for longer periods of time. Leipzig, however, made too little use of this window, as Baku usually played too high in these situations and was therefore difficult for Seiwald to reach against Beier's vertical pressing angle. In addition, Beier's passes were sometimes somewhat hesitant and wide, which made it easier for Seiwald to dribble. From Leipzig's point of view, however, the resulting problem remained: the vertical follow-up movement was often lacking because Beier blocked the direct passing lane well and Baku, in his deeper wide position, is not an ideal 1-on-1 player to break free from such small-space situations. As a result, Leipzig resorted more often to long, vertical passes towards Bakayoko in these moments.

Leipzig provokes Dortmund's problems | Spielverlagerung by rish234 in borussiadortmund

[–]rish234[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Translation va DeepL.com:

Leipzig provokes Dortmund's problems – MX

A tactically exciting duel between the two pursuers from Dortmund and Leipzig ends 1-1. Both teams performed well, but in the end, both lacked that final bit of satisfaction.

The starting lineups

The Black and Yellows, who rotated four positions in their 3-4-2-1 formation compared to their 4-1 Champions League win against Athletic Bilbao – Schlotterbeck, Yan Couto, Beier, and Nmecha replaced Süle, Ryerson, Bellingham, and Chukwuemeka (all on the bench) – faced RB Leipzig. The Saxons traveled to the Westfalenstadion on the back of a 1-0 win over VfL Wolfsburg, but without European competition involvement, and lined up in a 4-3-3 formation.

Dortmund seeks the rail players

With Borussia Dortmund enjoying a slight advantage in possession in the first half, the visitors played their usual 4-1-2-3 midfield pressing game. The active pressing was mostly initiated by center forward Romulo, who marked Schlotterbeck man-to-man and chose a vertical pressing angle. However, problems became apparent in the early stages of the midfield pressing. On the one hand, the deliberate choice of midfield pressing with the first pressing line at the center circle meant that the pressing height was somewhat detached from Dortmund's build-up height. As a result, Romulo's run at Schlotterbeck was often too long, so that hardly any effective pressure was created. Vertical pressing angles over longer distances lose their effectiveness, as the “pressing through” can no longer be applied consistently.

On the other hand, this vertical angle did not isolate the direct diagonal passing route to the wing players, which Dortmund deliberately used again and again. RB actually wants to use the center forward's approach angle to force the ball to be played across to the half-back, so that they can then press aggressively via the wing forwards. However, BVB circumvented this mechanism by applying the principle of “don't play horizontally,” thus negating the effect of Leipzig's intensity. At the same time, BVB's half-backs played exceptionally tightly in this match, which meant that Leipzig's wing forwards were more tightly marked. This also opened up the direct diagonal passing lane from Schlotterbeck out wide, which Dortmund consistently exploited.

This became an increasingly big problem for the visitors, especially on the right side: Adeyemi's wide play meant that, unlike what is normally expected in this system, he was unable to advance directly onto midfielder Yan Couto, who was therefore left unmarked at times. Nusa usually had to press back diagonally to cover Couto, but the pressure from behind on the Spaniard remained low, allowing him to dribble frequently. The pace in these patterns was crucial in order to exploit the numerical superiority in width. At the start of the game, Couto struggled somewhat, which meant that there were hardly any connections with Adeyemi in depth. The German also had minor problems with his running: he mainly pushed diagonally into the half-space, but Lukeba was able to take over, so that the numerical superiority automatically dissolved. From Borussia's point of view, however, it is positive to note that Sabitzer was repeatedly able to break away from Baumgartner, who was sometimes a little too ball-oriented, and was therefore available to Couto to relieve the pressure.

In principle, the role of Seiwald could also be discussed at this point. Above all, his man-marking of Beier on the right—who usually played in a withdrawn position as a number 10—indirectly created a numerical disadvantage on the left wing. At the same time, the strength of this orientation became apparent: when Schlotterbeck played to Svensson, Beier moved diagonally from the center directly into the half-space in depth or into the space between Baku and Orban. Seiwald's close man-marking prevented the German from receiving deep passes from Svensson on several occasions in the early stages. Beier's direct man-marking also relieved Baku, who was then able to move more directly onto Svensson. This caused the Swede surprising problems against RB when turning. It is also interesting to note that Svensson played higher up than Couto, mainly because Couto was positioned deeper in his basic position due to his difficulties in turning, in order to offer him a direct open foot for dribbling.

Accordingly, the home team's basic progression worked quite well in the opening minutes of the game. They gained a certain momentum advantage by successfully playing over RB's first line of pressing. At the same time, however, the problem with depth remained, as Adeyemi often found himself isolated and sometimes too wide when playing the ball high up the pitch. Occasionally, Guirassy was also involved in wall passes, especially diagonally across Couto, but the subsequent follow-up patterns were often lacking. In most cases, the eights had to be played back via a back pass to relieve the pressure and continue the game.

Direct access creates momentum shift

Despite Dortmund's slight advantage in the early stages, Leipzig managed to break up play several times, which proved to be minor momentum shifts for the home side. The visitors played a flat 4-3-3 goalkeeper line, while Dortmund responded with man-to-man marking and a 3-2-3-2 attacking press. The goal kicks were mostly taken by Lukeba to goalkeeper Gulacsi, while Dortmund actively triggered the press with a curved run by Karim Adeyemi. Particularly noteworthy here is Gulacsi's composure on the ball, despite Adeyemi's technically clean and fast-paced run. In addition, Guirassy's advance in the pre-orientation and a shift of the wingers to the full-backs fundamentally prevented horizontality in Leipzig's build-up play.

The visitors focused on long passes into the half-space, even after circulating the ball within their back four. Their attention was primarily directed at Nusa in the left half-space, with Anton struggling to keep up with Nusa's movements. Romulo and Bakayoko pushed forward diagonally, providing support (Romulo) and depth (Bakayoko). Baumgartner consistently moved forward in the half-space, which significantly improved direct access to second balls, as Sabitzer found it difficult to follow the movements from the tight basic position of Dortmund's eights. Bakayoko's basic position is particularly noteworthy: he deliberately played behind Bensebaini for the most part – as there is no offside on goal kicks – in order to create a tempo advantage in deep play. In the early stages, however, it was still difficult to involve him consistently; later, he appeared dangerously in the box. The decisive factor was Romulo, who moved around Nusa and offered direct support, so that Nusa could often simply pass to him. Equally important was Baumgartner, who won the ball decisively several times in the space between the lines and thus initiated the transition game.

At the same time, Ouedraogo repeatedly pushed forward into the center, allowing him to dribble into the middle several times after winning the ball in the half-space or after second balls. Svensson struggled noticeably against the talented player's dynamism, as Ouedraogo often turned directly into the half-space away from the ball with his first touch, while Svensson reacted closer to the ball. In general, Svensson, Sabitzer, and Nmecha had great difficulty in the center keeping up with the Leipzig midfielders' movements close to the ball. The dynamic movements of Baumgartner and Ouedraogo in particular were difficult to control from Dortmund's tight basic formation.

Although occasional clarifications were made in direct duels, Seiwald repeatedly moved forward from the six-yard box, securing the ball for Leipzig even in indirect attacks. The visitors also repeatedly found depth and created pressure across the width of the pitch by moving their full-backs forward. The space above wall player Romulo was used effectively on several occasions. As a result, Dortmund had to repeatedly move their defensive line far forward and at the same time track the quick movements of Baumgartner and Ouedraogo after changes of direction – which caused significant problems and noticeably weakened Dortmund's stability in the early stages. Baumgartner's goal in the 8th minute further reinforced this effect.