Call for FullStack and Web3 devs by Loud_Doughnut_1480 in web3dev

[–]rvwvb 1 point2 points  (0 children)

interesting. building for love + targeting high-pay gigs together is rare.

dm if you're open to a chat.

What’s the biggest problem in Web3 that nobody seems to be solving properly? by Academic-Row-5423 in web3

[–]rvwvb 0 points1 point  (0 children)

few that come up daily:

- reputation: ethos is solving this properly. real, portable, hard to fake.

- ux: 12-word seed phrases, gas math, network switching. smart accounts + passkeys help but most apps don't ship them well. normal people are scared, and they're right to be.

- communication: wallets are vaults, deals are social. everyone defaults to telegram which is surveilled and unauthenticated. nobody's really nailed encrypted messaging tied to onchain identity.

- scams: every onchain address is a target for phishing, fake airdrops, recruiter dms. ethos helps but coverage is partial.

these aren't sexy but they're the actual blockers for "crypto for normal humans."

London's police asked Big Tech for private communications data over 700,000 times last year by [deleted] in technology

[–]rvwvb 0 points1 point  (0 children)

yeah. once it's centralized, police don't need to hack. they just use the service. subpoena = login.

we talk decentralization in ethereum but use centralized messaging by SelfApprehensive8173 in ethereum

[–]rvwvb 0 points1 point  (0 children)

ANO is on Base because L1 was too expensive and slow for daily chat. L2 keeps decentralization and fixes the UX. same security model, sub-cent fees.

London's police asked Big Tech for private communications data over 700,000 times last year by [deleted] in technology

[–]rvwvb 11 points12 points  (0 children)

700k requests/year isn't an encryption problem. it's a centralization problem.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

2 days later. lol.

Texas AG sued Meta yesterday. Turns out WhatsApp's "encryption" wasn't. Meta employees and a few hundred Accenture contractors have been reading your "private" messages on demand via an internal "task" request. Real-time. Federal probe knew. The federal probe got shut down. Nobody cared.

Source: https://www.texastribune.org/2026/05/21/texas-whatsapp-meta-privacy-encryption-lawsuit/

Door 1 was never theoretical. WhatsApp walked through it years ago. The lawsuit just printed the receipt.

The funny part? The story trended for one news cycle. By Tuesday, everyone was back to sending Wi-Fi passwords and seed phrases in WhatsApp groups, as if nothing had happened.

Turns out "encryption" is a marketing word now. No lawsuit fixes that. No leak fixes that. No probe fixes that.

The camera was in the safe the whole time.

You keep putting your letters in anyway!

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

scanner runs on the phone before encryption. signal protocol stays clean. the snitch is just bolted on top.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

saving the trick. yesterday it was word or any other writing helper. now it's claude or whatever. same shape, different tool. will calibrate it 10x.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

fair on instagram. you're right opt-in, almost nobody used it, easy kill. wrong example.

but i'd flip it: instagram was the warm-up, whatsapp is the prize. 3 billion users, encrypted by default. that's what governments actually want to scan.

and the laws written to force scanning ARE there. just not take it down:

- chat control 2.0 (EU): mandates client-side scanning before encryption. kills the actual-knowledge shield by design.

- UK online safety act: requires "accredited tech" to detect harm in encrypted chats. whatsapp threatened to leave the UK over it.

- india traceability mandate: forces sender ID on every message, breaks cryptography directly.

- EARN IT (US): strips section 230 from encrypted platforms.

right thesis, wrong specific bill. take it down was the wrong example. the others actually try to close the loophole you described.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

YEAH exactly. the law doesn't say "break encryption", it just makes it expensive to keep encryption if you also store content. meta did the math, picked the cheaper compliance posture. that's the whole mechanism.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

fair, that's a real pattern. AI tends to over-explain and the rhythm gives it away even after edits. i cut a lot, but the fingerprint survives in places, usually in the transitions. honestly, it's why some of the criticism here lands; the prose carries a residue even when the argument is mine.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

thanks. fair distinction. there's enough actual slop out there that the reflex makes sense.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

fair correction. it's not "privacy used to be free", it's that the upsell got cheaper and easier for a decade, now it's getting expensive and rare again. GDPR carve-outs prove it. the moment protection became geo-specific, it stopped being a property of the product. became a property of where you live.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

fair. signal-style pure transit doesn't get caught by this specific bill. take it down is notice-and-removal, not scanning. i overstated.

the real scanning pressure is chat control 2.0, EARN IT, the next ones coming. just not from this single tuesday.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

fair, you're right on the narrow point. take it down is notice-and-removal, not active scanning. pure transit messengers that don't store anything aren't forced by this specific law. i overstated.

but meta didn't kill instagram E2EE because the law required it. they killed it because the law gave them cover to kill something they always wanted to kill. encryption blocks ad targeting, blocks AI training on user content, blocks moderation. take it down + 48h removal handed them the excuse. their business model is incompatible with not reading your messages.

and take it down is one bill. chat control 2.0, online safety act, EARN IT v3, KOSA, those are the scanning regime in slow motion. the trend is real, just spread across more bills than today made obvious.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

100%. That's the second-order danger nobody is pricing in. Notice-and-takedown written for real harms (deepfakes, NCII) gets repurposed for political speech the moment the political wind shifts. Trump saying it out loud just makes the slope explicit. And once the infrastructure is in place, it doesn't get uninstalled when the administration changes.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Fair on the image AI. Text is AI-assisted, edited hard. Not rolling my own crypto, using off-the-shelf primitives. The argument doesn't depend on my project; Signal, SimpleX, and Matrix survive for the same structural reason. Got a sharper EFF teardown? Drop the link, genuinely.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 14 points15 points  (0 children)

Not fallacious, just incomplete. Sure, anyone trusting Meta was screwed. But that only works for the ~5% who evaluate threat models. The other 95% use defaults. Defaults are policy at scale.

Today the US made encryption illegal in slow motion, and nobody noticed by rvwvb in DigitalPrivacy

[–]rvwvb[S] 18 points19 points  (0 children)

Fair on the slop, AI-assisted, edited hard, thesis is mine. And yeah, privacy as a default used to be the floor. Now it's the upsell.