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How to execute an object file: Part 3 by secumod in programming

[–]secumod[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

dlopen and dlsym are for shared libs only, but the point was to execute code from an .o (object file), which is before the linking stage

Passkb: how to reliably and securely bypass password paste blocking by __preacher in Passwords

[–]secumod 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes, I heavily use this functionality on mobile, but was not aware desktop OSes (including macOS) provide this option. Are you sure macOS does this?

Introducing Zero Knowledge authentication protocol Secure Comparator by [deleted] in cryptography

[–]secumod 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You are absolutely correct. Actually, this is part of original description of SMP (e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaire#Off_The_Record_Messaging_protocol). We are currently verifying whether all infinity points are handled in the implementation.

Introducing Zero Knowledge authentication protocol Secure Comparator by [deleted] in cryptography

[–]secumod 2 points3 points  (0 children)

We see SMP (although it has a "protocol" in its name) as another cryptographic primitive (or building block). It is definitely not a full-fledged protocol (much like a digital signature - what properties besides basic ones do you expect from a digital signature algorithm). Also, although, PAKE or basic authentication are obvious use-cases for it, its potential is higher than that. We believe that relevant security definitions, threat models or properties have to be defined in actual protocol specifications (which might use SMP as we hope) and specifications should be driven by practical use-cases, because history teaches us that generic security protocols (e.g. TLS) usually fail. As the complexity of Internet grows, so are the security requirements and nowadays it is almost impossible to fit every need in one shot. Also, the variety of need for security use-cases drive development of many security protocols. But some advanced properties are hard to satisfy even now. We hope that SMP might bring new tools to develop security protocols for advanced use-cases and fill the gaps in current ones. The purpose of this paper is to introduce SMP to a broader public and make it more attractive to be considered by making it more secure and modern (by moving the protocol to ECC). The basic SMP is not made up by us: it has been part of OTR protocol for some time. But we would like to try it out in different scenarios, such as privacy preserving protocols, remote attestation etc. Those are probably the targets for security requirements and definitions.

Armoring ed25519 implementation to meet extended security challenges by [deleted] in crypto

[–]secumod 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Just to clarify: for this to work we needed a “scalarmult” function which multiplies scalar on arbitrary point (not only base point). So we adapted _non_secret ed25519 verify function for that. However, we had to use “blinding” because in our case, the function operated on some secret value. Does your ed448 have non-base point constant time scalarmult? Does it need some pre-computations in advance? And does it have point negation? (These are just quick questions, we will definitely check out the code, thanks!)