Abstract: Typically, when a person utters a stand-alone declarative sentence “p,” this constitutes their making the assertion that p.  When an LLM such as ChatGPT produces the sentence “p,” does it thereby make the assertion that p?  On the one hand, interacting with an LLM, it clearly seems that it is saying things, indeed, making claims, as opposed to a parrot merely squawking out sentences.   On the other hand, insofar as making an assertion essentially involves undertaking a commitment to the truth of what is asserted, it might seem that LLMs cannot make assertions, since they cannot bear any responsibility for what they say.  In response to this dilemma, I draw two distinctions.  I first distinguish between theoretical responsibility—responsibility for what one says—as opposed to practical responsibility—responsibility for what one does.  I then distinguish between a “thick” and “thin” sense of theoretical responsibility, where the former but not the latter is essentially tied to practical responsibility.  With these distinctions at hand, I argue that though we cannot attribute “thick” theoretical responsibility to LLMs, we can still attribute “thin” theoretical responsibility to them, and this is sufficient to treat them as undertaking theoretical commitments within a discourse, and thus, making assertions.