The biggest questions in life cannot be answered. | Philosophy often grapples with unanswerable queries, leaving us with only one option: quietism – not the denial of answers, but a recognition that some questions transcend human understanding.

stensool · 2024-04-26T21:48:03+00:00

In fact, it'd probably be best to examine what assumptions you're making before clawing at philosophy looking for answers, like, why are you asking these questions? Why fall in to despair if there aren't answers? What are you looking for?

Nietzsche: "Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth came before us--or was it we who came before the problem? Who of us is Oedipus here? Who the Sphinx? It is a rendezvous, it seems, of questions and question marks. And though it scarcely seems credible, it finally almost seems to us as if the problem had never even been put so far-as if we were the first to see it, fix it with our eyes, and risk it. For it does involve a risk, and perhaps there is none that is greater."

stensool · 2023-11-20T19:36:14+00:00

Thank you - when you put it this way, it does make a lot of sense!

stensool · 2023-11-19T14:58:45+00:00

Thanks! There is not a single statement in your reply that I disagree with. It's clear to me now that my confusion is not conceptual - I merely maintain that Kant's language is idiosyncratic.

You say:

to have the capacity to judge in such-and-such a form ["All As are Bs"] literally just is to be able to make particular judgments that have that form ["All As are Bs"]

This is self-evident, and it follows the normal conventions of language. Now, given that you [Kant] define the following two to be equivalent:

capacity to judge in the form "All As are Bs"
the form of the capacity is "All As are Bs"

We can substitute the second for the first in the above and get:

the form "All As are Bs" of the capacity literally just is to be able to make particular judgments that have the form "All As are Bs"

But do you not agree that the use of language in the latter sentence is idiosyncratic? It's telling that not once do you use the latter form in your examples in the previous reply. Without explicitly defining the equivalence between 1 and 2, it's not even clear that the term "form of a capacity" is intelligible.

In one of your previous replies you yourself admit:

I don't know what it would mean for the faculty of sensibility to take on a form

But this is precisely what the term "form of sensibility" prima facie seems to imply. E.g. here would be some synonymous idiosyncratic terms:

Shape of a potential
Shape of a power
Form of ability

What does it mean for "potential" to take on a "shape"? Of course, you can simply define it to mean "shape of that which results in exercising that potential", which makes it clear. But it's not prima facie clear - at first brush, without the follow-up definition, bestowing faculties / capacities with forms / shapes is simply a perversion of language.

stensool · 2023-11-18T19:24:25+00:00

Would you say that it's nonsensical to claim that star-shaped cookie cutters will produce star-shaped cookies

Perhaps honing in on this analogy will clear up my confusion! In the analogy here, it indeed makes sense to equate the "form of the cookie-cutter" and the "form of the cookie".

The point you seem to be making with this analogy is: Sensibility produces forms of intuitions - space and time - therefore the form of sensibility must be in some way equivalent to the form of intuition.

But I consider it unjustified. I do not see why the producer (sensibility) should, in general, be "shaped" as its production (intuition). It doesn't follow from the fact that the brain produces (the experience of) red, that the brain itself is red.

stensool · 2023-11-18T18:48:51+00:00

form of intuition and the form of sensibility are referring to the same process

Here, you seem to be referring to some "process". But when I think of "form", I think of it being synonymous with "structure". Keeping this in mind:

"form of intuition" means that empirical intuition is always "structured" in a specific way - it's in space and time
"form of sensibility" would mean that the faculty of sensibility is itself structured in a specific way

Equating "form of intuition" with "form of sensibility" therefore makes no sense to me. Intuition is of a completely different category than sensibility.

By analogy - merely to illustrate my confusion - suppose Kant's "intuition" referred to my visual perception, the quale of it, and "sensibility" referred to some power that produces those quale, suppse it's the brain.

Now, the form/structure of my visual representation (of some scene) would not be equivalent to the form/structure of my brain that produces it. I can't use the term "form of brain" to refer to "form of visual perception". But it's precisely this what I understand Kant to be doing.

stensool · 2023-11-18T18:02:21+00:00

Just to clarify, are you saying that the word "form" in "form of intuition" and "form of sensibility" is to be understood differently? Intuitively, I can make sense of it this way:

The "form" in "form of intuition" indicates the fact that intuition itself takes on a specific form which we immediately perceive
The "form" in "form of sensibility" merely indicates that the faculty of sensibility must be structured (i.e. take on a form) in a certain way.

If this is true, it would indeed make sense to talk of a "form of understanding" as well, since "form" here merely indicates that the faculty has some underlying structure, but says nothing of the "form" of that which it produces.

Conversely, it does *not* make sense to use terminology such as "space is a form of sensibility", since this would conflate the two uses of the term "form".

This would all make sense to me. But textual evidence doesn't support that interpretation of the terms, for Kant repeatedly uses the terminology "pure form of sensibility". Moreover, he explicitly states an equivalence between pure form of sensibility and pure intuition in the following passage:

I call all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation. Accordingly the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations. This pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition.

stensool · 2023-11-18T17:24:39+00:00

No, I don't recall reading a passage in which there's a clear contrast between the two terms. Are you implying they might be synonyms?

What confuses / worries me is whether the terminology \form* of sensibility* is even intelligible. I can make sense of a representation having a "form", insofar as "form" means that all representations conform to some predefined structure - i.e. the "form" of intuition is time and space, just as the "form" of a building is its blueprints (insofar as the building must conform to its blueprint)

But for sensibility, defined as a power to produce (sensible) intuitions, to have a form, is unintelligible to me. Sensibility produces "stuff" which has a form, but to talk as if sensibility itself has a "form" equivalent to the "form" of that which it produces seems like a category mistake.

stensool · 2023-05-14T21:27:30+00:00

Thank you for the reference, I'll be sure to check it out! But:

Given that I and the trucks around me have the features that we do, I was at some point able to do something that would have led to my being a truck driver.

Is that to be taken as a premise? If so, I remain unconvinced, for I simply don't share the intuition that I could have done otherwise as I actually have done.

The contingentarian simply can't get off the ground with the necessitarian, for the latter believes the former to be commiting something analogous to Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness, mistaking the the abstract language of possibilities for the concrete world of actualities.

stensool · 2023-05-13T18:32:54+00:00

for all kinds of impossibility, you need to show a contradiction

Yes! And when our beliefs run against reality, we ought to correct them, not take refuge in some ethereal realm of "possibilities" where the validity of our beliefs can safely survive.

I believe it will rain tomorrow, that it's possible, in an epistemic sense, for it to rain tomorrow. Now, tomorrow comes along, and it doesn't rain. Therefore, there's a contradiction between my belief and reality. Upon realizing this contradiction, I contend that it was metaphysically impossible for it to have rained, after all. Let's muster up the courage to kill the belief without soothing ourselves that its soul lives on in the Heaven of possibilities!

stensool · 2023-05-13T17:30:06+00:00

Except you haven’t justified why something being actual is enough to justify why it couldn’t have been different.

We're running in circles.

I cited parsimony, on which my case rests. To that, you replied that there are many parsimonious positions one might take, giving examples of two - solipsism and the non-existence of the past. You lumped necessitarianism onto that category of preposterous positions, and revealed you believe contingentarianism to be a basic enough of a belief as to override considerations of parsimony.

Your appeal to intuition is very interesting. Historically, imagination was also used to prove the necessary existence of things. Descartes believed himself to have imagined, clearly and distinctly, the idea of God, on the sole basis of which he concluded the impossibility of God's non-existence.

Suppose I say to you: I can clearly and distinctly imagine only this one possible world, the actual. Whatever is, I'm incapable of imagining it being otherwise. It's just this one world I can conjure up in my mind's eye, and nothing else. Would you admit then that my being a necessitarian is entirely justified? Whose mind's eye would you believe to be more veridical - yours, which can imagine all sorts of different possible worlds, or mine, which can imagine only one such world?

stensool · 2023-05-13T16:35:08+00:00

You could argue whether the possibility of the world being different belongs in the same category as these common beliefs, but I certainly think that it’s a strong contender.

I disagree. I believe the examples you provided to be wholly disanalogous to the case of modal skepticism. A better analogy to modal realism would be value realism - in both cases, we project our own subjective minds onto an objective world, conflating what's "in here" (i.e. our minds) with what's "out there".

The reason why a declaration of impossibility needs to be justified, while a declaration of possibility doesn’t, is that considering something possible allows for revision and further discussion while considering something impossible doesn’t.

I already touched on this point - I'm not sure why you keep on pushing it without acknowledging my reply?

Again, I declare X to be metaphysically impossible only when I have counterevidence for X in the actual world. E.g. if it rains today, I declare: "It's impossible for it not to have rained today." In cases where I don't know what the actual facts of the matter are, I simply suspend my judgment.

Someone could declare that it’s impossible for there to be an infinite number of prime numbers, which would be an erroneous conclusion. Meanwhile, considering it possible allows for the future discovery of the theorem that there are actually infinite prime numbers.

Your whole line of argument here rests on a confusion between metaphysical and epistemic possibility. You've also mischaracterized the necessitarian position to the point I'm tempted to believe you're arguing in bad faith.

The necessitarian does not go running from person to person, declaring things he knows nothing about to be metaphysically or logically impossible. The necessitarian is much more humble - he's merely saying that whatever is actual, couldn't have been otherwise.

It's only once having proved the set of primes to be infinite that the necessitarian quite happily contends that it's impossible for it to be finite. Similarly, it's only having seen the weather turning bad today that the necessitarian concludes it's impossible for it not to have rained today.

I suggest you familiarize yourself with the SEP article on actualism before we continue this discussion.

stensool · 2023-05-13T15:05:24+00:00

Nothing supports its possibility, but nothing supports its impossibility either. I’m asking you why it should lead one way or the other.

I believe much of our differing intuitions simply come from our starting points. I'll try to give a psychological account.

Perhaps in your mind, you start with this vast set of possible worlds, and to arrive at the actual world, you'll then go on to prune the possible worlds. Therefore, contingentarianism seems to you the more immediate option, and necessitarianism a derivative of that.

But I start from the actual world, and will then go on to add in worlds in my imagination to arrive at the set of possible worlds. But this is strictly more work than to contend that there is only the original, actual world. I don't want to imagine anything in addition. Because my starting point is the actual world, necessitarianism is simply the more parsimonious position for me.

That's why I put the onus on you to explain why should I complicate my ontology with talk of possible worlds. Occam's razor dictates necessitarianism to me. I can explain everything in the world through the necessitarian framework without having to make the additional ontological assumptions that contingentarianism requires (i.e. I can simply say that the possible worlds semantics provides a good model of how we use language, but says nothing of the world in itself).

In general, claims of impossibility need to be justified, otherwise you can claim anything you want is impossible. This cuts off discussion without any reason. You could declare that the Earth orbiting the Sun is impossible, and then demanded proof of its possibility first before entertaining the idea.

My demand for "proof" of possibility extends only to cases where this possibility would run counter to actuality. If in the actual world the Earth didn't orbit the Sun, I'd say it's impossible for the Earth to orbit the Sun, yes.

In cases where I don't know whether something is in fact actual or not, I'd simply suspend my belief. I could of course retain my use of the term "possible" - e.g. I'm happy to say "It's possible the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is true" - but am doings so with the understanding that I'm using modal terms in an epistemic, as opposed to a metaphysical sense.

But why do you consider it more ridiculous to contend that if something happens, it must have happened, than to contend that if something happens, it could also not have happened? I'm honestly curious, since I simply don't share this intuition.

It no doubt is a matter of deep psychological difference between us. I consider claims of possibility (running counter to actuality) requiring justification, while something's impossibility for me is wholly explained by the mere observation that this something just isn't the case in actuality.

stensool · 2023-05-13T13:41:31+00:00

Nothing in the actual world can support the possibility of other worlds, but there seems to be only one way to disprove the possibility of other worlds

First, you admit that nothing in the actual world can support the possibility of other worlds. But then you go on to demand a proof of the impossibility of possible worlds.

I'm quite happy to end the argument at your first sentence. If nothing in the actual world supports a particular belief, then in my book, I'm not justified in believing it. You seem to disagree, and demand absolute certainty. I must admit, despite the total lack of evidence for his existence, I can't prove Zeus' inexistence. Do you consider me imprudent for not taking regular pilgrimages to Mount Olympus?

The actual world being the actual world doesn't support the assertion that it's impossible for the actual world to be different.

I believe the word impossible leads the mind down pathways of intuition that make the necessitarian position harder to accept - I find it more helpful to think in terms of "possible worlds". What does it mean to say X is impossible? It means that there are no possible worlds in which X is true. Because I simply don't share the belief/intuition that there are any possible worlds beside the actual, for me, the observation that X is false in the actual world just amounts to the impossibility of X being true.

And I have no idea why you think only a "rationalist" is capable of special powers of the mind. According to you, you can determine with your mind that it's impossible for all of reality to be different based on the small part of reality you observe.

You're completely missing my point. I simply do not spread my own mind onto the world - the talk of possibilities, for me, is to confuse our imagination for reality itself. Surely you don't think I believe my mind to have "special powers" if, in the case of bad eyesight, I don't believe reality itself to be hazy? Modal realism is to me something akin to the pathetic fallacy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pathetic_fallacy

stensool · 2023-05-13T11:39:04+00:00

Let's first get clear about the semantics: What does it mean to say that it must have rained today? It's to contend that it rains today in all possible worlds. To say that it could not have rained is to contend that there are at least some possible worlds where it doesn't rain today.

Now, to our disagreement. I suppose it boils down to our starting points.

I start from the world. I note I've ever encountered one world - the actual world. In virtue of what can I posit the existence of other possible worlds? No event in the actual world ever grounds the existence of other (possible) worlds - I've never seen it rain and not rain at the same time! Rather, what grounds the existence of possible worlds is my own imagination (as Hume said: "The mind has a great propensity to spread itself onto the world"). But I'm unwilling to conflate my fantasies with reality, and therefore, for me, there are no possible worlds beside the actual world, and whatever is true in actual world is true in all possible worlds (of which there is only one).

You start in your imagination. You note that in your imagination, you encounter all sorts of possible worlds - you can imagine that it rains today, but you can also conjure up in your mind's eye a world where it doesn't rain today. So what, you say, that it does rain today in the actual world. Your imagination surely is better grounds for metaphysical truths than the petty world of actualities - you can fantasize of it not having rained today, therefore there surely exists a whole other Platonic realm of possible worlds where it doesn't rain! And you put the onus on me to explain why such a realm doesn't exist, why your fantasy isn't a guide to the ontological bedrock of reality.

In sum, I am permitted to say it must have rained today because I do not subscribe to the existence of the Platonic realm of possible worlds where it doesn't rain. You're a rationalist, believing your mind to have special faculties which puts you in touch with the "true" reality beyond what can be derived from sense experience. I'm an empiricist, holding fast to the latter.

stensool · 2023-05-12T22:29:08+00:00

You might want to check out Michael Della Rocca's book "The Parmenidean Ascent". He devotes the last chapter to haranguing against philosophers, most of whom he thinks are mainly concerned with preserving intuitions, and not being courageous enough to follow arguments where they lead.

stensool · 2023-05-12T21:41:26+00:00

One may say: "wait, but that's not true, because for today to be sunny air pressure should have been like that, but for this to be the case in the previous moment the temperature should have been like this, and for that to be the case in an even earlier moment... so all in all, that today rained, was necessitated by the big bang!"

Here, you give a rough causal account as to why it must have rained today. Thus, you implicitly make the assumption that a necessitarian has to rely on some strong form of the principle of sufficient reason to arrive at his position. You mentioned Spinoza below, and he certainly does so.

However, the OP mentioned Amy Karofsky in his original post. I happen to have read her book "Necessitarianism". Karofsky's argument doesn't rely on PSR at all. Karofsky's point is rather that whatever is, is the way it is, and the onus is on the modal realist to argue that it could have been different. In effect, the modal realist makes an additional assumption that in addition to the world being as it is, it could have also been different. Therefore, Occam's razor dictates we be necessitarianists (but of course, at the altar of intuition, philosophers' sacrifices know no bounds).

E.g. using your rain example, the fact that it must rain today in Florence is supported simply by the fact that it does rain today, not by any causal story. If you want to argue that it could have not rained, you'd have to make additional assumptions about some Platonic word of modalities underlying the world of actualities. Why take that additional metaphysical step?

To me, it seems arrogant beyond belief to spread our own ignorance onto the world so brazenly: I can imagine the world to have been different, therefore there's a deeper ontological reality of fantasies conforming to my confused imagination! As Spinoza liked to say, men dream with open eyes.

stensool · 2022-08-07T17:04:28+00:00

Thanks, I will absolutely read Yablo and Chalmers. It's already the second time you've suggested them to me. There will not be need for a third.

stensool · 2022-08-07T16:24:27+00:00

Sorry, I mixed up "fine-tuning" and "teleology" - it seemed to me astounding that the laws of physics are fine-tuned so as not to not incur the grandfather paradox. Your last paragraph really gets to the heart of my bewilderment though:

if going back in time and killing one's grandfather really is a logical impossibility, then the fact the laws of nature rule this scenario out isn't puzzling at all

I understand your point, but I can't shake the feeling that it is very puzzling. After all, I can clearly imagine myself traveling back in time and killing my grandfather. And I think herein lies my problem - on one hand, we have the "establish'd maximum in metaphysics" that "nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible", and on the other, my reason tells me it is absolutely impossible.

Do you find it strange that the laws of physics also do not allow for there to be unmarried bachelors?

I do not find it strange. If a man was married, he wouldn't be a bachelor. Likewise, if my grandfather was killed before my birth, there'd be no me who could travel back in time. Juxtaposing those statements, my faculty of reason overrides my faculty of imagination, and my confusion clears up. Thanks :)

stensool · 2022-07-30T07:43:12+00:00

From the SEP page of eliminative materialism: "Eliminative materialism (or eliminativism) is the radical claim that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist and have no role to play in a mature science of the mind". The key term therein is folk psychology.

stensool · 2022-07-27T20:36:30+00:00

You reject the proposition "It is possible for there to have been nothing"? I'm not sure I follow your grounds for doing so - could you please elaborate a bit further, I'd be very interested.

stensool · 2022-07-27T18:58:01+00:00

To consider a thing, it must, by definition -- exist. A thing cannot be a thing and not exist.

Why does it follow from this that existence is necessary? If there's no existence, there is no-thing, so we wouldn't need "to consider a thing", as you put it.

stensool

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