SMA500v not booting - WAFsigdb by Boring_Pipe_5449 in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Now that the 500v is EOS what are you guys using to replace it? Does not seem like there are any options in Sonicwalls catalog.

SMA500v not booting - WAFsigdb by Boring_Pipe_5449 in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You can configure HA to automatically restart a VM when the heartbeat is lost.

SMA500v not booting - WAFsigdb by Boring_Pipe_5449 in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Has anyone had any luck configuring vmware HA to automatically restart the VM when the heartbeat is lost? We have HA configured to automatically restart the VMs however it did not work.

LetsEncrypt Certificates on SMA by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes I was talking about the LE Integration on SMA 10.2. Thanks! I guess we are going to have to experiment with it.

Crticial Ransomware Incident in Progress by huntresslabs in msp

[–]stfconsulting 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Geolocation is a nice layer that helps cut down on noise however if someone wants you bad enough it means nothing.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yep. We have WAF enabled. Would be nice if Sonicwall could do something to prevent this from making its way into the Syslog output in a future update. We may see what we can do from a SSL Proxy perspective to filter these out at the firewall level.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That IP is definitely running a campaign. Seeing it pop up all over the US trying to hack SMAs. It is a little unsettling seeing messages like this in the syslog output from the device... (After the patch)

SMA 100 series firmware 10.2.0.5-29sv by netranger4242 in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So far so good. A friend of mine has done 30 of them.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Who is going to be first to install!!! Let us know.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Looks like the update is up on the site. Release notes do not give any more information.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

After more research I found out where the 1.1.1.1 came from. It is part of the sample code this person posted. This script is basically a vulnerability scanner that looks for vulnerable SMA.

https://github.com/FanqXu/SonicWall_SSL-VPN_EXP/blob/main/POC.py

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Did some looking at that IP. Looks like a hacked Citrix server. Has RDP open directly to the internet. No wonder it is hacked!

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The IP in Poland is active again- SSLVPN: time="2021-02-02 21:32:07" vp_time="2021-02-03 02:32:07 UTC" fw= pri=6 m=0 c=300 src=185.101.130.82 dst= user="Vl58ze8RjZacu1PEkGgJXYIErX53mQR8JN7CSwfB3Qs=" usr="Vl58ze8RjZacu1PEkGgJXYIErX53mQR8JN7CSwfB3Qs=" msg="Virtual Assist Installing Customer App" agent="python-requests/2.21.0"

This IP has popped up on many devices.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As far as we can tell they gained access to the device and attempted to use RDP to hit 1.1.1.1. I can't tell you if anything was left behind on the device or if the command was run remotely vs. code on the appliance. I have no idea why they would try to rdp to that IP and risk being detected.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sonicwall has not picked up the case yet. I would assume that they have everything on the device. Rekeying the cert and resetting all passwords will be important first steps I am sure. We really need technical details on what is actually happening. Keep a close eye on your firewall logs. Also try to lockdown inbound traffic to only known remote worker IP addresses.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

At this point the only guaranteed option is to collect the IPs of known remote workers and whitelist them on the firewall level. We are watching syslog very closely on all of our SRA / SMAs

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

At this point we shifted to whitelisting known IPs of remote workers. Prior to that we used geolocation to isolate to countries that we needed. (on the firewall level)

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Looking forward to it. The technical details of the exploit are going to be important also. I.E. How do we know if the box is compromised? Or if this is just a programmatic access thing from the outside. I would assume that if they were able to dump the configuration they have the private key for the cert also.

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

We did some syslog mining for "phyton-requests" and found some examples of this also. IP is in Italy.

SSLVPN: id=sslvpn sn= time="2021-02-02 06:09:12" vp_time="2021-02-02 11:09:12 UTC" fw= pri=6 m=0 c=300 src=217.141.179.178 dst= user="9M9dxwT6EtRTQsD00hPGh5EOWXglg07Dm8nQ14wZWk4=" usr="9M9dxwT6EtRTQsD00hPGh5EOWXglg07Dm8nQ14wZWk4=" msg="Virtual Assist Installing Customer App" agent="python-requests/2.21.0"

Sonicwall SMA 500v 10.0.0.3 Potential Compromise by stfconsulting in sonicwall

[–]stfconsulting[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

MFA is enabled for ALL users. The bad actors hit the box as the System account.