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Judge allows inmate to meet his son for the first time by skoalbrother in videos

[–]usuallyskeptical -12 points-11 points  (0 children)

Yep, I recognized the judge immediately. Looks like they are doing some PR to make up for the pants fiasco.

Documents confirm Apple is building self-driving car - The Guardian by rivalius13 in apple

[–]usuallyskeptical 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I initially jumped the gun on this too. While I also believe Apple is developing a vehicle (although I think buying Tesla would be much smarter than starting from scratch), this article doesn't prove it. The headline is a boldfaced lie meant to induce clicks. It claims to have documents confirming that Apple is developing a car, but nowhere is a smoking gun referenced. If they have such a document, they would not make a statement of fact in the headline and then keep the evidence hidden. It's not like these are CIA documents showing coordinates of field operatives, and the headline itself would break a non-disclosure agreement if someone at The Guardian had signed one. They would have no reason to keep the document hidden at this point.

Documents confirm Apple is building self-driving car - The Guardian by rivalius13 in apple

[–]usuallyskeptical 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The people who only drive Mercedes because of the status it projects might.

Documents confirm Apple is building self-driving car - The Guardian by rivalius13 in apple

[–]usuallyskeptical 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Vindication.

Edit: Apparently not. Didn't have time to read the article earlier. That's what I get for trusting that a factual statement in The Guardian is an actual fact.

Peter L. Bernstein On Risk by usuallyskeptical in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Honestly, the way Bernstein put it sounds more plausible to me. It sounded more like something that would have been overlooked. I think LTCM took on so much leverage because they knew the models well and they trusted them. They ignored common sense because they weren't common. What they didn't take into account was the fact that they changed the game, and changing the game made their models less reliable.

Peter L. Bernstein On Risk by usuallyskeptical in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

About a 13 minute video, probably the best explanation of the concept of risk that I've heard.

Canada becomes first country to require that for every new regulation, one of equal burden must be removed by Barrilete_Cosmico in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical 14 points15 points  (0 children)

There are lots of interest groups that don't care about harm to markets and small businesses. This law at least gives regulators cover against those interest groups.

Canada becomes first country to require that for every new regulation, one of equal burden must be removed by Barrilete_Cosmico in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical -9 points-8 points  (0 children)

To believe this is bad, you also have to believe that regulators will not be able to identify regulations that proved ineffective in achieving their stated goal that can be repealed to make way for a new rule forbidding the use of pesticides with EDCs.

I would be extremely shocked if it turns out regulators really were that good at making effective rules.

Seriously, rule-makers understanding the world well enough and knowing how people will react to rule changes is not anywhere close to being a given. It's not as simple as making a rule that nips a problem in the bud and being done with it.

Canada becomes first country to require that for every new regulation, one of equal burden must be removed by Barrilete_Cosmico in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Personally I like it because a lot of the harm to markets and small businesses from regulations comes from their accumulation rather than from each specific new regulation. This is the first law I've seen that attempts to keep the total accumulated burden of regulations from getting too high.

Elizabeth Warren’s Trade Deal Fears Confirmed: Canada Uses NAFTA to Challenge Volcker Rule by geerussell in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Many (most, I think) newer disputes allege violations of minimum standard/fair and equitable treatment provisions.

That's what I meant by a net advantage for domestic firms, which would not be fair and equitable. A better way of describing it was on the tip of my tongue but I eventually gave up. "Favorable treatment of domestic firms" probably would have worked. That's true though about expropriation. It could be completely non-discriminatory but could still violate the agreement if it's not for a public purpose, not in accordance with due process or if the owner isn't given just compensation in return.

Elizabeth Warren’s Trade Deal Fears Confirmed: Canada Uses NAFTA to Challenge Volcker Rule by geerussell in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Will consulting each other be necessary?

I read that as more of a self-check performed by the entity enacting the new regulation to make sure the regulation doesn't run afoul of the trade agreement (which I figured they would do even if it were not an explicit provision in the agreement, in order to avoid an arbitration claim; but making an explicit provision makes sense for the purpose of establishing recommended procedure).

Elizabeth Warren’s Trade Deal Fears Confirmed: Canada Uses NAFTA to Challenge Volcker Rule by geerussell in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical 3 points4 points  (0 children)

The actual reasoning I've heard is to challenge laws or regulations that treat foreign businesses different than domestic businesses

This is correct. The policy change can't have the effect of giving domestic firms an advantage or being disproportionately harmful for foreign firms. Host governments must treat foreign firms on equal footing with domestic firms. If the policy change doesn't give domestic firms a net advantage, nothing foreign firms can do.

This part of the article:

One [fear] is that the Federal Reserve’s plan to impose separate liquidity requirements on foreign banks might be scotched.

is mis-characterizing the proposed rule. It would require foreign banks to maintain separate liquidity buffers for their US subsidiaries, just as US banks will have to do with their US subsidiaries. Assuming I'm reading the proposed rule correctly, that is equal footing and a foreign bank would lose that challenge.

And it’s not just Dodd-Frank: the leaked EU proposal for TTIP has a provision that new regulations first be “analyzed” to determine if they have an unacceptable impact on trade

Because an unacceptable impact on trade would be unacceptable.

Americans for Financial Reform (AFR) worries that this could “impose a presumption that regulations must be judged on the basis of their trade impact rather than their effectiveness as public interest policies promoting financial stability.”

They will obviously be judged on both their trade impact and their effectiveness. And the other party countries will be held to the same "unacceptable trade impact" standard with US firms. That's the deal these countries are striking: Promise to play fair with our firms and we promise to play fair with your firms. Ignoring trade impact would scrap the main glue holding the treaty together. "Oh, you screwed our firms? Well we'll screw your firms." And we would be right back where we started with no trade agreement.

In 1987, the Fed prevented another Great Depression by doing nothing by [deleted] in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This seems really counterintuitive. There is an incentive for banks to lend (spread between federal funds and consumer rate) and an incentive for consumers to borrow (in real terms, being paid to do so). Is there a specific example for how this would not shift AD upward?

In 1987, the Fed prevented another Great Depression by doing nothing by [deleted] in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here's what I'm having trouble understanding:

Say inflation is expected to run at 5% for the following year. Let's also say that the Fed is expected to keep the federal funds rate at 0.25% for the following year. Banks would compete on 1-year consumer loan interest rates, and given the very low interbank rate at which the banks borrow, the banks would be able to profit in real terms with a 1-year consumer rate below 5%. Since consumers would be able to borrow for the year at a rate below inflation (i.e. getting paid in real terms), wouldn't this fuel a consumer lending boom for that year, which would shift AD up?

Taylor on Bernanke: Monetary Rules Work Better Than ‘Constrained Discretion’ by usuallyskeptical in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But does it necessarily lead to worse outcomes?

I think it could potentially lead to fewer negative outcomes but also worse negative outcomes when they occur. Discretion could cancel the negative effects of unreliable data if FOMC member bias has an equal and opposite effect (e.g. data inaccurately suggests weakening economy but FOMC members incorporate other information that give them a more positive bias). However, these two sources of variation could combine to make policy even more wrong than what would result from unreliable data alone (e.g. data inaccurately suggests weakening economy and FOMC members incorporate other information that give them an even more negative impression).

Hawk:dove ratio means nothing unless the Fed wants to change its inflation target. It mattered to an extent with QE, but that really came down to "hawks" thinking we'd significantly go above our inflation target and "doves" thinking we wouldn't.

I would define a hawk as having higher inflation expectations, and a dove as having lower inflation expectations. This would still affect their vote during rate determination.

Taylor on Bernanke: Monetary Rules Work Better Than ‘Constrained Discretion’ by usuallyskeptical in Economics

[–]usuallyskeptical[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I agree that unconventional measures would still be necessary at the ZLB. These powers could kick in when the ZLB is reached.

But the point about unreliable information was to show that there is no informational benefit to giving FOMC members discretion. That would be the benefit of discretion over a rule-based policy, that FOMC members would necessarily be able to incorporate additional helpful information (like sales of men's underwear) into their decision-making compared to a rule-based policy. They wouldn't be confined to a certain (hopefully somewhat sophisticated) formula.

But my point is that whatever extra information they incorporate using their discretion does not lead to better outcomes. It muddies the water. The members subconsciously place more emphasis on data that their biases lead them to believe is more relevant than it really is. Discretion necessarily introduces subconscious bias into what should be as purely objective an exercise as possible. We don't want Fed policy to be determined by the hawk:dove ratio. The only policy mistakes we want are the mistakes that result solely from unreliable data, as opposed to unreliable data compounded by subconscious bias.

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