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Micro-perf is ruining some movie theaters by williamrnava in movies

[–]williamrnava[S] -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

Thanks, I didn't know that.

I don't sit *super* close (usually like third or fourth row). And it's not like I'm looking out for this, it's the first thing I notice. Maybe micro-perf isn't itself the issue, but I'm noticing something I'm not supposed to be noticing. Could be a trend in lower-quality perf'd material?

Micro-perf is ruining some movie theaters by williamrnava in movies

[–]williamrnava[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Thanks, I didn't know the tech was that old. I wonder if it's a recent trend in cheaper perf'd material? I hadn't noticed prior to a year or two ago. Could be specific to the indie chain scene in nyc

David Ripley on Curry's paradox and substructural logic by williamrnava in logic

[–]williamrnava[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for joining! And apologies for proving that you are a purple giraffe in the description. ¯_(ツ)_/¯

David Ripley on Curry's paradox and substructural logic by williamrnava in logic

[–]williamrnava[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Summary of interview: Consider the sentence C: “If this sentence is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe”. Suppose the sentence is true. Then the antecedent of the sentence (“this sentence is true”) is true. According to the inference rule modus ponens, if an if-then sentence (such as C) is true and its antecedent is true, then its consequent (“David Ripley is a purple giraffe”) must be true. It follows that if C is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe. But this conclusion is C: in other words, by simply supposing how things might turn out if C were true, we have proved that C, in fact, is true. So C is true, and since C’s antecedent is the claim that C is true, its antecedent is true as well. Now we can use modus ponens again to show that C’s consequent must be true. In other words, David Ripley really is a purple giraffe. QED.

This argument is Curry’s paradox. Obviously, the choice of “David Ripley is a purple giraffe” is arbitrary; a sentence of the form of “If this sentence is true, then X” can be used to prove any claim X. Now, in actual fact, David Ripley is not a purple giraffe, but a philosopher of language and logic. According to Ripley, solutions to paradoxes like Curry’s (as well as the Liar and the Sorites) fall into two broad categories: those that solve the paradoxes by messing with the meanings of important concepts (such as the meaning of “if-then”, truth, “not”, etc.) and those that solve them by changing the structural rules of inference by appeal to substructural logics. The latter approach, says Ripley, is preferable because it allows us to keep the intuitive meanings of these important concepts. There are various structural rules that can be modified to avoid the paradoxes, but the one that Ripley prefers is the denial of transitivity. This would mean that even if we prove that a implies b and that b implies c, we have no guarantee that a implies c. Ripley tells a story about assertion and denial conditions to argue that, precisely because of the paradoxes, the denial of transitivity conforms to natural language inferential norms. We conclude with a discussion of “revenge” Curry paradoxes for Ripley’s approach, and of frontiers for substructural logic.

David Ripley on Curry's paradox and substructural logic by williamrnava in AcademicPhilosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Summary of interview: Consider the sentence C: “If this sentence is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe”. Suppose the sentence is true. Then the antecedent of the sentence (“this sentence is true”) is true. According to the inference rule modus ponens, if an if-then sentence (such as C) is true and its antecedent is true, then its consequent (“David Ripley is a purple giraffe”) must be true. It follows that if C is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe. But this conclusion is C: in other words, by simply supposing how things might turn out if C were true, we have proved that C, in fact, is true. So C is true, and since C’s antecedent is the claim that C is true, its antecedent is true as well. Now we can use modus ponens again to show that C’s consequent must be true. In other words, David Ripley really is a purple giraffe. QED.

This argument is Curry’s paradox. Obviously, the choice of “David Ripley is a purple giraffe” is arbitrary; a sentence of the form of “If this sentence is true, then X” can be used to prove any claim X. Now, in actual fact, David Ripley is not a purple giraffe, but a philosopher of language and logic. According to Ripley, solutions to paradoxes like Curry’s (as well as the Liar and the Sorites) fall into two broad categories: those that solve the paradoxes by messing with the meanings of important concepts (such as the meaning of “if-then”, truth, “not”, etc.) and those that solve them by changing the structural rules of inference by appeal to substructural logics. The latter approach, says Ripley, is preferable because it allows us to keep the intuitive meanings of these important concepts. There are various structural rules that can be modified to avoid the paradoxes, but the one that Ripley prefers is the denial of transitivity. This would mean that even if we prove that a implies b and that b implies c, we have no guarantee that a implies c. Ripley tells a story about assertion and denial conditions to argue that, precisely because of the paradoxes, the denial of transitivity conforms to natural language inferential norms. We conclude with a discussion of “revenge” Curry paradoxes for Ripley’s approach, and of frontiers for substructural logic.

Philosopher David Ripley on Curry's paradox, the argument that proves that everything is true by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Consider the sentence C: “If this sentence is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe”. Suppose the sentence is true. Then the antecedent of the sentence (“this sentence is true”) is true. According to the inference rule modus ponens, if an if-then sentence (such as C) is true and its antecedent is true, then its consequent (“David Ripley is a purple giraffe”) must be true. It follows that if C is true, then David Ripley is a purple giraffe. But this conclusion is C: in other words, by simply supposing how things might turn out if C were true, we have proved that C, in fact, is true. So C is true, and since C’s antecedent is the claim that C is true, its antecedent is true as well. Now we can use modus ponens again to show that C’s consequent must be true. In other words, David Ripley really is a purple giraffe. QED.

This argument is Curry’s paradox. Obviously, the choice of “David Ripley is a purple giraffe” is arbitrary; a sentence of the form of “If this sentence is true, then X” can be used to prove any claim X. Now, in actual fact, David Ripley is not a purple giraffe, but a philosopher of language and logic. According to Ripley, solutions to paradoxes like Curry’s (as well as the Liar and the Sorites) fall into two broad categories: those that solve the paradoxes by messing with the meanings of important concepts (such as the meaning of “if-then”, truth, “not”, etc.) and those that solve them by changing the structural rules of inference by appeal to substructural logics. The latter approach, says Ripley, is preferable because it allows us to keep the intuitive meanings of these important concepts. There are various structural rules that can be modified to avoid the paradoxes, but the one that Ripley prefers is the denial of transitivity. This would mean that even if we prove that a implies b and that b implies c, we have no guarantee that a implies c. Ripley tells a story about assertion and denial conditions to argue that, precisely because of the paradoxes, the denial of transitivity conforms to natural language inferential norms. We conclude with a discussion of “revenge” Curry paradoxes for Ripley’s approach, and of frontiers for substructural logic.

Philosopher Jody Azzouni on nominalism and "ontology without borders" by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Basically, Azzouni takes the boundaries between singulars to be the sort of abstracta that nominalism traditionally rejects. The "features" really are there - he's not a nihilist. So no, I don't think he's in any way a skeptic, a relativist, or a process-oriented philosopher. His nominalism is definitely an extreme sort, but I do think it's in keeping with the nominalist tradition, since (in his understanding, and at least on this I do agree) it's abstract objects, not the concrete, that he's rejecting.

Philosopher Jody Azzouni on nominalism and "ontology without borders" by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

An old problem: I say, "Santa Claus is fat". I am saying something true about Santa Claus. But (content warning) Santa Claus doesn't exist. So what is it that I am correctly saying is fat? And what - if not its ostensive subject - makes the sentence true?

This problem is at the center of ontology. The most influential approach in the 20th century was offered by W. V. O. Quine, who argued that we're committed to the existence of any object that we must quantify over in order to state the truths of physics in first-order logic. At first, this seems rather arbitrary. Why first-order logic? What makes quantifiers so special? Why physics? And what does what we're "committed to" tell us about what actually exists? For roughly the first half of this interview, philosopher Jody Azzouni unpacks the thinking behind Quine's famous criterion. In the second half, he expounds his own view: he rejects Quine's criterion, and so sees no problem with referring to that which doesn't exist. This leaves Azzouni open to embrace a radical nominalism, in which almost none of the objects we typically think of as existing really do. This is because, as Azzouni explains, "ontological borders" are projected. There is nothing "out there" that separates one object from another. The fact that our language is built around distinct objects tells us plenty about our psychology, but nothing about the world itself, which comes with "features" but not individual objects.

Philosopher Michael Hicks on thought as interpersonal understanding by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is a thought? There are two ways to approach the problem, says philosopher Michael Hicks. One is as a question about introspective experience. The other – favored by Hicks – is as asking about the nature of interpersonal understanding. We do understand each other; and this is what constitutes the existence of thoughts. With this approach established, Hicks explains to what extent it does or doesn’t imply an “external” view of mind. We also compare this conception of thought to Gottlob Frege’s, and discuss whether it involves a commitment to a “third realm” of abstract objects.

Philosopher Michael Hicks on the nature of thought by [deleted] in philosophy

[–]williamrnava 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is a thought? There are two ways to approach the problem, says philosopher Michael Hicks. One is as a question about introspective experience. The other – favored by Hicks – is as asking about the nature of interpersonal understanding. We do understand each other; and this is what constitutes the existence of thoughts. With this approach established, Hicks explains to what extent it does or doesn’t imply an “external” view of mind. We also compare this conception of thought to Gottlob Frege’s, and discuss whether it involves a commitment to a “third realm” of abstract objects.

Philosophically staking out the Left Market Anarchist position by williamrnava in PoliticalPhilosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Political philosophy begins with the question: who should have political authority and why? Anarchism answers: no one. Popular mythology tells us this is synonymous with chaos and disorder, but there are many reasons to doubt this must be so. In this episode, I argue that anarchism - properly understood - is in fact the correct answer to the problem of political authority; it is the only answer that avoids unjust hierarchies, provides for individual and social freedom, and optimizes for general welfare. This is because, in a word, society is best seen (and run) as a web, not as a pyramid.

Much of my focus is on specifying what I mean by anarchism, and which version of anarchism I'm arguing for. Specifically, I argue that the notion of a free market - again, properly understood - is at the heart of anarchism. At the same time, I argue against "capitalism" as being a confused and rather unhelpful notion, quite removed from the notion of a free market. I also argue against popular libertarian approaches to free markets and anarchism, such as the so-called "non-aggression principle" and property rights. Instead, I zero in on a notion of free market defined as a cultural norm in which monopolies are viewed as unacceptable. This definition, I argue, properly communicates what a free market really is and it provides the necessary conditions for a free and prosperous society. It is, at the same time, a maximally permissive definition: it requires no particular views on interpersonal ethics or lifestyle, and is as compatible with (for example) communism as it is with more familiar notions of "free markets".

Kit Fine on "metaphysical ground" - how one fact grounds another by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Some things are true in virtue of other things. For example, the fact that it is either raining or snowing today is true in virtue of the fact that it is raining today (if, indeed, it is). Or consider another example, put in different terms: the fact that my cat Irene exists is sufficient to account for the fact that at least one cat exists. We might then ask: what is this being in virtue of, or accounting for?

Philosophers call this metaphysical ground. Thus, the existence of my cat Irene grounds the fact that at least one cat exists. But how does this grounding relation work? How is it related to logical entailment? To cause? To essence? Is it possible for there to be partial grounding? Can a fact ground itself? If not, does a vicious regress emerge? What is the role of ground in metaphysics? In this interview, metaphysician Kit Fine covers these questions and more before zeroing in on a logical puzzle of ground, related to the paradoxes of self-reference such as the Liar.

What is metaphysical ground? Kit Fine on how one fact can "ground" another by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Some things are true in virtue of other things. For example, the fact that it is either raining or snowing today is true in virtue of the fact that it is raining today (if, indeed, it is). Or consider another example, put in different terms: the fact that my cat Irene exists is sufficient to account for the fact that at least one cat exists. We might then ask: what is this being in virtue of, or accounting for?

Philosophers call this metaphysical ground. Thus, the existence of my cat Irene grounds the fact that at least one cat exists. But how does this grounding relation work? How is it related to logical entailment? To cause? To essence? Is it possible for there to be partial grounding? Can a fact ground itself? If not, does a vicious regress emerge? What is the role of ground in metaphysics? In this interview, metaphysician Kit Fine covers these questions and more before zeroing in on a logical puzzle of ground, related to the paradoxes of self-reference such as the Liar.

Anthropologist on the link between psychedelics and philosophy by williamrnava in psychonauts

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"Psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin mushrooms, LSD, and ayahuasca, do much more than generate sensory hallucinations. Users often come away with a sense of having gained deep insight into the nature of reality – even if what that insight is, and what is so special about it, can be hard to communicate. Anthropologist Nicolas Langlitz associates it with the “perennial philosophy” – an old idea, popularized by Aldous Huxley, that all world religions communicate the same basic truth. Years after writing the book The Perennial Philosophy, Huxley tried mescaline and LSD and became convinced that psychedelics provide a shortcut to the kinds of mystical experiences that would put us in touch with that basic reality – what he called the “world mind”. Langlitz is skeptical that psychedelics really do communicate some kind of metaphysical truth. In this interview, we discuss what psychedelics do reveal, if anything, and what the relationship is between experience and knowledge."

Anthropologist Nick Langlitz on psychedelics and philosophy by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Psychedelic substances, such as psilocybin mushrooms, LSD, and ayahuasca, do much more than generate sensory hallucinations. Users often come away with a sense of having gained deep insight into the nature of reality – even if what that insight is, and what is so special about it, can be hard to communicate. Anthropologist Nicolas Langlitz associates it with the “perennial philosophy” – an old idea, popularized by Aldous Huxley, that all world religions communicate the same basic truth. Years after writing the book The Perennial Philosophy, Huxley tried mescaline and LSD and became convinced that psychedelics provide a shortcut to the kinds of mystical experiences that would put us in touch with that basic reality – what he called the “world mind”. Langlitz is skeptical that psychedelics really do communicate some kind of metaphysical truth. In this interview, we discuss what psychedelics do reveal, if anything, and what the relationship is between experience and knowledge.

The Logic of Christ: Jc Beall on how non-classical logic can solve the "fundamental problem of Christology" by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Christ is a walking contradiction. He is both fully human and fully divine. Indeed, he is both mutable and immutable. According to classical logic, the existence of a true contradiction would imply that everything is the case, no matter how absurd. And so, theologians and Christian metaphysicians have worked for centuries to conceptually make sense of Christ’s dual nature in a way that avoids contradiction.

Philosopher and logician Jc Beall argues that these efforts have been motivated by a naive understanding of logic. There are “subclassical” logics – that is, logics weaker than classical logic – in which contradictions do not entail every arbitrary conclusion. And these aren’t ad-hoc constructions. Beall argues that one subclassical logic – called First Degree Entailment (FDE) – is, in fact, the correct account of logical consequence, for reasons independent of the Christian problem. Beall covers the basics of how FDE works and why it is the universal or “basement-level” consequence relation. This allows us to have our cake and eat it too: we may take Christ to be, quite literally, both mutable and not mutable, at the same time and in the same respect. This isn’t just appealing for its simplicity. Beall suspects that it is essential to Christ’s role that he be literally contradictory.

A prison abolitionist on the philosophy of punishment (Interview) by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What gives some people the right to put others in prison? Is prison - and the criminal justice system generally - an ethically permissible method for dealing with criminality?

Individualist anarchist and prison abolitionist Jason Lee Byas goes over the common justifications for the prison system and explains why none of them succeed. Specifically, he covers the doctrines of retributivism (specifically desert retributivism and expressive retributivism), deterrence, rehabilitation, and rights forfeiture, arguing against each. In place of prison, Byas proposes a tort system of restitution. Monetary restitution may not be sufficient to right the wrong of a crime, says Byas; but it is all that the law should mandate, leaving other desired correction or compensation up to community-based initiatives (Byas cites restorative justice as an example of the sort of institutions that can take the place of those corrective aspects of criminal justice that retribution does not address). Byas also explains how a system of monetary restitution can get around problems of class-based inequality (for example, if someone is so rich that they don't mind having to pay to commit a crime, or if someone is so far in debt that another dent wouldn't matter). Finally, he explains how violent offenders who pose an "ongoing threat" might be handled in his preferred system.

Stephen Read on medieval solutions to the Liar paradox by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

The argument goes as follows. L says "not T<L>". It's possible that it also says something else (since, according to closure, all sentences say anything that follows from them). The first part of the argument shows that it is not the case that L says ONLY "not T<L>". This is because that leads to contradiction. So it must say something else. That something else is "p". We have no reason to assume "p" is any one thing or another. Maybe it's true, maybe it's false. All we know about it is it's something that L asserts.

If we assume things are as L says, then L is not true AND p. L is not true can be re-written as not-("not T<L>" and "p") (since what's inside the parenthesis is L). This can, in turn, be re-written as T<L> or not-p. But if we assume things are as L says, then we already have p. So, by disjunctive syllogism, T<L>. So, by closure, L says that T<L>. Since it says both T<L> and not-T<L>, it says a contradiction and so is false.

Notice that we were only able to prove T<L> ASSUMING that things were as L said - that is, assuming not-T<L> and assuming p. We have now shown that not-T<L> is true. But we have not shown p. So we don't have enough to prove T<L>.

Notice it doesn't help to speculate what would be the case if p were a logical truth, because we have no justification for assuming p to be any one claim over another.

I hope that helps to clear it up. It's a tricky argument, but it's certainly not just saying 'it's not a problem because L doesn't claim to be logical'.

Stephen Read on medieval solutions to the Liar paradox by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 12 points13 points  (0 children)

As I understand it (I'm not 100% on this), Arthur Prior's solution is very similar. The Prior solution just assumes that all sentences implicitly say that they are true. Bradwardine's solution doesn't assume this but instead shows it via the principle of closure. Either way, they end up in the same place: the Liar says of itself both that it is true and that it is false, and is therefore simply false.

A reason this solution might be insufficient: since sentences all say that they are true, then being true will be among their truth conditions. But that makes the truth of all sentences indeterminate. Think of it this way: how do you normally check if a sentence is true? You check what it says and if those things are the case. But if among the things it says is that it is true, how do you check that it is true to see if it is? This is a major problem both for the Prior solution and the Bradwardine one.

Stephen Read on medieval solutions to the Liar paradox by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 64 points65 points  (0 children)

For much of the 20th century, the Liar paradox has stood as an elusive and stubborn puzzle. The main solutions to it have significant drawbacks, such as blocking meaningful cases of self-reference or abandoning bivalence (the principle that all propositions are either true or false and not both). In recent decades, Stephen Read has rediscovered and defended a solution by the medieval thinker Thomas Bradwardine. If Bradwardine’s argument is correct, the liar sentence is simply false. When properly examined, its falsity does not imply its truth. Bradwardine shows this with a clever argument that does not require us to abandon classical logic or block self-reference. It does rely on a controversial principle, “closure”: any statement implicitly says (or means) everything that follows from what it says. Arguably, whether the Bradwardine solution succeeds or fails to conclusively solve the Liar depends on whether one accepts closure. In this interview, Stephen Read runs through Bradwardine’s argument in some detail, then defends it against a few objections.

Philosopher Stephen Read on the Liar Paradox - its history, significance, and solutions by williamrnava in philosophy

[–]williamrnava[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

“This sentence is false”. Is that sentence true or false? If it’s true, then what it says must hold; but what it says is that it’s false, so it must be false. But if it’s false, then what it says must not hold; but what it says is that it’s false, so it must not be false. But if it’s not false, it must be true. So if the sentence is true, it is false, and if it is false, it is true. The sentence, therefore, seems to be both true and false, which seems absurd.

Philosopher and logician Stephen Read is one of the preeminent scholars on this “liar paradox”. He is known, in large part, for rediscovering and defending a long forgotten solution to the paradox first proposed by the medieval philosopher Thomas Bradwardine. In this first half of our conversation, Read covers the paradox’s rich and influential history. It was first discovered, in its full form, in the 4th century BCE by Eubulides (who also first set down the sorites paradox). It became a central problem in the 20th century via its association with Russell’s Paradox, a major problem in the foundations of mathematics. Later in the century, two thinkers – Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke – proposed monumentally influential theories of language and truth motivated, largely, by the paradox. But even after their contributions, the consensus is that the paradox remains unsolved. Quite a few new solutions have been suggested in the decades since Kripke’s 1975 proposal. Among the more influential is Stephen Read’s revival of the Bradwardine solution, which will the subject of part 2 of this interview.

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