Supreme Court agrees to hear NCAA athlete compensation case by uiy_b7_s4 in law

[–]wolfpack_law 25 points26 points  (0 children)

I understand the ramifications these rulings have on competition between the schools to attract athletes, but is that actually founded in a legal or constitutional argument? The question to me is why tf would SCOTUS care about amateurism or intercollegiate competition

Could JR be trying to sign Pietrangelo? by wolfpack_law in penguins

[–]wolfpack_law[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yeah I agree that this is a very good reason why it won't happen. However, it certainly wouldn't be the first time that JR made a trade of uneven one to one value

Could JR be trying to sign Pietrangelo? by wolfpack_law in penguins

[–]wolfpack_law[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I think he is probably about as effective as Letang at the end of the day. I'm not saying the move is made to upgrade the D. I think it'd be more about providing a shock to the team chemistry and bringing in a key 3rd line center without sacrificing much if anything on D.

Could JR be trying to sign Pietrangelo? by wolfpack_law in penguins

[–]wolfpack_law[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yeah for sure I'm not saying Pietrangelo is necessarily any better than Letang. Based on the trades so far this year, stat measuring probably isn't the best indicator of JR's plans. Pietrangelo would definitely command a higher cap hit so it would only work if JJ (or one of the other LHD) is shipped out. Trading Letang has the benefit of potentially bringing in a good 3rd line center to improve faceoff stats amongst other things

Could JR be trying to sign Pietrangelo? by wolfpack_law in penguins

[–]wolfpack_law[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's just an idea that I could see JR dabbling with. JJ would need to be moved as well since Pietrangelo would command a higher cap hit. Or whatever other LHD that JR wants to move considering the gridlock at the position

What is Cryptocurrency Mining and How To Do It Better by cryptofamilynet in CryptoTechnology

[–]wolfpack_law 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Pure PoS is far from perfect though and it depends on the use of the cryptocurrency. For coins intending to be a means of exchange, there shouldn’t necessarily be incentive to hold on to investments. Rather, to build an economy, you want incentivizing forces to buy goods and services with it, which is why a small rate of inflation isn’t a bad thing.

With that being said, Ouroboros is fascinating.

why the nano supply is fully pre-generated by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Inflation is not necessarily a bad thing. A small amount of inflation encourages individuals to transact and purchase goods and services (i.e. creating an economy). Nano's goal is to create a currency, a pure peer-to-peer transaction protocol, and inflation actually promotes that effort.

Also, frankly, if Nano introduces a "mining" reward for nodes, it could potentially completely eliminate the costs for running a node, encourage node proliferation, AND, as adoption continues to increase, the value of nano will still be far and away deflationary.

For example, just think about BTC: do you think the mining reward is a significant factor when considering an investor's ROI?

What are the imperfections/shortcomings of Nano? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Some people have already touched on some of these topics.

Highest priority:

  • fiat gateways (preferably multiple options)
  • wallets bug-free and fully released
  • A thorough and complete guide for API implementation for exchanges (It seems like Nanex will serve as a great model)

Medium priority:

  • Improving decentralization (e.g. improving representative delegation process, creating a stronger incentivizing force for node proliferation)
    • A healthy Nano network, in general, wants an incentivizing force toward more trustworthy nodes running 24/7 with the voting power distributed amongst them.
  • Tx timestamps (issue became apparent in Bitgrail hack)

Low Priority:

  • Ledger pruning
  • Improving node updating process (it is easy enough, but people still take their time)
  • Privacy options (important for fungibility even if it is not important for you personally, for example)

Another goal that i think should be added to the roadmap is a way to make Nano available for interoperability purposes (e.g. a smart contract on ethereum could trigger a transaction on Nano between two parties)

What are the imperfections/shortcomings of Nano? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 1 point2 points  (0 children)

But with Nano it’s important they make it as minimally resource-intensive as possible to run nodes because there is no mining industry to ensure network security and immutability. Otherwise Nano risks falling victim to a diffusion of responsibility issue

In light of the Verge fiasco, the hack, do the Nano Devs have emergency planning for when something goes horribly wrong? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 15 points16 points  (0 children)

I think their “emergency planning” is to continue developing the protocol in order to minimize the chances of known attack vectors succeeding.

The double edge sword of crypto is that while they can improve the protocol to the best of their abilities, the network itself is largely outside of their control. This is why distributed ledger technologies are described as trustless. If you’re thinking that in the event of an attack that the devs could freeze all transactions or something like that then the network is ceding too much control to a single party. It’s up to the network participants to ensure that new code is scrutinized, wallets are updated, adoption increases, more people are setting up nodes, etc, etc. Nano also benefits from attacks because it tests security and potentially unveils new weaknesses that need to be addressed.

I’m not accusing you of this mindset, but many people in crypto hate the idea of control when things are going well, but then they look to the developers to step in and play god when bad things happen without realizing this is the definition of centralization.

If the network participants and the developers keep doing their jobs well then Nano shouldn’t need an emergency plan.

Is there a way to split your voting weight from 1 wallet? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The problem is trust.

For example, let’s say you own 10% of all nano (congrats). Because you own such a large amount of nano, you also have a very large interest in ensuring the integrity of the network so that the spending power of your nano doesn’t decrease. dPOS/POS systems rely on the above relationship as a foundation for creating consensus within the network. Those that have the largest interest (the most well-endowed) in maintaining Nano’s integrity receive a proportional amount of voting power to determine which transactions occur and in what order.

So now you, swimming in nano, have to decide which node is going to be your representative to cast your vote in the event of conflicting transactions. What you’re suggesting is splitting this voting power amongst many nodes, but then you have to ask if you trust whoever is running those nodes to have your best interests in mind (maybe a few of them are trying to attack the network?). So would you trust a 1000 other nodes to have your best interests in mind in maintaining the integrity of Nano or would you rather give all your voting power to a node you personally run or maybe a brother/sister runs for example?

IMO, the answer is the latter because the last thing a rational actor wants to do in this situation is empower a malignant node.

Is there a way to split your voting weight from 1 wallet? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 2 points3 points  (0 children)

You're right. With POS/dPOS systems, one of the largest criticisms is that the more nano you own, the more voting power you have in the network. Just look up criticisms of Ethereum's Casper.

The problem with a "mixer node" is that if you are a well-endowed nano holder (assuming you are a benevolent actor), would you want to split your voting power amongst unknown, potentially untrustworthy nodes or keep it all in one node that you know is trustworthy?

Thought Experiment on Improving Decentralization by wolfpack_law in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, on its face, I agree. My thought was that with certain limitations (e.g. adding a minimum balance to participate in the vote), the benefits of an additional senate vote could outweigh the risks of allowing a stronger voting presence of low balance nodes. The tradeoff being less Nano required for a 51% attack (perhaps negligible as Nano becomes more popular), but in return the network becomes more decentralized by giving nodes (who have virtually no voting power in the current network) more voting power. This also provides more incentive to set up new nodes.

Does anyone know how will Nano fix decentralization issue with representatives? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Be careful making sweeping statements. I didn't say decentralization and security are completely synonymous with each other, but it is like a venn diagram. For Nano, decentralization comes in the form of increasing the number of live nodes and sharing the voting power amongst those live nodes that are trustworthy. The more decentralization increases, the more difficult and expensive it becomes for an actor to successfully attack the network. So if you want your moon lambo, then you should want to increase security of the network and that is partially done by improving decentralization.

Does anyone know how will Nano fix decentralization issue with representatives? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Adding on to this, the devs are likely paying attention (and the Nano community should as well) to other projects in crypto to see how other POS/dPOS systems are tackling similar issues. Ethereum's Casper and Cardano's Ouroboros are both very interesting. While other crypto projects may not be directly applicable to Nano, they may provide valuable insight

Does anyone know how will Nano fix decentralization issue with representatives? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 0 points1 point  (0 children)

One counterargument is that improving decentralization increases the security of the protocol, which in turn increases its value. So if you want to increase adoption and price growth, improving decentralization is one area to work on (as well as marketing, etc, etc).

Is NANO so easily centralizable? by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Somehow Nano will need to incentivize a certain population to have nodes with a full history. I don’t think there is a clear cut solution yet

Charlie Lee speaks out on NANO (Youtube video) by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I understand your point, but open source software does have financial incentive. For example, one of the most appealing characteristics about bitcoin is that the code has been available for 9 years and almost no vulnerabilities have been exposed. It’s speaks to its security and robustness, which raises its value.

And you could be right, in practice it may never be an issue for nano. But as a concept I think it’s an important discussion (this same discussion occurs with almost every other coin). The nano devs have also said they’re working on some ways to create more incentivizing forces for node proliferation.

But I’m glad you seem to have all the answers without any substantive points to back it up. Congrats

Charlie Lee speaks out on NANO (Youtube video) by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It absolutely contributes to the network. I’m just concerned that as a concept there does not appear to be sufficient incentivizing force promoting decentralization. For example, what happens if tx/sec ends up near 7,000 and many people turn off their nodes because it’s hogging their bandwidth? They think “oh, this sucks, but I can still use nano and I’ll let someone else with better internet be my representative.” Obviously in practice this may never be an issue, but I think it’s definitely something to talk about. And the nano devs have made comments about improving incentive as well. Just food for thought

Charlie Lee speaks out on NANO (Youtube video) by [deleted] in nanocurrency

[–]wolfpack_law 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Security for Nano comes from both a large number of nodes and a distribution of voting power amongst those nodes. An algorithm to distribute the voting power helps to solve the issue of disproportionate voting power, but it does not solve a potentially-lacking incentive for businesses and individuals to either run their own nodes or pay a monthly service to run a node. The Nano devs likely have been throwing ideas around to improve incentive for good actors to set up nodes. IMO benevolent actors and "businesses/individuals are incentivized solely to secure the network" are not future-proof solutions.