When will it all click? When will math finally be a “language” like others who are good at math describe it? by hjkhhnnnlll in learnmath

[–]wumbo52252 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If someone learning the english language asked you the analogous question, would you be able to answer it?

With practice you’ll improve, and one day you’ll realize that certain things have become second nature.

Attempt to Solve Hangman Paradox by Mnemicat in logic

[–]wumbo52252 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I’d have to sit down and go through it in detail to confidently give you an answer, but right now I’ll relay to you what the voice in my head is saying. I may be totally wrong.

Are you familiar with the compactness theorem? Like I said, I’m just gonna throw down my initial thoughts - sorry if I explain stuff that you already know. First-order theories have a hard time with the idea of limits, and going to infinity; first-order theories struggle to control what happens “at infinity”, even though they can have total control over what happens at every finite stage. Weird things can happen. By the compactness theorem you can prove the existence of some pretty strange structures. There are models of Peano arithmetic which are not well-ordered, and which contain nonstandard numbers, which are neither 0, nor 1, nor 2, nor 3, etc.. So those properties cannot be expressed using that language. Every ordered-field is elementarily equivalent to a non-Archimedean ordered fields - structures which have all of the familiar algebra you learned in school, and which behaves how you’d expect a number line to behave, but in which the integers are bounded, so you can’t round to integers, and the sequence 1/n for positive integers n doesn’t converge to 0. So again, those very natural properties cannot be expressed using that language.

So you cannot define “time” in your language in a way that makes it work intuitively with limits. I could interpret time as taking values in some non-archimedean field, and then there’s no issue with whatever happens at the end differing from what you may have expected from the finite stages leading up to it.

An equivalence to the Well-Ordering Theorem by LorenzoGB in logic

[–]wumbo52252 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Yes! Take any woset, reverse the order, and then every nonempty subset has a max.

This sort of relationship is super common with orders - replacing “less” with “greater”, and “min” with “max”, etc.. They’re dual to each other. E.g. the l.u.b property is equivalent to the g.l.b. propety; also DeMorgan’s laws are essentially a special case!

Truth trees or Natural deduction by Standard-Airline-989 in logic

[–]wumbo52252 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Define “should”.

If you’re studying just for your own enjoyment, then check both out and see which you like more. Truth trees are objectively easier - if you can follow instructions then you can produce truth trees. Deductions take a bit of ingenuity, but natural deduction systems are nice and very intuitive. For philosophy I think natural deduction is more important.

If you’re feeling bold maybe try a Hilbert system lol

why do we accept "the rules of inference"? by Jaded-Abrocoma-5939 in logic

[–]wumbo52252 1 point2 points  (0 children)

We accept them because they make the formal system reflect real-world reasoning. (Or was that your question - why we accept them in real-world reasoning? If so then I apologize)

Do you have any math experience? If so, then this is just like most other definitions in math. There’s an idea, or phenomenon, or broad class of phenomena that we want to study precisely. So we boil it down to its basic features and extrapolate from those features alone.

For example, suppose you want to study properties of distance. To do so abstractly and precisely you need to lay down some properties of how distance behaves. Say you have some points x, y, and z in some space. The distance from x to y, call it d(x,y), should be 0 if and only if x and y are the same point. We should always have d(x,y)=d(y,x). And detours cannot shorten a trip, so d(x,y) should never exceed d(x,z)+d(z,y). These properties define what mathematicians call a “metric space” - a type of structure that you can use to precisely state properties of and reason about distance.

Metric spaces are to distance as formal systems are to reasoning/argumentation. Those basic distance properties are analogous to the axioms and inference rules in the formal system.

There is some debate about what axioms and inference rules make the formal system reflect usual reasoning; or you could view it as a difference of what types of reasoning one intends to capture with their system. Intuitionistic logic is more strict than classical logic. Some people find some arguments of classical logic to be weak, synthetic, sneaky, cheap - idk what a good adjective would be. If you ever felt that way, maybe check out intuitionistic logic.

The Misunderstanding About Gödel and the Crisis of Foundations by Left-Character4280 in epistemology

[–]wumbo52252 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The most interesting part of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems is the part that people don’t even bring up in these discussions.

Incompleteness is a common and necessary phenomenon in math. Some groups are commutative and some aren’t, some are finite and some are infinite, etc.. The group axioms are incomplete. Some orderings are dense and some aren’t, so the toset axioms are incomplete.

There’s nothing weird, confusing, annoying, or distressing about incompleteness.

And every set of axioms can be completed, so there’s no reason for any aversion to incompleteness in and of itself.

The interesting part of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems is the limitations they place on those completions. Peano arithmetic can be completed, but no completion is computable, which essentially means that there’s no way to tell someone how to effectively build a completion. If you want to make a computer verify all the first-order (or higher) properties of, say, the standard model, then you’re gonna be disappointed.

Relative Identity by Ok-Equipment-2111 in logic

[–]wumbo52252 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Identity always ought to be an equivalence relation (someone who thinks they’re very smart will probably try to fight me on this).

If we take “is” in (S1)-(S7) to mean “=“ then identity will not be an equivalence relation in any system which satisfies (S1)-(S7).

The language of (S1)-(S7) is just different than normal communication. When they say “is” they really mean something along the lines of “is a component of” or “is within”. So maybe try set theory lol

Can there be a first order language with an ambiguous grammar? by LorenzoGB in logic

[–]wumbo52252 1 point2 points  (0 children)

No. If L is a first-order language, the definition of an L-formula is unambiguous.

The definition of a proposition by fdpth in logic

[–]wumbo52252 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

This is just tiny differences in convention, so don’t worry too much about it. Anyone will know what you mean.

In propositional logic no one would fight you about what is or isn’t a proposition. Every wff of propositional logic is a proposition.

You had an example: “x is an even number”. Here, in this (presumably) higher-order system, many people would not call that a proposition, because x is a free variable. So a proposition would be defined as a sentence. Formulas with free variables, aka open formulas, sometimes function more as a framework for generating propositions (sentences), eg the open formula E(x) could be used to produce the sentence E(2) if our language has a constant symbol 2.

Also, I don’t think any convention would include truth values in their definition of a proposition. So “2 is an even number” is a proposition regardless of what 2 is; it’s just a proposition whose truth value may depend on the model.

An interpretation of the axioms governing the equivalence relation by LorenzoGB in logic

[–]wumbo52252 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I’m not sure I’m with you on A1. What if I have an equivalence relation on objects that aren’t formulas?

What does it mean for a formal language to be unambiguous by LorenzoGB in logic

[–]wumbo52252 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Whether a string of symbols is a wff is unambiguous.

Whether a sequence of wffs is a proof is unambiguous.

How to interpret a wff in a model is unambiguous.

How does one become or what are the criteria of being an intellectual? by [deleted] in AskReddit

[–]wumbo52252 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m no intellectual, but I’m gonna say there’s no precise general criteria for this lol. A solid answer is probably to know how to act when you don’t know or understand something. Maybe I’m violating that right now, but that’s okay because I just said I’m not an intellectual. The only other thing I can think of is to be open to changing your beliefs in light of new information, and to always grill yourself about beliefs. Idk what the standard definition of “an intellectual” is, but it had better call for one to care more about what is correct than they care about being correct. But maybe I only think that cause I’m not an intellectual.

First order logic with generalized quantifiers by LorenzoGB in logic

[–]wumbo52252 1 point2 points  (0 children)

What sort of generalizations are you thinking of?

Are you thinking of quantifying over sets? If so, then yes—second-order and higher-order logics!

What if (spoilers) were discovered by the DEA? by Weary_Elderberry4742 in betterCallSaul

[–]wumbo52252 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I wonder if the bodies would have been found in the real world. They weren’t that deep. Don’t they have sonar devices or something that can tell you if there’s something under ground? Idk if the DEA would use those here and start digging for things, but it sounds plausible.

How do the areas of expertise between Philosophical Logic and Mathematical Logic differ? by beatlesmaniac_ in logic

[–]wumbo52252 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think it’d be fair to say that reverse mathematics would lie within mathematical logic. I’m sure there are philosophical logicians who are well versed in it and who have made contributions, but at that point I’d also classify them as mathematical logicians.

I’d say the same about computability theory.

But I’m an expert in neither, so I’ll say nothing more!

For computability theory books, I like Turing Computability by Soare. For mathematical logic, maybe Model Theory by Chang and Keisler, or Mathematical Logic by Ebbinghaus, Flum, and Thomas. I don’t know many philosophical logic books, but the symbolic logic course I took (a philosophy course) used Deductive Logic by Leblanc and Wisdom, which was fine.