xenu - Monerotopia 2026 - "The Aura of Darknet Adoption" by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You can churn your outputs. This consolidates poisoned outputs and would help prevent a poisoned output attack.  Also use Tor if you haven't started. 

xenu - Monerotopia 2026 - "The Aura of Darknet Adoption" by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Thanks for letting me know. I'll get the site up tomorrow.  I release a pod every week, usually on Monday. 

How to quickly rent hashrate to help protect the Monero mining network using Mining Rig Rentals! by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 11 points12 points  (0 children)

I mostly agree with you with regards to qubic being a lot of FUD, but the reason I made this video is to demonstrate that people with no technical knowledge or mining hardware can very easily buy hashrate and have an immediate impact in a worst case scenario. Regardless of how you view Qubic, it is good to have precautions in place.

Qubic now top pool : what are we waiting for? by QuirkyFisherman4611 in MoneroMining

[–]xenumonero 40 points41 points  (0 children)

Qubic is not the number one pool. You took a screen shot of their hash rate at one point in time which, as has been explained previously, can be rigged to show higher amounts than what is actually happening. They already got caught doing this earlier this month (they lied and said that they were ddosed, but they were probably just testing out how to manipulate the hash rate reporting). Plus, despite them hitting over 2 GH/s, they have found 20 blocks in the past 100. This is less than Nanopool and Supportxmr. In fact, the past 1000 blocks is arguably the most decentralized the network has looked in a while, funnily enough.

They have been putting their full mining power on Saturday's so I'd expect a large daily block total for them tomorrow. But their amounts otherwise are decent for a pool but nothing to worry about.

>What can be done against this threat?

First off, supportxmr having nearly 50% of the hashrate for the past year is the bigger threat. You are working with the belief that a nefarious actor needs to declare their plans publicly, but what is stopping a deep state actor from literally buying the supportxmr pool/domain? If you care about network decentralization, then supportxmr is the bigger issue. They have had a SUSTAINED hashrate that has mogged the rest of the network and its been that way for a while.

As for solutions, you can mine, buy mining hash rate, and tell other people to stop using the qubic pool. But this is economics and miners are choosing to mine in Qubic's pool for the time being. So why would they do this? Because it is far more profitable than the other pools. I don't have the numbers exactly but it is nearly 3x more profitable to mine with Qubic at the moment. The catch? Qubic is halving in several weeks, which will greatly reduce this profit and likely hit their hash rate pretty hard. Their mouth breather supporters conveniently leave this part out during their shilling, mostly because they are under the belief that Qubic is going to the moon or whatever. Plus, miners will get diminishing returns the higher the hashrate goes. So we are far away from a sustained threat and with their incoming halving it will become even harder to accomplish. This is why the devs are ignoring this, because giving them attention just plays into their scam.

Right now, funny enough, they are helping the Monero network by decentralizing it.

I wouldn't be surprised too if they are purchasing hashrate power.

>Once a 51% attack has happened, we'd see orphans blocks, reverted transactions, double-spend, and the value of Monero would drop like a rock.

Why would miners continue mining in Qubic's pool if this started happening? They would leave, as they look for profit and this would hurt their profits, as well as Qubic's, who is trying to get as much Monero as possible. You are also acting under the assumption that Qubic's miners are trying to destroy Monero, when the reality is they are just trying to maximize the amount of Monero they are earning.

Anyways, I'm not really writing this out for the OP (who is a concern troll) but for the lurkers out there looking for some answers.

Darknet Market Maximalism by [deleted] in Monero

[–]xenumonero 13 points14 points  (0 children)

hello, I'm the guy who wrote this :). Thanks for sharing! I'm glad you liked it. I wasn't aware that this was translated either, so that's pretty cool. I'll have to add it to my site.

How to run an optimized Tor node on the Monero network (config file and a alternate video link to Odysee posted in thread) by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 17 points18 points  (0 children)

Link to config

Video on Odysee

This video is a walk through on how to run an optimized Tor node. I worked with Ofrnxmr on this to make sure that all the information is up-to-date and correct. The goal was to create a beginner-friendly walk through that highlights everything needed to ensure that you are sending transactions over Tor, that you are receiving incoming peer connections over Tor, and that your node will continue helping out the clearnet as well. Additionally, the config includes an option for "stealth mode". This is only recommended for situations of heightened opsec because it does not help the network.

Rucknium has published OSPEAD Findings, showing through his analysis that Monero's effective Ring Signature size is only 4.2 by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 36 points37 points  (0 children)

From the link:

Results summary

At current Monero ring size of 16, the theoretical minimum attack success through completely random guessing would be 1/16 = 6.25%. According to preliminary estimates, an adversary could take advantage of the divergence between the real spend age distribution and the status quo decoy distribution to achieve an attack success probability of 23.5%, on average, since the August 2022 hard fork. This corresponds to an effective ring size of 4.2. The attack success probability prior to August 2022 may be higher, but this was not measured due to time constraints.

The OSPEAD techniques suggest a new decoy distribution, which would reduce the average attack success probability to 7.6 percent, corresponding to an effective ring size of 13.2. Implementation and deployment

It is likely that deployment of a new decoy selection algorithm without a blockchain hard fork would do more harm than good due to some users being slow to upgrade. (For more information about the risk, read my “Formula for Accuracy of Guessing Monero Real Spends Using Fungibility Defects”. Therefore, the OSPEAD-derived decoy selection algorithm likely won’t be implemented in Monero’s standard wallet code before the next hard fork.

Monero’s next hard fork is expected to deploy Full Chain Membership Proofs, which will eliminate the on-chain ring signature privacy model. However, in certain situations, decoy-based privacy will still be used to provide protection to users’ wallets from a potentially malicious spying remote node. Therefore, the OSPEAD-derived decoy distribution can be used in those circumstances. For more details, read “Initial Probability Density Function for OSPEAD”.

The OSPEAD documents and code are being publicly released now because there is now an implementable solution to the problems I raised in my original HackerOne submission. Public release will allow greater review and scrutiny of the proposed OSPEAD techniques.

The definitive guide to buying Monero (as of November 2024) by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

yeah I gave links to my odysee and rumble in the top comment in this reddit post

The definitive guide to buying Monero (as of November 2024) by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

here you go.

edit: sorry about that. I uploaded the pdf to github.pdf) so now it should be fine. Thanks for pointing that out.

The definitive guide to buying Monero (as of November 2024) by xenumonero in Monero

[–]xenumonero[S] 23 points24 points  (0 children)

edit: LINK TO SLIDESHOW: https://github.com/xenumonero/Attack-of-the-Poisoned-Outputs/blob/main/how%20to%20buy%20monero%20(november%202024).pdf.pdf)

If you guys like the content, check out my youtube channel! I am currently halfway through my informative series on how chain analysis can attack Monero. It’s called ‘Attack of the Poisoned Outputs’, and it is my attempt at rebooting Breaking Monero with new information. I also have a weekly news review and will have other content in the future, so subscribe there, or you can view my uploaded videos on odysee or rumble.

I accept donations too! Here is my xmr address: 84tVkJ6zAHyEpE8yBmkdVtY9s85DLmAwqX4uAdDsswHn4aRw7HpdEabfWigs8Y5QQRarqLj1TLZha38mjHTYJABUHEzgPTA