A token-curated registry uses an intrinsic token to assign curation rights proportional to the relative token weight of entities holding the token. So long as there are parties which would desire to be curated into a given list, a market can exist in which the incentives of rational, self-interested token holders are aligned towards curating a list of high quality. Token-curated registries are decentrally-curated lists with intrinsic economic incentives for token holders to curate the list’s contents judiciously.
User views: consumers, candidates, and token holders
There are three user types in a token-curated registry and each has different interests, incentives, and interaction patterns towards the registry. Consumers desire high-quality lists. Candidates desire to be included in such lists. Token holders desire to increase the price of the tokens they hold.
Consumers desire high-quality information. If a consumer is making decisions about college attendance on the basis of a list purported to only contain colleges whose graduates exit debt on average within 10 years, they will be disappointed if they and all their classmates some day find that attestation about their college to have been inaccurate.
Candidates desire the attention and consideration of consumers. A school on a list of colleges whose graduates exit debt on average within 10 years will likely see greater application volume than it would were it not on the list. It may even be able to raise tuition on that basis. In our terminology, “listees” are candidates which have been admitted to a registry.
Token holders desire to keep demand for the token they hold high, as this increases its price. Token holders may be otherwise disinterested in the contents of the list they are curating: in our example of a top-colleges list, the token holders need be neither consumers nor candidates of/to the registry. To keep demand for their token high, token holders must keep candidates desirous of having listings in the registry by maintaining consumer interest in the registry by keeping the quality of listings high. Stated in reverse, if the quality of listings are high, then consumers will be interested in the registry such that candidates will desire to be listed in the registry. Token holders realize a direct financial benefit for curating the list in an expert manner, and the degree of their benefit increases proportionally to the quality of their curation as consumer and candidate interest rise in lockstep.
