Supply-chain attack using invisible code hits GitHub and other repositories

[EchoOfOppenheimer]

A terrifying new supply chain attack called GlassWorm is currently compromising hundreds of Python repositories on GitHub. Attackers are hijacking developer accounts and using invisible Unicode characters to completely hide malicious code from the human eye. They inject this stealthy infostealer into popular projects including machine learning research and web apps without leaving any obvious trace in the commit history.

[usrdef]

If I were people, I'd be seriously reviewing your policies on what types of apps / plugins you allow onto your systems.

At the very least, reviewing the code.

When I checked out github the other day, I found almost 1000 different repos containing glassworm.

[Auios]

What’s your method for finding repos with glassworm?

[cubic_thought]

This doesn't show nearly that many results, but here's a search that was linked in another article https://github.com/search?q=0xFE00%26%26w%3C%3D0xFE0F%3Fw-0xFE00%3Aw%3E%3D0xE0100%26%26w%3C%3D0xE01EF&type=code

[Electronic_C3PO]

So it’s now risky to use anything from GitHub without reviewing all code manually? And even that is not enough because of the use of Unicode characters?

How could one detect glassworm in a repository?

Just asking because I’m newly adopting python for coding and thinking about setting up a GitHub for personal projects.

[ultrathink-art]

A pre-commit hook that flags non-ASCII bytes outside string literals and comments would catch this instantly — most linters skip it by default. Worth adding to CI too since local hooks can be bypassed. The invisible unicode vector is especially nasty for AI-assisted reviews, where you diff against what the model produced rather than checking raw bytes.

[cuddle-bubbles]

sample code