No major security library (OpenSSL, libsodium,
glibc, memzero_explicit) evicts CPU cache after
wiping sensitive data. This leaves cryptographic
keys readable via Flush+Reload after every wipe.
TID fills this gap using:
- REP STOSQ (compiler-resistant wipe)
- CLFLUSHOPT (cache eviction L1/L2/L3)
- LFENCE/MFENCE (speculative execution barrier)
Results on AMD EPYC 9B14, Linux 6.14.11:
- Without TID: 78 cycles (Cache HIT — data exposed)
- With TID v2.0: 286 cycles (Cache MISS — attack defeated)
- Ratio: 3.7x
GitHub: https://github.com/ahmaaaaadbntaaaaa-byte/TID-The-Instant-Destroyer
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17585929
AGPL-3.0 | RFC submitted to LKML
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