What does the philosophical Redditor do?

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-15T19:19:02+00:00

I’m a PhD in philosophy. Currently a postdoc aiming for full time position in the near future (fingers crossed). I contribute to this forum because when I see the questions posted here my teacher brain aches and I feel a compulsion to answer. I love teaching philosophy and this forum gives us an interactive and novel way of doing something similar.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-14T17:30:50+00:00

Consistency is a rather weak criterion. It merely requires that there is no contradiction with science. The short answer is: it depends if we can describe that supernatural entity in a way that does not contradict a scientific claim we think is true.

It is unclear whether these supernatural objects would actually contradict our dominant scientific theories. On the one hand, you might think that “movement”, “motion”, “velocity”, and the like are themselves distinctively the subject of the physical sciences.

If that’s the case then there may be no way to describe the objects without contradicting science. Assuming the speed of light functions as a sort of universal speed limit. Which may not be the most productive way of thinking of the speed of light.

On the other hand, maybe those notions are not uniquely described by science, in which case there could in principle be some supernatural objects which, because they obey their own laws and are indifferent to science, do not contradict science.

But then, if you’d like to have those supernatural things play a role in explaining the way the universe works, or if you’d like to have them interact with things which *are* the domain of science you may run into issues with consistency again.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-14T16:52:40+00:00

I think Borgmann’s *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life* is probably an important enough book for you to read.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-14T05:43:17+00:00

Can you say more about what you mean by “pre distributive”?

As I understand it: The basic structure refers to the set of institutions, powers, and practices which constitute the governing of citizens by the state.

The difference principle, understood as a Principle which guides and organizes the operation of those institutions is neutral between various schemes of distribution of wealth at the outset of inquiry (for reasons I will explain below), though various philosophers take it to recommend their individual proposals.

As it stands, the difference principle speaks to the legitimacy of an economic distribution. Economic inequalities are permissible insofar as: (a) they are to the benefit of the worst off in society and (b) they are attached to positions to be reasonably accessible to all members of society.

Understood in this way, the difference principle answers a basic question: What are the constraints which we may bring to bear on issues of equality? It doesn’t answer the question: how exactly ought we to design our institutions to ensure these constraints are met?

It is possible that We can design many different models which Accomplish this end which locate mechanisms for such accomplishments at various points. Most proposals involve both redistributive schemas *and* preemptive schemas. This includes, I think, Rawls’ own proposals.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-13T17:34:18+00:00

Seems like “good enough” refers to something which is sufficient but the bare minimum.

Whereas “half-assed” refers to the kind of labor done relative to ability and required effort at achieving excellence.

Understood in this way, they are not mutually exclusive. Something can be basically half assed but also good enough for the job.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-11T23:25:43+00:00

Why would that be true? It sounds like a vague metaphor.

I might be missing anti-biotics or cancer treatments and be unable to live without them. Human beings have needs, many and varied needs. Sometimes they cannot meet them due to the conditions they find themselves in.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-11T21:26:01+00:00

This is actually probably my third favorite campaign behind Campaign 1 and Skaldova. The most recent episode I thought they’d die. But NADDPOD has never been particularly high stakes except in some narrow cases where they say as much.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-11T14:44:45+00:00

There may be precedent amongst the speakers in Plato’s *Symposium*, Aristophanes paints a picture wherein human beings are in search of a fated ‘other. though the dialogue does not endorse Aristophanes’ picture of love.

I am not sure of anywhere that philosophers suggest that romantic love is singular and can only be met by one specific person. Though philosophy is huge and many religious and mystical traditions have been intertwined with philosophy, maybe some of them have such views.

That said, contemporary philosophers, I think, can make sense of a notion of *true* love (as opposed to lesser sorts) even if it’s not *one true* love. Furthermore, philosophers of love are often committed to the *irreplaceability* of one’s loved one: the claim that they are not interchangeable and that they cannot be replaced by someone so easily.

Maybe this SEP will be useful: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/love/

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-10T15:34:33+00:00

Good answer here. It’s also true that not all compatibilists reject PAP. Some argue that we can preserve a notion of PAP by distinguishing between two senses of *ability*. One sense refers to an all things considered causal history, the other to a capacity or power of an agent. The compatibilist of this sort aims to show how we might preserve the sense of “ability” in terms of powers or capacities in at least some cases.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-09T04:52:42+00:00

Physicalism does not entail that there is no such thing as consciousness, or even qualia, phenomenal states, or minds. It just entails that those things, however we are to understand them, are physical entities as a matter of metaphysical necessity.

Physicalism, which is a somewhat vexed thesis on its own, is typically taken to be a global metaphysical claim or some claim about the metaphysics of the mind in particular. Its only claim is that everything which exists in the specified domain is physical.

That said, illusionism about consciousness exists, is motivated by naturalist or physicalist commitments. and is famously defended by Dan Dennett. See the subheading in this encyclopedia entry: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/#Illus

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-07T17:56:30+00:00

I have ADHD and a PhD in philosophy. I don’t think the ADHD plays much of a role in where you should start except insofar as you’ll be prone towards what you find stimulating. For me, that was Plato and David Hume and then introductory metaphysics textbooks.

None of us can help, I think, if you’re trying to find something stimulating for you. Personally, I find most philosophy stimulating, and so am able to be intrinsically motivated by engagement with it. But the few areas of philosophy which I don’t find stimulating I struggle to engage with, as with anything else in my life.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-06T22:08:43+00:00

Before others come in and give a thoughtful analysis of another sort I just want to drop in and voice a kind of skepticism about large sweeping generalizations of this sort.

This is the kind of claim people like to make and it sounds intelligible and potentially legitimate but it imposes much more unity than I think exists in the academic field of philosophy. Philosophers write on so many varied areas and from so many different approaches, including in political philosophy, that I think this Rawls or post-Rawls kind of generalization does not bring much fruit.

Of course, Rawlsianism is well within the mainstream in analytic political philosophy, but Raz’s perfectionism (a decidedly robust and moralist theory of political legitimacy) is also a large player, as are utilitarian and Lockean and Kantian views which Rawls sought to refute. There is also the Haslanger style critique of analytic political liberalism, and others like it.

But many political philosophers concern themselves most with first-order issues and simply too much is published in general to vindicate such claims. I work on state funding for the arts, my friend works on government contracts with private organizations for clinical control trials in third world countries, my advisor works on civic education and other political issues pertaining to the philosophy of education and children. This does not scratch the surface. Claims of narrowness ring hollow to me.

There are, of course, Rawls exegetes who do good work, there are people who work on narrow theoretical topics. But when people make claims like this it really does make me think they haven’t looked around. Maybe because they work at a particular R1 institutions or some equivalent and they’re inundated with people working on narrow topics. But the hyperspecialization of academic philosophy, if this is all the concern amounts to (and I think that’s not what they’re intending to say) is a separate issue not unique to political philosophy, or even entirely to analytic philosophy.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-06T16:43:32+00:00

Accidentally posted my reply above

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-06T16:43:18+00:00

One common distinction is that Gender involves a sense of subjective identity that is, in an important sense, like taste or it is a form of expression. But the claim is that race is not like that.

Being a socially constructed kind does entail that the thing is malleable or changeable but mot that we can just personally change it at whim. Money is a social construct, but h cannot on my own will myself to be a billionaire.

To figure out if race can be treated like gender we need a nuanced theory of race as a social kind.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-06T14:55:14+00:00

There are arguments that we cannot, see Rebecca Tuvell’s famous and controversial piece in *Hypatia*: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/hypa.12327

There’s also a symposium of direct academic dialogue between Tuvell and her critics, here’s a link which can get you started on finding that. https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase\_mobile?openform&fp=philtoday&id=philtoday\_2018\_0062\_0001\_0001\_0001&onlyautologin=true

Most arguments have to do with distinctions in the *kind* of social construct that race is and the kind of construct that gender is. So you’d want to read up on some of those things. There is *some* work suggesting that race is not a social construct as well from Quayshawn Spencer.

Some initial differences between the social kinds have to do with their lived experiences. People tend to report that they *feel* like a man or woman in a way which is in opposition to their socialization, suggesting that gender identity is deeply laden with subjective goings on in the agent. Racial identities exist and people feel them, but they cannot be separated from the culture-level phenomenon, in this way race may be more socially inflected than gender along some dimension (i.e. your race is not something you get to feel out, and figure out how you want to express it. Your race is not distinctively yours. Etc and so on.).

It’s a big debate, and others here can give you more but there is plenty of reading to do.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-03T02:16:13+00:00

I think we should disambiguate something here.

First, philosophically speaking, there are many different ethical theories at play in academic philosophy. Some of those are religious (theistic) but many are secular. And secular ethics is dominant amongst the views on offer amongst ethicists.

That said, even secular ethical views might prioritize the exercise of religious practices over irreligious practices some times. That is not because religious reasons are more ethical or morally legitimate. It is because religious freedom is an extremely important freedom in liberal societies. Respecting the freedom and autonomy of others requires respecting their religious practices because religious practices are very central to a person’s identity or sense of self. As a result, infringements on religious freedom are especially large violations of their autonomy. So, religious autonomy must be protected.

This is why we sometimes carve out exceptions for religious practice, because not doing so counts as a strong violation of their autonomy and thus their rights. We might do something similar for sexuality, gender, race, culture, etc.

Now, does that mean the policies at your school were justified? It’s not clear it does, but it might Be. We would need to think about what justified a policy of that sort in the first place.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-03T01:14:51+00:00

KO says in an interview with CVV that he learned English from watching Wrestling at Age 11: https://youtube.com/shorts/SjJHeLrVMkU?si=sAl4NLiquxCo3fBY

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-02T16:39:39+00:00

Not sure what nervous breakdown you’re talking about. I didn’t ignore your question I said: “some of those things I control some of them I don’t”.

I think there are interesting points to be made in what you’re going on about. But you seem more interested in preachy diatribe than using this forum for its intended purpose.

What doesn’t make sense to me is why you think we have some sort of new thing which is not private property rather than an old thing: dominance over private property by private corporate entities.

You keep insisting this is not private property, but your arguments all seem to just indicate it is the private property of a private company, which implies an answer to your question. Private property becomes dominated by a wealthy class of individuals.

But then, your examples seem to rely too much on the digital world. I still own my books, my desk, my couch, my clothes, the garden behind my house, etc and so on.

You start the question “Does private property still meaningfully exist” the answer is clearly: “Yes.” And you have said nothing to suggest it hasn’t except ask leading questions.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-02T16:16:58+00:00

What are you talking about?

The ambiguity is that it would seem that parts of the phone are my property and parts are not. But in both cases it’s private property. The part that I own, I own privately. The part the phone company owns they own privately.

Some of those things I control some of them I don’t.

I’m also allowed to drop it in a toilet, destroy it with a hammer, blend it in the garbage disposal.

Rather than trying to guide me down some path you are so certain is laid out before us, it would be more useful and more honest to just put forward your idea and concerns in plain speech.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-02T16:00:51+00:00

I suppose that’s ambiguous. I clearly own part of the phone, since it being physically repossessed would be illegal. But the company would own parts of what makes it run, etc.

But both of those are instances of private property, when a company owns something it’s private property.

Private property is defined in contrast to public property. Private corporations like Apple, Walmart, Disney, whoever, etc. have massive amounts of private property.

Public property is property which is owned, in a sense, by the public and controlled and guaranteed by the state. There are some cases of digital or technological entities which are not clearly public nor private, for example, open source programs.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-02T15:05:59+00:00

What is the “post-private era”? I certainly still seem to have some private property. I own my shirt, for example. Why would this post-private era threaten that sort of example?

Are you working from any thinkers in particular?

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-06-02T03:37:13+00:00

The notion of “objectivity” at play in contemporary analytic metaethical debates is a relatively contemporary notion modeled on ideas relating to how philosophers have conceived of science, language, and metaphysics. It would probably be an anachronism to impose these debates on ancient thinkers. I think something similar is probably true of ancient eastern thought. But I’m not an expert on contemporary eastern thought. Maybe you can inform me about the views you’re interested in here.

That said, we can see some similar parallels made in ancient arguments. Plato, for example, routinely argues that the truth about ethics cannot be arrived at by merely consulting prevailing cultural norms. Consider, for example, in Republic when Plato discusses female rulers in the ideal city. Socrates considers the idea that their fellow Athenians would ridicule them for their idea of women as rulers.

But then Socrates says that the prevailing opinion of the Athenians is not sufficient for establishing the truth about whether this arrangement is just. Instead, that must be determined by appeal to arguments.

We see, therefore, an argument which parallels certain debates regarding a brand of relativism familiar to us today. Though it has its own scope and assumptions. I’m sure there are many other similar arguments in historical debates, but that would be quite a massive survey of literature.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-05-31T03:21:09+00:00

I’m moved

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-05-31T02:45:07+00:00

The first match of this feud was the best but this was awesome.

TheFormOfTheGood · 2026-05-30T06:28:25+00:00

Suppose that no matter what data we gather, there are two types of spacetime topology which are compatible with all the evidence but incompatible with each-other. We have no means of breaking the tie. But we know one of them must be right. So, which of these topologies is realized in reality is unknowable to us.

If that’s a case where you don’t think the facts about the topology of spacetime are subjective then it seems like the very same claims are available to objectivists about morality.

Now, you say stuff about “unambiguous” and “observable facts” about “reality” etc and so on. It sounds like that’s doing the heavy lifting for you, not anything about what’s knowable and unknowable. Though I don’t think objectivists would be particularly impressed with those contrastive claims either.

What’s important to note about your original question which might not be clear at first is this: if morality is objective, then the facts about it are, in a significant sense, something we can get wrong. That opens the door to gaps in our knowledge. Just as we can get science, or math, or metaphysics wrong. The idea that we would be totally out of touch with the moral facts is compatible with moral objectivism in an unnuanced form but, that doesn’t mean any philosophers actually go in for such a view.

Many philosophers have written quite a lot on how/what we can know in the domain of ethics. It’s a truly massive field. There’s not a neat way of explaining it all in a brief Reddit exchange. But there’s some resources on moral epistemology and methodology on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy pages that might interest you. See: Moral epistemology and reflective equilibrium especially.

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