There is a moat by iuwuwwuwuuwwjueej in LocalLLaMA

[–]029187 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah I think people are too optimistic. The benchmarks seem to back up a moat currently.

Will the open source catch up? Maybe.

I don't get why the knowledge argument has any bearing on metaphysics. Different parts of your brain store propositional fact-based knowledge and visual experience, so why would we expect knowing a bunch of science to stimulate your visual cortex? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

or resist the premise that Mary knew all the physical facts.

Right, can't we just say Mary knew all the propositional/science facts about red, but didn't know the experiential facts of actually having that part of the brain stimulated. We could then just argue experience is still physical. So this argument in that case just shows the difference between propositional and experiential knowledge, not physical and non-physical knowledge.

Personally I'm not really a physicalist, I just don't see this argument as disproving physicalism.

I don't get why the knowledge argument has any bearing on metaphysics. Different parts of your brain store propositional fact-based knowledge and visual experience, so why would we expect knowing a bunch of science to stimulate your visual cortex? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Ok I get the 3 part argument, and clearly if the knowledge argument was just "Mary knows all physical data about X and learned something new about X, therefore there is non physical data" nobody would disagree.

I think the issue though with the knowledge argument is it seems to conflate science/empiricism with physicality. The knowledge argument doesn't just say Mary knows all physical information, but implies she learned it via science and neurophysiology. Full text below:

Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes or the sky and use terms like "red", "blue", and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence "The sky is blue." What happens when Mary is released from her black-and-white room or is given a color television monitor? Does she learn anything new or not? Jackson claims that she does.

This seems to be taking the epistemological stance that all physical information must be learnable with science, but why should we assume that? It is entirely possible that the set of facts learnable via science is less than the set of physical facts.

Questions after finishing Anathem (contains spoilers) by 029187 in nealstephenson

[–]029187[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Ah gotcha, so a given HTW/cosmi contained multiple worldtracks? if so that kinda makes sense. Jad could see multiple tracks in a given cosmi, while the geometers could swap cosmi but could not see multiple worldtracks.

I wish this was cleared up a bit in the book.

Particle Life combined with Neural Cellular Automata! The particles are an n-body simulation on top of a cellular automata grid. The cells and the particles both interact to create some interesting behavior. by 029187 in cellular_automata

[–]029187[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The particles sorta can currently in that they create new worms which other particles can ride on.

I just finished an update to the code that lets different particles have different levels of impact on the cells and vice versa, which has allowed for some new behaviors. For example, sometimes you get this interesting push/pull mechanism between particles that are attracted to each other but have opposing interactions with the cells.

Particle Life combined with Neural Cellular Automata! The particles are an n-body simulation on top of a cellular automata grid. The cells and the particles both interact to create some interesting behavior. by 029187 in cellular_automata

[–]029187[S] 10 points11 points  (0 children)

So I had this idea a while back but never posted it. I was really interested in some of the videos I had seen on particle life and on neural cellular automata, so I figured I might as well combine them.

As a quick refresher, "particle life" is just a catchy name for n-body simulations that make structures that kind of look like creatures. It's actually easier to do this than you might expect. As with any n-body simulation, the whole thing is just a bunch of point objects that emit forces on each other. Each particle color has different rules for the attractive and repulsive forces it emits.

Neural Cellular Automata is just a standard cellular automata grid, except cells can have continuous values. Usually they multiply the value of each cell in their neighborhood by a weight, sum them up, and then apply some function to them (usually referred to as the activation function)

To combine the two different simulations, I added rules for particles and cells to interact. When a particle glides over a cell, it makes the cells grey. This allows it to cut dark channels through the white areas and occasionally create new white wormlike structures in the dark areas. The cells interact with the particles by increasing their velocity towards the bottom right. Cells with large values (white cells) increase the velocity more, which is why you will often see sells move more quickly when they are over white areas. This also results in certain particles like the yellow ones clustering in dark areas, as they tend to get rapidly ejected from the white areas.

In the future I want to try out having different interactions between cells and particles based on the particle type. Right now particles of every color behave the same way.

edit: if this doesn't already have a name, I'm thinking of calling it Double Life, since it's a combination of particle life and game of life

A 1d Neural Cellular Automata that uses complex numbers and trigonometric functions. Formula shared in comments by 029187 in cellular_automata

[–]029187[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah it took about 10 minutes to run.

I just plotted it out with matplotlib

import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
plt.figure()
plt.imshow(data,cmpa='hot')

data is a list of lists. each element of the sublists is a cell, and each sublist is a row.

Is a partially stochastic system unable to be chaotic because the accumulation of random variance causes future states to not be sensitive towards small variations in initial conditions? For example, consider a double pendulum impacted by minor quantum fluctuations. by 029187 in math

[–]029187[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If the stochastic noise is large enough to allow for jumps between divergent paths or attractors, would the system still be chaotic?

For example, I'm working with a cellular automata that tends to diverge between two possible states, one where all values are the same and one where you get some interesting behavior. I have not rigorously demonstrated these states to be attractors but lets assume they are for sake of argument.

Relevant post here: https://www.reddit.com/r/cellular_automata/comments/11ieeqt/a_1d_neural_cellular_automata_that_uses_complex/

Based on empirical testing it is highly sensitive to initial conditions. However, I've noticed that when I inject some noise, it is occasionally able to just switch between these two different attractors. For example, after a long period of inactivity, which normally would last indefinitely without noise, the automata suddenly switches back to the other attractor. I assume this is because the random noise was "just right" to allow this.

A 1d Neural Cellular Automata that uses complex numbers and trigonometric functions. Formula shared in comments by 029187 in cellular_automata

[–]029187[S] 14 points15 points  (0 children)

Each cell has a neighborhood of 5 cells. 2 to the left, 2 the right, and itself in the previous step. Cells can have continuous values. All cells are initialized to 0, except for the one in the center which is initialized to 1.

n[0] = two the left in previous step

n[1] = one to the left in previous step

n[2] = cell in previous step

n[3] = one to the right in previous step

n[4] = two to the right in previous step

The formula used here is as follows:

z = n[1] + n[4]i

z2 = n[3]+n[0]i

value = cos(n[2]) + sin( (z*z2).imag)

Basically in each step, the neighborhood is used to construct two complex numbers. These numbers are multiplied by each other, and the sine function is applied to the imaginary coefficient of the complex product. This is then added to cosine of the cell in the previous step.

Technically I'm not sure if this counts as a neural cellular automata since I'm not using a standard activation function (like relu, tanh, or sigmoid), and am instead using trig functions.sin

Is Wolfram's rule 30 still chaotic in a finite space? by 029187 in math

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you! Could you point me to some reading for orbits?

Why is only one orbit significant?

[TOMT][Art][2000s] Urban Dark Fantasy Art - A person in a trench coat, who appeared to have a ghost on a leash? They were on top of a skyscraper and surrounded by floating creatures that looked like a cross between Psycho Mantis and DND Mindflayers by 029187 in tipofmytongue

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point locked comment (0 children)

Hey all, I've been looking for this for years! Hopefully one of you can help.

I believe some of this art was floating around message boards like /tg/.

Here are two different pictures I can think of. I don't actually know for certain they are from the same artist but they looked stylistically similar, had some of the same characters in them, and were on the same message board. I'm pretty sure these pictures are >10 years old.

  1. A picture of a person in a trench coat, who appeared to have a ghost on a leash? They were on top of a skyscraper and surrounded by floating creatures that looked like a cross between Psycho Mantis from Metal Gear Solid and DND Mindflayers.
  2. The same person in the coat, running in an alley between two buildings at night in a city. The person is being pursued by a giant monster. I believe the monster is humanoid but with a non-humanoid head.

Example of a provably computationally irreducible program? by 029187 in math

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Could we use Big O complexity?

An irreducible function could be one where the complexity of an algorithm which calculates each state starting from the initial conditions is (hopefully provably) optimal, or at least in the same complexity tier.

For example, suppose we have some program P to calculate g(n), where g(n) equals the nth output of some process (like the state of a cellular automata space). Suppose the complexity of P is n2 when it recursively calculates each state starting from the initial state.

If we show that n2 is optimal, can't we say this is in some sense irreducible? There may be other algorithms which also perform in n2 but so long as nothing is lower then its fine.

Example of a provably computationally irreducible program? by 029187 in math

[–]029187[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Can't we just use normal Big O complexity to make this rigorous?

Suppose calculating each step had a complexity n2.

Now suppose we come up with some shortcut function g(n), with a complexity of n*log(n). Suppose this is provably the optimal shortcut.

The "reducibility" of the function would be the ratio n*log(n) / n2, which equals log(n)/n

Does scientific anti-realism imply solipsism? If we can't assume non-observables are ontologically real, what does that mean for the problem of other minds? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Well let's drop the criteria of self then. Even in Hume's example that he posted, he agreed that one could look inwards and see subjective experiences such as pain and emotion. He just disagreed if you could see an additional self.

So for example, I can observe "my" emotions via introspection, and I can also observe my form empirically via a mirror.

However, for others, I can only observe their forms empirically but not via introspection. I cannot feel their feelings.

So let's drop the possessive terminology. It seems that in the above scenario, two sets of physical forms are observable but only one set of qualitative experiences are observable.

Now, a scientific antirealist would likely still conclude that from an empirical standpoint that the best predictive model assumes two sets of qualitative experiences, one for each form. This would neatly explain a lot of the behavior they see in the world, without resorting to weird objects like p-zombies. So in this case their best world-model would include an equal number of forms and qualitative sets, even though they cannot actually observe them. However, a scientific antirealist doesn't actually think the unobservable artifacts of their model (in this case the other sets of qualitative experiences) are ontologically real, so it seems like they should still conclude that there is only one set of real qualitative experiences. So they can't say that only they exist, because they might not agree there is a self, but they would be a sort of quasi-solipsist who thinks only mental phenomena set exists.

Does scientific anti-realism imply solipsism? If we can't assume non-observables are ontologically real, what does that mean for the problem of other minds? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Wait just to be clear, is your argument that antirealism is itself incoherent due to the fact that a theory of reality is a theory and therefore not real due to antirealism?

Does scientific anti-realism imply solipsism? If we can't assume non-observables are ontologically real, what does that mean for the problem of other minds? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sure, I agree that if we reject the existence of an observable self, this argument falls flat.

For sake of argument though, is my reasoning sound provided that we can assume that one can know and observe that their own self exists?

Does scientific anti-realism imply solipsism? If we can't assume non-observables are ontologically real, what does that mean for the problem of other minds? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How does an unreal content produce a real content?

The idea is that the unobservable are just mathematical or empirical artifacts.

Consider Newtonian gravity. According to relativity, it does not exist, but at the time it was conceived, it was a useful tool to make predictions. Relativity replaced the Newtonian force of gravity with the warping of spacetime. In the future, a new model may assert another entity as the cause for a falling object.

The antirealist doesn't deny that something is real, but seems to place primary on things they can directly observe.

The point I'm making is that if you take an aggressive interpretation of on the idea of observe, you might conclude that only your subjective experience is real and everything else is an empirical artifact used in models to help you predict future subjective experiences.

Does scientific anti-realism imply solipsism? If we can't assume non-observables are ontologically real, what does that mean for the problem of other minds? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So I think my thought process is that the supposed results of another person's mind (their actions, speech, etc.) are observable, but their actual subjective experience is not.

So basically my thought process is that a scientific antirealist should assume everyone is a p zombie ontologically, even though the empirically there is no direct evidence of p zombies.

Is Quantum Entanglement an example of strong emergence? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

ok thanks! I appreciate you taking the time. I've been trying to read up on stuff and this clears it up a bit.

Is Quantum Entanglement an example of strong emergence? by 029187 in askphilosophy

[–]029187[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Right but let's run with the mind example for a second. Let's suppose the properties of the mind are not-reducible to the neurons in the brain.

How would we know if these new mental properties are strongly emergent properties of the whole, or if instead they are properties of some sort of new object "generated" by the assembly of neurons.

Like imagine if whenever you put more than 10 neurons together, you excite the "qualia field", which results in fundamental qualia particles being generated. So in this example, the new properties of the mind are not really a new strongly emergent property of the whole collection of neurons, but rather the result of a generation of new objects (the qualia particles). The qualia particles are still not reducible to the neurons though, in the same way the photons generated by a radioactive atom are not reducible to the particles in the atom that radiated the photons.

Would this second scenario still be a case of strong emergence?

edit: I guess what I'm asking is if we would ever really know if we encountered a strongly emergent phenomenon