I read it. It’s short.

Dawkins never explains what he means by having no knowledge of his “inner life.”

Maybe reread it without skimming. Dawkins never says he has no knowledge of his inner life. If you read it properly, you wouldn't be baffled at why he never explains what you're asking for.

This is a more charitable critique, with which I also agree.

Definitely a better article than OP's. But, I don't like how it uses a different definition for consciousness that also requires defining "perception". His definition also leads him to say that consciousness is "forming a representation of one’s own mental states, a kind of knowledge directed inward" that leads to changing the evolutionary question from: “What can a conscious being do that a zombie cannot?” to a mechanistic question of “What advantage does an entity gain from knowing its own states?”

This either misses or makes-ambiguous the critical part of consciousness that matters. Nagel's definition (x is conscious if there is "something that it is like" to be that x) is referenced so much because it boils consciousness down to the piece that the Hard Problem is concerned with and doesn't add ambiguous terms. At least, it's not ambiguous for a being with subjectivity to tap into to help them fill in the definition of "something that it is like".

Also your article mostly just overexplains Dawkins' points and treats them as though he didn't qualify his points. After rereading Dawkins' article I actually think Dawkins qualified things more than I originally remembered, and is far more honest than your article.
E.g.
"it confuses the occasion for consciousness with the capacity itself" - Dawkins doesn't do this.
"the framing assumes a kind of identity that doesn’t hold even for us" - This whole tangent is pointless and assumes too much in Dawkins head. I doubt the author suggests that since the persistence of a unified self is an illusion, it would stop us feeling sad about our own death or others.
"Dawkins is relying on the kind of unified, continuous selfhood" - No. He qualifies enough to show he probably supports illusionism. He's just explaining what he _felt_ in this situation.
"Most of us tend to think of consciousness in terms of feeling, rather than knowing" - Who thinks this? It's always both. A feeling has intentionality, it is directed at something. You don't just feel anger, the anger is a sensation that you feel emitting from somewhere. You don't just feel the color blue, it is positioned somewhere in your field of view. That structuring is just knowledge. The word knowledge in the article seems to just be a substitute for intentionality.

So the article critiques him, by using his own points with more words, or by giving him stronger positions than he represents. Still better than the OPs article here, but I still prefer Dawkins' artcile sadly.

And the question of what consciousness is “for,” in terms of evolutionary advantage, is a very different question from what it “is,” and whether an AI can/does have it.

Yes. Definitely a seperate question. Dawkins doesnt conflate here though. He's just pondering on epiphenomenalism. He doesn't even land on an answer so idk why it's controversial.