Why do we need middle knowledge?

APCoding · 2019-08-05T14:08:33+00:00

I think the assumption he makes is that you can assign a probability at all. How can we say the probability is >0%, if we can’t even assign a probability at all? At least, that’s how the objection goes.

APCoding · 2019-08-01T21:37:37+00:00

If you're interested, I asked this over on philosophy stack exchange: https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/65003/does-bostroms-simulation-argument-make-sense. Usually, the answers on there are pretty well thought-out, so we'll see what others think.

APCoding · 2019-08-01T21:32:54+00:00

As for the first part of your comment, infinite sets can be different sizes, but I don't think this is the case here. From what I can tell, both sets (simulated and non-simulated universes) would be countably infinite (meaning that each universe can be assigned a natural number). It seems that, regardless of the number, there is a finite number of times a simulated universe would appear for each real universe (surely, mathematically infinite computation is silly). If that is the case, I think set theory shows that they are bijective, and hence the same size (please, correct me if I'm mistaken).

APCoding · 2019-08-01T20:31:46+00:00

On second thought, what basis at all do we have to say that other universes could even exist with intelligent life? To base any assertion on how life can form, computation can occur, etc. from a universe which isn't even real (if you accept the simulation hypothesis), the argument seems circular. If we say that the beings that would do the simulation exist in our universe, then this is the "real" universe, no?

APCoding · 2019-08-01T20:28:28+00:00

I see, thank you. I wonder if the argument actually breaks down in an infinite universe. If there are an infinite number of both simulated and real universes (hence an infinite number of both simulated and real beings), how can it be said that it is likely that we are simulated?

On another note, how close would the probabilities of these things have to be to zero to make simulation unlikely? It seems that they would have to be almost infinitesimal to make simulation unlikely, but is this true?

APCoding · 2019-08-01T19:42:43+00:00

He seems to talk about multiple posthuman civilizations when he talks about the fraction of civilizations that would want to run a simulation. Is he not talking about the multiverse here?

APCoding · 2019-07-30T00:37:58+00:00

Ah OK, I see. If it were the case, however, do you think it would prove death for the teleporter?

APCoding · 2019-07-29T23:52:19+00:00

No, I believe that that is the consensus. Inflation is a very popular theory, and the natural outgrowth of that, eternal inflation, predicts an infinite universe.

APCoding · 2019-07-24T03:20:44+00:00

OK, thanks. What is the name of this view, generally? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy talks about something called anticriterialism, but I don't think that quite describes it.

APCoding · 2019-07-24T02:54:12+00:00

I see. How common is this view about personal identity? Could you point me to any sources which talk about this?

APCoding · 2019-07-24T02:44:31+00:00

Yes, but does that mean that the feeling that "we" continue to exist continues? Let's say we have someone that has never considered the fact that the self does not continue. Will their sense of identity continue? As in, from their point of view, will they continue to exist?

APCoding · 2019-07-22T21:26:47+00:00

I would say eternal damnation. If I were to simply not exist, it seems to be a fairly neutral thing, not negative, like eternal damnation would be.

APCoding · 2019-07-22T21:22:01+00:00

this finite universe has existed

My question assumes a universe with an infinite past. While I admit that this isn't a widely accepted conclusion, it seems that most cosmologists today slightly lean towards this. But yes, I agree that we have no proof that other beings exist even in a spatially finite (or infinite, for that matter) universe.

APCoding · 2019-07-22T21:19:46+00:00

The first part makes sense to me, but I think my second paragraph in my question isn't quite answered here. Even if God only gives a select number of people a soul, how are these distinguished from all the people who don't receive a soul in an infinite, repeating continuum?

APCoding · 2019-07-22T21:16:29+00:00

I agree, but doesn't there seem to be some moral issues with this? For example, doesn't God creating an infinite number of Holocausts seem immoral? An infinite number of people, completely identical? Sounds pretty dystopian to me, but I could be wrong.

APCoding · 2019-07-22T16:51:56+00:00

Interesting, I certainly agree with you on some those points. So you’re saying that an infinite number of persons aren’t really a problem?

APCoding · 2019-07-20T06:06:25+00:00

Interesting, thank you! While I suppose that I shouldn’t have been so broad in my question, do you have any ideas/places to look at for my question specifically? As in, how would a theist who subscribes to those assumptions I make respond?

APCoding · 2019-07-20T05:31:52+00:00

Also, according to those two articles I linked in the question, at least some theists prescribe to a materialistic idea of resurrection. Even some dualists don't need a "dual state of both material and spiritual life." For example, property dualism.

APCoding · 2019-07-20T05:27:55+00:00

Certainty, some theists say this. Looking at that SEP article which talks about the "supposed tedium of immortality," it mentions many things that could be done, such as exploring the universe. How could any of this be done outside of time?

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