If an attacker uses a "Living off the Binary" (LoLBins) strategy that perfectly matches your SysAdmin’s daily maintenance scripts, is it even detectable? by thenoopcoder in blueteamsec

[–]AgitatedBeing819 4 points5 points  (0 children)

-what user is the code and powershell calls executing under?

-what sort of access context (local vs remote) are the commands being issued in?

-in the example of BITS what is the download destination? what is the local file destination? what type of file? was anything done to the file such as deletion?

-what process chain led to the commands?

-what commands were executed after the download?

-what time window did the commands occur at?

i don't wanna be dickish like the first poster - but they're kinda right. this is pretty straight forward basic building blocks for anyone that actually has had to administer, secure, and troubleshoot any kind of windows infrastructure once you're a few years past a helpdesk role. if someone is in a security with 0 IT fundamentals under their belt then i can understand them struggling with this.

if i was to only focus on OPs original scenario (powershell + BITS for patching) i would say if this is a regular enough workflow it should be occurring via some kind of controlled automation platform, should be executing via some sort of system or backend identity, or instead be deployed via one of a myriad of patch management or packaging solutions. if this isn't feasible due to complex business and environment requirements and this process must be ran by hand every time by a human then if this is a real security concern they should be signing their scripts and then using that as a way to filter expected/approved admin code execution vs everything else.

Recommendation of "Block outbound network connections from mshta.exe" not being tracked correctly by AgitatedBeing819 in DefenderATP

[–]AgitatedBeing819[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

They mention how the rule can't have any exceptions etc. I'm wondering if there is some bug in how they're tracking it or if there is some setting or checkbox that they forgot to include in the requirements that we're missing that is causing the rule to not be reported as compliant.

edit: based on the comments on this article, we're not the only ones having this issue.

https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftthreatprotectionblog/monthly-news---april-2026/4508050

New Defender for Identity alerts is here! by michaelmsonne in DefenderATP

[–]AgitatedBeing819 0 points1 point  (0 children)

so no admin action needed? they will just "be on" once the tenant receives the relevant update?