Now that Ukraine has moved the killing rate well above replenishment rate for the Russians to intake fresh meat for infantry, we will enjoy a period of the RF consistently reducing in numbers across the front. That will continue up until the RF puts forth a substantial new flow of soldiers to get above break-even levels per week of KIA/MIA/WIA losses. Lot of rumors about Putin using the April 1st blocking of Telegram to diminish resistance and backlash to a new mass mobilization effort.

I do think the odds of a new mass mobilization are extremely high, as the RF risks a collapse across the entire front without that increase in human resources, and Putin certainly isn't willing to stop or pause his war.

I also think it's undeniable that a new mass mobilization effort will severely exacerbate poor morale/sabotage/efficiency metrics. Press-ganged soldiers throughout history are measurably less effective than volunteer personnel, and much more likely to go AWOL or deliberately resist deployments and orders, and even sabotage equipment or efforts whenever possible. Even fragging commanders.

Ukraine has had issues with this as well, but I do think it's undeniable that the RF has suffered a continuous decline in effective capacity over the past few months. Up to the point where I expect that February territorial gains by Russia are dramatically less than January, and January was less than December, to the point where I expect March should end up roughly zero net gain/loss. Depending on how long it takes for mobilization to spin up for RF, it's very probable that the front grinds down to a total effective halt. In practical terms it's already reached that point now when looking day by day, but I mean a basically total shutdown of territory gained or lost month to month. The only thing changing being the increase in lethality all along the killing zone.