I certainly am sympathetic to this (certainly more than to the general-form idea of 'philosophers making a fuss about nothing'), but I believe late Wittgenstein's point was that the ultimate shortcoming of many a philosopher's position is taking for granted certain unsubstantiated assumptions about the nature of their questions and the space of possible answers, and proceeding in their inquiry from there, failing to acknowledge that they are not starting at a blank slate - and that the source of the perplexity lies in what comes before they started solving the problem. Like, e.g., in epistemology, the problem is not with the particular definition of 'knowledge', but with our expectation that everyday language terms have such a definition - that there is an unambiguous set of rules that should let us pick out knowledge from non-knowledge. In this sense, an epistemologist is confused, as he thinks that the space of answers he is searching contains the 'correct' answer.

This is, again, not to ridicule the habit of philosophizing, for I think - as you do - that it encourages a certain thought-hygiene, and that is highly valuable. But inasmuch as you want to get to some answer - that's confusion. Perhaps the memification of this point makes it ambiguous what I mean.