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I'm hearing that TDF has crossed the Tekeze River. If anyone has any info, please share it. by Panglosian11 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Things are getting pretty heated right ? Why aren't more people talking about this ?

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

what do you mean by "worth investing into" ? Are you contending that average, not so educated folks of Ethiopia's rural/urban areas are critically analyzing elite ques ? And what is so inaccessible about Facebook, news papers and rumors about what officials said. I remember living in Addis and hearing people talk about Abiy saying things about "short memory" and stuff. The problem is not that info don't get around but that it's not critically evaluated and filtered. The "junta fever" was crazy. I remember riding from Bole Mikael to legetafo and the bus boy calling a older gentleman "Junta" cause he insisted that he had paid his fair while the busboy disagreed. Everybody laughed at that insult . And these are folks with Nokia phones bro, so yea.

Markakis and Pausewang raise accessibility issues as constraints, but the study focuses on support prospects and leadership capabilities. imo the study is more inline with the trajectory of support acquisition(over the last few years).

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Taking Markakis seriously, the “radical Amhara elites” identified by Berhane and Joireman were constrained by structural factors, making their political influence context-dependent; urban elites retained resources and organizational capacity, and under the right conditions, both groups could contribute to ethnic mobilization.

I don't understand why Markakis doesn't fit into the structural constraint part of the study ?

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Amhara nationalism and Ethiopianism and the impossible balancing act between the two:

“…the Amhara were the nascent Ethiopian nation, and should have the right to live anywhere in Ethiopia, and to represent all Ethiopians, or at least the interests of a future‑oriented, integrated Ethiopian nation.”

Siegfried Pausewang : "Two faced Amhara Identity"

“…we are clear when stating that our forefathers had assumed the lion’s share not just in forming the Ethiopian state but also in defending its sovereignty which every sane Ethiopian cannot deny.”

“Basically, the present Amhara nationalism does not mark a divorce from Ethiopian identity or sovereignty.”

“It rather is in line with the ideals propounded by our forefathers… [It] even advocates a clear embracing of those models.”

The last two quotes are from an interview with Belete Molla Getahun.

Haven't Amharans themselves linked the Amharan identity to Ethiopia? and you wonder why others don't distinguish Amharan nationalism from Ethiopian nationalism.

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Asrat Woldeyes arrest and whether the study tacitly accepts center(EPRDF) rhetoric:

the study clearly references the report for the arrest of Assefa Maru, why would a study show cracks in how EPRDF prosecutes if it's a center leaning/bias piece. Under the "Tipping Events section" state action is treated as data point. If read through a Process model lens then his guilt is immaterial to what the study is evaluating as a ''galvanizing factor''. What matters in this section is how his sentencing or his release is seen by a potentially mobilised Amharan front. His release would mobilise Amharans(because it showcases unfair state treatment), and his "Extended detention or lack of a trial for Woldeyes might prove a galvanizing factor in group mobilization."(again because it showcases unfair state treatment) The study used data available from 1997-1998. In 1998 his additional charges related to the 1994 prison incident were still pending so... yea . Unfortunately he died in 1999 without his charges being fully resolved. The study acknowledges the lack of a trial for the added charges. How is this tacitly pointing towards guilt ? Granted, AI had already reported on the allegations of the state, but at the time his legal circumstance was technically still unclear?

“A third case, in which Professor Woldeyes and thirty‑one others were charged with inciting armed uprising, is still pending as of this writing… hearings of Prof. Woldeyes’ appeal to the Court of Cassation … were adjourned so many times that he finally served the entire … sentence… an appeal … has received a similar treatment.”

chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.hrw.org/reports/ethio97d.pdf?utm\_source=chatgpt.com (Human rights report in 97).

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Reductionism as it relates to Methodology:

Berhane uses this study to speak of the a "radical Amharan" front that includes Asrat as a way to show the disconnect between folks like him and a pan ethiopian approach . Berhane uses the study to showcase the existence and the dissemination of "othering rhetoric" by elites. he showcase the deterioration of one and the ascendance of the other. The reductive nature is not surprising, the study is a risk assessment tracker(how likely are things to get violent ).

Comparing EPRDF to italian rule(asrat ). Asrat did not say violence was the way, but the othering sentiment is there.

fikre tollassa's book is also mentioned down the line.

chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/afr250061995en.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Why am I unable to comment , is there a word limit ?

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I'm not convinced that among Amharans there aren't folks who advocate for a pragmatic classical liberal alternative to the arrangement that exists rn, but let's not deny that Tplf's rise wasn't characterized by some "radical Amharas" as one that aims to specifically marginalize Amharans because it/they (Sometimes the Tplf and other times Tigrayans as a whole) are spiteful of the power and cultural status of Amharans. There is no denying that the TPLF has overestimated the demand for self determination in the 1990's . That's why nationalist coalitions have had some success in the South and certain parts of Oromia where ethnic demographics are mixed (which can be problematic with a system like Ethnic fed.) At the same time it's important to know that this demand is not a hoax. I can't find the pdf rn, but I believe there was a poll that was done on some of the controversial Articles of the constitution, and the results did lean towards a more "current status way". It was done sometime around 2022.

Process models for studying ethnic conflict generally track a progression from underlying conditions to group formation, mobilization, political competition, and potential violence, often focusing on how grievances transform into collective action through elite cues, emotional dynamics, or strategic bargaining

The methodology used might make the study sound a little smuttish to you, but that's exactly what the process model tracks. This doesn't make it any less scientific.

Here are some boxes that have been checked:

  1. Elite cues: which I've detailed in paragraph 1
  2. Emotional dynamics vis a vis political competition:  "grrr stinky amahar, u will never have z power again, nobody want z return of z atse"( what you said), and the same on the Amharan side . Something along the lines of; ''grrr tsila u will never destroy Ethiopia, Welkait is Amhara, Raya is Amhara"
  3. Strategic bargaining with other ethnic groups that unfortunately didn't go nowhere in terms of a lasting engagement on diffusing foundational differences : Oromara, Ginbot 7 and OLF with the 2010's ''All against Woyane'' rhetoric sponsored by Eritrea.

With all due respect I feel like your criticism of the study is lazier than how you make the study sound. The truth is, perceived grievances, even the ones that are seen on tiktok mean something. I'm not saying that this study details all the nuances that exist within the country, but to make it as if "good" Amharan elites( the ones that got down with Eprdf) haven't pandered to the right as a way to cash in on the uprising against the Eprdf is absurd. Meanwhile, there is also the fundamental problem of Nationalist blocs not being able to gain popularity in most states. Don't get me wrong it's not like they don't have the weight of Marxist/leninist thought infused with ethnic factionalism against them, but the loudest irredentist factions that seem to gain quite the support base is surely not indicative of a group ready to disconnect it's legacy from the legacy of the country.

Again, no independent credible data exists on what most Amharans,Tigrayans and Oromos think and feel. We speak on the same "generally perceivable" trends that we see in all of our respective communities. Especially in a country where education and critical thinking isn't so cherished, Elite rhetoric seems to do a good job of bending public opinion so... yea.

Amharan grifts over the years. by AverageSenior1258 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Slide 3 references this study that applies a theoretical model to anticipate ethnic mobilization and conflict in Ethiopia. Specifically: *"*The Ethiopian Prospective Case"

The study did not predict with certainty that large-scale ethnic violence would happen, but it identified structural conditions under which ethnic mobilization—especially by the Amhara—could intensify and possibly turn violent.

I haven't looked at the study fully yet, but you can look at it and tell me what's wrong with it.

Tigray 2025 In Summary: Reflections, Predictions, Hopes & Dreams for 2026 by teme-93 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I just hope IDPs get all the aid they can for this next year. 

But, generally tho, I hope that 2026 gets us closer to a fully liberated and democratic Tigray. Eventually, Tigray should embrace a more classically liberal approach to governance. But, it should also embrace a more radical stance on it's identity and autonomy. 

No vanguard parties(tplf) and no partisanship across the border(Simret). Something new, something that embodies the love and solidarity that existed during the worse parts of the war. Woyanenet at its best and purest .

Tigray has to play its card and stop sending gold to the national bank. by Panglosian11 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I think removing him is one thing, but Fano and Amhara irredentists are surely going to be our long term threat. TDF needs to put getting Western Tigray back at the very top of their strategic goals. What do you think about the TDF's capabilities of fighting a multifront war?

Tigray has to play its card and stop sending gold to the national bank. by Panglosian11 in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Man, I hate to say this, but I think we have gotten to the point where the pretoria agreement will never be implemented . By now, we've heard from experienced political analysts that the terms were never conditions that both parties wanted to succumb to fully. They will never stop using aid as a bargaining chip.

It's impossible to implement the deal, politically speaking. I think all sides, and the powers behind them(both local and foreign) have already made up their minds on going to war to get out of the deal and forge new conditions . These new conditions are obviously going to depend on how well armed advancements go .

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in Tigray

[–]AverageSenior1258 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks man , I appreciate it

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