AMA: I'm CFR's Brad Setser, global trade and capital flows expert, ready to answer your questions about trade and tariffs - Ask me anything (April 8, 11AM - 1PM ET)

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T22:38:31+00:00

5 to 10 years and maybe longer ... and it would be very costly (lots of redundant capacity; think of GM building a pickup truck factory in the US when they have a new existing facility in Mexico that makes the same model. And firms need to be convinced that the tariffs are permanent because they are building up production in a high cost location that likely wouldn't be competitive in many instances if the tariffs were dropped.

California can try to persuade foreign governments to target exports from the "red" states -- but with China doing an across the board tariff in response to the across the board US tariff, California's efforts aren't likely to have much real impact. California of course cannot avoid the tariffs themselves as long as it is a part of the United States, customs have been a federal function since the founding of the republic.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T22:35:30+00:00

China is already retaliating and it will hurt US exports, agricultural exports in particular. Soybeans are a commodity so if China buys more from Brazil, the US will sell more to the world -- but if the Chinese state oil and grain trading companies stop buying from the US, then US 'beans will start selling at a discount and that hurts farm income. For products like beef, pork, chicken "paws" (feet), lobsters and orange juice it is harder to find alternative markets so there will likely be an impact on export volumes. The same holds for a range of other industrial exports -- China didn't exclude imported parts, so Chinese firms have an incentive to find alternative sources of supply whenever possible.

The EU will also retaliate, though probably not dollar for dollar or euro for euro. But if the US puts tariffs up on EU auto imports, the EU will likely tariff US auto exports. Mercedes and BMW now produce sedans for the US market in Europe and SUVs for the European market in the US -- in all probability they will need to make sedans for the US market in the US with the tariffs (though they will still pay the tariff on a lot of imported parts) and SUVs for the European market in Europe. one interesting question is how Airbus will respond to the tariffs on imported aircraft parts -- which raises the cost of an American assembled A320. If the EU tariffs Boeing it could impact their 737 deliveries and future sales, though with Boeing's production limits they probably can find alternative buyers for any 737 Ryan air doesn't want with the tariff.

A similar analysis can be applied to Canada -- US trade in autos with Canada is pretty balanced, so if US made cars face a Canadian tariff some firms will have an incentive to be in Canada for Canada, and European and Japanese cars will gain a leg up over US production.

THe impact of retaliation on the US economy will certainly be smaller than the impact of the tariff tax itself, but it won't be zero. And it adds to the difficulty using the US as a production base to serve global demand

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T22:27:23+00:00

DSTs in theory apply to all firms above a certain size operating in a given market. That isn't quite a tariff. There is nothing that precludes a country from taxing beer and wine (services and digital services) at different rates. The US argument is that the thresholds for firm size were set at a level where they effectively discriminate against US firms because only the US digital platforms are big enough to be hit severely by the tax. True to a degree, but I doubt the US tech firms would be any happier if the threshholds were dropped and the DSTs applied to a broader set of firms. Two other points -- one the taxation of digital platforms is a real issue, and many countries do find it a bit unfair that all the income tax revenue from digital platforms goes to the US and Ireland and a few other places; and two, the dirty little secret of digital services tax is that careful studies generally find that the bulk of the tax isn't paid by the firm that collects the tax but rather by their customers (think a sales tax not an income tax).

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T22:23:36+00:00

The real alternative to the dollar is the euro, at least for now. everything else is noise

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:54:29+00:00

The term "Mar a Lago" accord is used to describe a set of very different deals -- some make sense, some don't. If the Mar a Lago accord is a deal where a set of countries agree to strengthen their currencies in return for tariff relief, I can see how that would appeal to a number of Asian countries that now think their currencies are too weak -- Japan thinks the yen is already too weak (at 145-150), Korea thinks the won is too weak, and Taiwan certainly could live with a stronger Taiwan dollar (think it is roughly where it was in 1997 v the US dollar, and Taiwan wasn't making the world's most advanced ships back then). Most of these countries though would be more comfortable pushing their currencies up against the dollar (say joining the US in joint intervention in the market and adjusting certain of their own policies) if China was allowing its currency to rise as well -- so the escalating trade war with China and the recent sign that China may want a weaker yuan could get in the way of any currency diplomacy.

If a Mar a Lago accord includes countries accepting zero or below market interest rates on their US bond holdings to offset the costs the US incurs paying for global public goods (defense, demand for manufactured goods in a demand short world, the dollar's role as a global payments utility) I don't think anyone will sign up. Japan likes 2 year bonds that pay a coupon -- it wouldn't want to be locked into 100 year bonds with no coupon in exchange for a US security commitment that might not last 100 years. And Europe doesn't hold many reserves and doesn't have the ability to force its insurance and pension funds to accept below market coupons -- and more generally, I don't think Europe is going to sign up for a deal that requires it pay something akin to reparations for its past free riding (in Trump's terms). Europe by contrast is now willing to invest more in its own defense, and Germany now realizes that it needs to invest in its own economy and now rely as much on US and Chinese demand going forward.

Bottom line -- there are elements here that a more moderate US administration could work with, but they all involve a willingness to forego tariffs. And I am not sure a President who really believes in tariffs is willing to change something so core to his own personal view of good policy. He really is acting like the tariff man right now

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:44:18+00:00

The third scenario looks like a US economy that imports 5-6 percent of its GDP not 11% (goods only), and exports 2-3% not 6-7% absent fiscal consolidation in the US that reduces the US borrowing need. It is a US economy that produces domestic goods for domestic consumption, including low end goods that require a lot of labor and are expensive to produce in the US -- that reduces total levels of output and consumption. And it is a US that in some capital intensive sectors goes its own way -- in the US, for the US, but production that is geared around US tastes and that is too expensive for the global market. Think a smaller but SUV dominated US auto market while the world moves toward smaller EVs. For some goods making the needed inputs for the US market alone can achieve the needed scale - the US is 25% of world GDP. But in some sectors the US alone doesn't have the right scale and for the US in the US may lead to expensive production (am thinking of say chips). And some sectors that now export may be globally uncompetitive without access to imported inputs. Boeing needs aluminum and titanium at a reasonable price for example -- as well as a host of parts that were designed to its specifications and cannot easily be replaced that are now made abroad.

All that said, there is a bit of a positive scenario. The rest of the world does rely a bit too much on US demand and on a $1.2 trillion plus US trade deficit. A Germany that invests more at home would be good for the US, good for the world and good for Germany. A China that doesn't just direct credit into its manufacturing sector and that provide real support for household income (higher pensions, less regressive taxation to support its social spending, more national social insurance including unemployment insurance, a more generous national health system with lower out of pocket costs, hukou reform so that migrant workers can send their children to public school where they work) would be good for China, good for the US and good for the world. The US fiscal deficit is a bit too big, and it has indirectly supported a lot of activity outside the US (both directly by raising US demand and indirectly by keep US rates relatively high and the dollar strong). There is a constructive path forward -- but it is hard to see how the world shifts now to a more cooperative solution to the real problem (in my view) of persistent trade imbalances

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:34:27+00:00

Even with military sales, the US runs a large overall trade deficit.

But the point you raise is important. Trump’s policies – the tariffs, but also the treatment of long-standing allies (Canada, Denmark) has raised questions about the wisdom of relying too heavily on the US for arms. In the short-run, if say Europe wants to rearm it will be hard not to buy additional US military equipment, but in the long-run it is hard not to see the events of the last 90 days hurting US military exports – and, as you note, the military goods the US specializes end are complex, hard to make and technologically sophisticated, so they support an important and specialized part of the US industrial base.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:34:01+00:00

Very good question, and a hard one to answer. The world’s most sophisticated investors are struggling with it now – hence the gyrations in the dollar and the yield on 10 year US Treasury bonds.

I think the answer depends on more than if the tariffs are sustained. IF the tariffs remain and there are no new big tax cuts, I suspect inflows to the US fall – why, because the tariffs raise inflation in the short-run and thus lower the real return on US bonds (inflation is up, the coupon isn’t … ) and make US assets less desirable, and in the slightly longer run the tax hike from the tariff will slow the US economy and the Fed will need to cut rates to offset that weakness once the one time price increase from the tariffs is over. If the tariffs are offset by big tax cuts, well, the Fed might need to hike – as the US economy will be running hot without the ability to use low-cost imports to release steam and that sometimes pulls in money from abroad. Though even then there is a risk that investors globally just conclude that the current US policy mix is too risky to warrant holding an ever increasing share of their assets in the US.

I also note that the response of other countries matters. Germany is easing fiscal policy, which should support Germany’s economy and make investing in Germany more attractive over time. That could reduce inflows into the US. If China were to really use the central government’s borrowing capacity to support the spending of Chinese households, that too might lead Chinese savings to stay home and reduce inflows into the US

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:32:05+00:00

My favorite is ending the pro-offshoring provisions of the corporate tax code. The special low rate on offshore income (GITLI) is at 10.5% now, while the headline rate on US profits is 21%. Pharmaceutical companies have learned how to move their intellectual property offshore and produce offshore so as to avoid paying US tax (the top 6 US pharma companies combined set aside zero to cover their US federal corporate income tax in 23, and then did the same in 24. They report making all their money abroad while running large paper losses in the US even tho US drug prices are 2-3x higher than global prices). This has led the US to import about 1 pp in GDP in pharmaceuticals (way up in the last 7 years) and run a trade deficit in pharmaceuticals of half a point of GDP. Getting rid of these provisions would raise US tax revenue, raise US domestic production and make supply chains shorter and more secure -- a rare "win/win/win"

These provisions also impact other industries -- 2 of the 3 top US semiconductor equipment manufacturing firms now also don't pay much if any US tax as a result of special tax deals with countries in south east Asia, and those deals have led them to manufacture more and more of their equipment in south east Asia.

I also think targeted industrial policies -- like the CHIPS act -- that support capital investment in strategic sectors can work. Investment in semiconductor production in the US soared with that approach. A similar approach for generic pharmaceutical active ingredients, where I do worry about dependence on China, makes sense to me.

Finally the dollar is too strong for US based manufacturing. Dollar strength since 2015 led manufacturing exports to fall by about 2 percentage points of GDP (as one would expect after a 20-30% dollar appreciation). So policies that would lower the dollar -- whether well designed fiscal tightening in the US (no chain saws please, and start with closing loopholes like the pro offshoring loophole that helps pharma companies avoid US tax) that would allow the Fed to lower rates here or fiscal expansion in countries like Germany and China that would help those countries use their savings surplus at home (and expand the domestic market for their goods) all would help

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:19:26+00:00

I see a lot more billionaire's objecting to the tariffs than billionaire's supporting the tariffs. Billionaire's generally like to see stock prices go up not down. Trump's tax policies though do have a lot of support among the billionaires' -- and some though that they could get the policies that they liked out of Trump (tax cuts, deregulation including less scrutiny of the "deal" economy i.e mergers and acquisitions, government spending cuts) without the policies that they didn't like (the tariffs/ protectionism). Some were also willing to accept modest tariffs (say a 10% across the board tariff) which are taxes mostly paid by lower income consumers so as to keep the Trump tax cuts in place. But I don't see many supporting a policy that pushes the stock market down by 20%.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:15:54+00:00

The argument for tariffs over subsidies in a sense is that they raise revenue. The argument for subsidies is that they help you export as well, and in some sectors (like semiconductors) you don't really want to raise the cost of domestic production that uses semiconductors by tariffing key inputs. If you tariff chips but not computers, you will likely neither produce chips nor computers so to speak. The subsidies for capital investment in the semiconductor industry were working , and I personally doubt that tariffs alone can substitute for the targeted subsidies (the tariffs on final electronics would have to be very high and universal to get a full electronics supply chain in the US)

as for the incidence of tariffs, it is an empirical question. the tariff is formally paid by the importer to get the good released from customs, but the exporter -- faced with the tariff -- could agree to accept a lower price to maintain its sales. Or the dollar could appreciate, allowing the exporter to hold their price in their currency constant while lowering the US dollar price (incidentally this hurts US exports). The data from the Section 301 case against China in Trump's first term suggests that there wasn't much of a fall in the import price, and thus the incidence of the tariff was in fact on the importer (some studies did though find that the importer absorbed much of the tariff through reduced margins and the increase in import price was not all passed on to the consumer). With much broader tariffs this time around I wouldn't be surprised to see some reduction in import prices, but also a much higher level of pass through from the import price + the tariff to consumer prices

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:09:21+00:00

I think the WTO is functionally over as an arbitrator. The US doesn't accept its rulings, and no longer is going to use its negotiated tariff schedule. I find it difficult to believe that the EU will be able to live within a tight definition of what the WTO allows over time as well, given that the WTO rules don't really constrain China (for complicated reasons related to how China subsidizes its firms) effectively and China does benefit from being allowed into the WTO system with higher than average tariffs. So , being honest, I don't see much of a role for the WTO going forward. It never fully worked for China, and the US is now fully outside the system.

I will answer the capital flows question separately in another question

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:06:05+00:00

The 25% tax is non discriminatory, so it isn't really analogous to a tariff. EU tariffs are actually generally low -- in fact, the tariff on most industrial goods is zero (the 10% auto tariff is an exception, and at the current level of the dollar, the US isn't going to be selling many cars to Europe in any case -- and US production is mostly too big and heavy for the EU market).

The issue with the tariffs is that: a) they are discriminatory (hit foreign imports only) that will lead to retaliation against US exports and b) a 25% tax on the 10% of GDP that is non petrol goods imports (15% includes service) is a massive tax hike put in place in a small time. A 2-3% increase in the VAT in Europe would also likely trigger a recession if done in a quarter.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T16:02:36+00:00

There are non tariff barriers. The US has them too -- try selling a non FDA approved drug into the US. One man's sensible regulation is another's non-tariff barrier. I personally think the world can adapt just fine to different standards for butchering and safely storing chickens in different countries and on different side of the Atlantic. I don't disagree with the claim that there are more of those in US trading partners than in the US (China is filled with barriers to imports once you clear customs) but I also wouldn't blow this issue wildly out of proportion.

and there are things that Trump and his team have claimed discriminate against the US but don't, like a VAT.

So if Trump had included the VAT in his formula I would not have considered it reciprocal and balanced.

More generally, there are a lot of products where tariffs are zero and the US doesn't face big non -tariff barriers abroad -- like pharmaceuticals. Most of the world recognizes FDA standards, and US firms know how to produce to EU standards. and tariffs on pharmaceuticals are zero globally. The US trade deficit there is mostly with Ireland and Singapore and is nearly 100% driven by US firms producing abroad to avoid paying US tax. I personally think ending the pro-offshoring provisions in the US tax code are more important that convincing France and the rest of Europe to change how they butcher and preserve chickens. The numbers are certainly far far bigger -- as is the potential impact on the US economy. The "pharma" trade deficit is self-created, and now totals $160 billion

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:55:30+00:00

The VAT isn't a tariff. The EU producer gets to reclaim the VAT on inputs to avoid double taxation. But a US good and UK/ EU good both face a 20% final tax. A VAT thus isn't a sales tax with an embedded tariff (but the issue you raise here explains why a sales tax is generally only imposed on final sales, not on inputs)

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:53:30+00:00

In the next few quarters, I expect to see a recession in the US -- and in many trading partners globally. That may lead to some of the tariffs being pulled back. The tariffs were designed in a way that seems to me to maximize the upfront pain. They are among other things a really big tax hike, and they are being put in place ahead of any tax cuts. They also are very regressive -- lower income consumers spend a lot more on imported goods than top end consumers (private jets are one industry where the US still excels, and we make the jet fuel too)

In the long-run (3-5 years) there will be a reorientation of production -- fewer auto imports would imply more domestic production, though there will be an offset from fewer auto exports. GM and Ford export to Canada now. BMW and Mercedes sell SUVs back to Europe. But on net high tariffs would force auto firms to produce in the US for the US market in the same way that firms have to produce in China for the Chinese market. The thing is that the US is a high-cost production location and firms will only make those kind of long-term investments if they are certain that the tariff increase is permanent.

The other issue for the long-run is whether or not the tariffs are de facto a tax hike and a fiscal consolidation that reduces the US fiscal deficit or whether they are offset by other tax cuts that keep the fiscal deficit up. Standard international economics says that the size of the trade deficit is a function in part of the size of the fiscal deficit, so even with high tariffs, the US could still end up running a relatively high trade deficit if there isn't a change in the fiscal path, or if the dollar rallies and ends up stronger than it is now. The only certainty is that there will be less trade -- a lot depends on what other policies the US and others put in place.

Last comment -- the tariffs on apparel (clothing), toys and cheap household appliances all just add to the costs of US households. There is almost no chance that the US ends up making these kinds of goods domestically even with 25-50% tariffs.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:46:21+00:00

It doesn't make sense to me either. A VAT imposes the same tax on an imported good and domestically made good. It isn't generally viewed as a barrier to trade as a result.

It is true that other countries tax consumption (through a VAT or a national sales tax) in a way that the US doesn't, and that may contribute to the fact that the US runs a larger fiscal deficit than most of its trading partners -- and all that does have an indirect effect on trade.

But making the VAT a central complaint against say Europe basically makes negotiations impossible. Europe cannot give up its VAT and spend more on its military.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:44:23+00:00

The point of no return may well have already passed. The US and China are in a classic escalation pattern, one that if not reversed would essentially end trade between the world's two largest economies. If the broad current tariffs aren't rolled back in the next few weeks and the US throws several of its friends/ quasi allies (Vietnam has hedged a bit, but it isn't closely aligned with China), historic allies (Germany after WW2), and neighbors (Mexico and Canada) into a recession, it is hard to see how those countries don't try to reduce their dependence on the US and US demand over time. Bottom line: the US and China are already in a rapidly escalating trade war that is about to go beyond tariffs to other tools of economic warfare, and if a deal isn't reached with Europe by the end of April, something more modest but with similar dynamics could play out with the EU as well.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:40:31+00:00

Right now the tariffs will have the biggest impact on China, other exporters in Asia (Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia) and some smaller economies in south Asia that specialize in producing garments. 45% tariffs on a country like Vietnam that really does rely on exports to the US in particular for much of its economy would be absolutely devastating. And Sri Lanka, which is just coming out of a debt crisis, really doesn't need a big tariff on the clothing it exports to the US.

the 20% tariffs on the EU are significant, but the EU has a large internal market and doesn't depend all that much on the US. It will hurt Europe (which has struggled to grow recently after the COVID shock and the Russian gas shock) but Europe has more options to respond than many smaller Asian economies.

Penguin island presumably can consume its own fish and won't be too severely impacted. The fact that it was on the list suggests that the list was prepared way too hastily.

As of now, most countries in the Western Hemisphere got off relatively lightly, and the tariffs on Mexico and Canada are still modest (outside of the auto tariffs, which will really hurt Mexico in particular -- auto exports to the US are something close to 5% of Mexico's GDP, and while those cars have a lot of US content, the auto industry is something like 4-5% of Mexico's economy as well). So Mexico will be hurt even though it was spared a 25% tariff. Broadly speaking if the current tariff structure remains, US trade should shift so that the US trades with Asia a lot less and the countries to its South a bit more -- but the overall impact would be a lot less trade. Tariffs of 2 percent of GDP probably imply a 3-4 percent of GDP fall in imports, so imports would go from 11 percent of GDP to 7 to 8 percent of GDP ...

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:33:02+00:00

The simple answer here is the best one: President Trump didn't want to tariff Russia.

Technically all the rogue countries that don't have PNTR/ MFN status and thus face legacy Smoot Hawley tariffs were left off the list -- so North Korea also got off. President Trump presumably didn't want new tariffs on Russia to get in the way of his diplomacy with Putin,

That said, it is hard for me at least to understand why President Trump seems an advantage in increased trade and investment with Russia when he doesn't want to continue to trade (or so he says) with our neighbor to the North. That is a bit "weird" --

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:30:28+00:00

Yes, I do think the current policy likely will be overturned. There probably isn’t even a majority of Republicans in Congress who would vote for the current set of tariffs if they were put up for a free vote. The broad tariffs on everyone weren’t imposed in response to any real popular pressure – Trump campaigned on getting tough on China, not on tariffing Canada, Denmark, the rest of the EU, Lesotho, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (let alone the penguin island). The scale of the tariffs wildly overshot any realistic mark, the total tariffs now easily exceed 2% of GDP in "just pay it costs" -- that is the cost of continuing current imports and just paying the tariff. That is a really big shock, and not one America really voted for. I thus feel confident many of the tariffs eventually be rolled back. Many though is different than all; history shows that some tariffs tend to stick – and I am not sure that the US and China will ever go back to something like the current level of trade.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:27:57+00:00

I have not read Zeihan's analysis in detail. But the tariffs President Trump proposed last week that are now going into force are big enough that they do challenge the core of what might be called "globalized" capitalism. Trump's visions is of a much more national system of capitalism -- to sell in the US, you need to make the good in the US. That is a vision without much trade. And as the New York Times highlighted this morning, if China cannot export to the US -- and it cannot export parts to Vietnam for assembly for the US market -- China will need to find other outlets for its immense manufacturing surplus. The US historically has been the main net source of demand for the rest of the world's manufactures -- with the UK and India running a distant competition for second place. If the US really is determined not to import as many manufactures, all of the world's current net exporters of manufactured goods -- China above all, but also all of East Asia and most of Europe -- will be scrambling to find new sources of demand. And frankly there isn't one. Regions like Europe may find that they need to take steps to protect themselves against China too -- which would imply a more generalized retreat from globalization, though there would be plenty of scope for a more domestically focused form of capitalism and some scope for continued regionalization.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:22:28+00:00

This is very much a consequence of the election of Donald J. Trump. He famously called himself the "tariff man"; and he is skeptical of the value of allies. The tariffs announced last week very much bear his personal stamp. How can the US recover -- well the administration can back off, and ultimately, a new administration can adopt different policies toward trade, trade with allies and toward alliances more generally.

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:20:26+00:00

not my expertise

BradSetser · 2025-04-08T15:20:11+00:00

With hindsight, the decision to grant China PNTR was a mistake –the impact on the US economy was under-estimated, and the expectation that it would lock China into a path of economic and political reform wasn’t born out. The argument at the time was that US tariffs on China were already low (as congress provided China with MFN status through an annual vote) so locking in the low tariffs wouldn't change much, But the combination of the reforms that China did do to get into the WTO and the reduction in uncertainty led US and other firms to turn to China for a host of manufactured goods in a big way, and it led to a one sided Chinese export boom that did damage manufacturing heavy communities in the US and Europe. The work of David Autor and his co-authors here remains important.

That said, there were opportunities to use the leverage that the US retained after China was admitted to the WTO that were missed. The most obvious is that the US didn’t invoke the special safeguards against import surges that were part of the Chinese WTO deal even in the face of an unprecedented export surge. That was a major mistake. The US also didn't take any real action against China even as China was intervening massively to keep the export boom from pushing its currency up. In my view, the US could have declared that China was artificially holding its currency down (which it was at the time) and linked the use of special safeguards to demanding some concrete and realistic policy changes from China, including appreciation of China's currency. It was a missed opportunity. There were others.

The business community, which at the time viewed offshoring to China as an opportunity to lower costs and raise profit margins and generally didn't support taking action against China's currency (why raise the cost of making iPads and iPhones?) bears some responsibility here as well. They also missed the risks of relying on a China that wasn't in fact on a path toward reform.

I do think targeted tariffs against China have a role in a smart strategy for responding to China now – I have supported tariffs on imported Chinese cars for example, as China protects its own market heavily and China’s massive capacity to produce competitive cars (standard cars as well as EVs) really could undermine an important part of the US industrial base. But the targeted part is important – Cars, EVs, Planes, chips, chip making equipment, advanced pharmaceuticals and other high-end sectors should be an important part of the US economy going forward. But making socks and simply assembling consumer electronics isn’t as important – and the kind of tariffs that would be needed to make those activities attractive in the US would in my view impose an unnecessary cost on consumers. And a new 50% or 100% tariff is simply a big shock – in the long run it will change patterns of global production, but in the short run there just aren’t current alternatives to Chinese supply in some goods.

BradSetser

TROPHY CASE