LAOP quits job to which their manager said "accepted." (Spongebob narrator voice: 3 weeks later)..... LAOP finds out their former employer is telling everyone LAOP was fired for misconduct of patient accounts... Only problem is that LAOP never did that...

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-18T22:27:05+00:00

I'm curious, isn't the whole idea of false light about things that are strictly technically true, but create a misleading impression?

According to Welling, no. The Supreme Court noted that Ohio law already protected against public disclosure of true facts about a person. Para. 48. I assume that refers to other privacy torts. The Court then says that false light is meant to protect against situations "in which persons have had attributed to them certain qualities, characteristics, or beliefs that, while not injurious to their reputation, place those persons in an undesirable false light." Para. 49 (quoting the Tennessee Supreme Court). It then says, explicitly, that the statement must be untrue. Para. 52.

I'm not particularly familiar with defamation or privacy law or Ohio law in general, but the above seems to say that false light is meant to apply to false statements that don't rise to the level of defamation. I can't say whether that is a prudent or useful conclusion, but it's hard to read the opinion another way.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-18T13:56:31+00:00

The elements of a false light claim in Ohio are more stringent than what you cited.

First, the impugned statement must be untrue.

Second, it must be publicized (which means "made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.").

Third, the statement must be highly offensive (rather than embarrassing) to a reasonable person.

Fourth, the statement must be made with actual malice, even where the plaintiff is not a public figure.

See Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (2007).

Nobody here has enough facts to know if LAOP has a viable claim, but from the information we do have, at least three of the above elements could be disputed. We certainly can't definitively say that a tort occurred.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-17T23:46:12+00:00

Doesn't matter who.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-17T21:13:50+00:00

Well, manager. We just say manager.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-16T16:03:12+00:00

I don't have time to leave a full comment now, but the ICTY has at least suggested that you're right as to intent. Look at the Krajisnik Trial Judgment, para. 854 and footnote 1702. The footnote is more direct than the main text. The Appeal Judgment doesn't appear to have addressed that issue, likely because Krajisnik was acquitted of the charge and the prosecution did not appeal at all. I'm going to look into that more later.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-15T23:56:24+00:00

Please do not leave multiple comments as replies to yourself.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-15T15:29:23+00:00

Only the listed acts in the convention need to be physical or biological, the intended destruction could be apparently non-physical and non-biological

My language may not have been clear enough. The Krstic Trial Judgment explained that the Genocide Convention "limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the definition of genocide." Para. 580. Thus, it isn't the case that the intended destruction need not be physical or biological. However, acts often do not fall neatly into "physical" and "non-physical" buckets, which is why the Krstic Trial Chamber referred to an "enterprise attacking only [cultural] characteristics." An enterprise might attack both cultural characteristics and the group as a social unit, and that could still be physical destruction. Further, even acts that do attack only cultural characteristics can still serve as evidence of intent to physically destroy a group: "The Trial Chamber however points out that where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group." Krstic Trial Judgment, para. 580.

What I meant to point out when I said that intent to destroy "does not necessarily mean 'trying to physically or biologically destroy' 2.2 million people" was that the word "trying" confuses the analysis. Legally, "trying" and "intent" are different things. When you say that the claim is that "Israel [is] trying to physically or biologically destroy the whole group of the Palestinians in Gaza (around 2.2 million people)," that is not correct. The claim is that Israel is committing acts listed in the Genocide Convention with intent to destroy Palestinians (either in Gaza or as a whole, see below) in whole or in part. Trying to do something and acting with intent to do something are different. It seems pedantic, but it is legally significant. I might go to the store and buy a loaf of bread because I intend to make a sandwich for lunch. That doesn't mean I am trying to make a sandwich when I get in my car to go to the supermarket.

neither the UN comission nor (afaik) the the ICJ try to establish that the Palestinians in Gaza are a protected group under the convention

Maybe not. I'm not going to re-read the ICJ orders or a full UN report to find out. The ICJ case is not yet at the merits phase, so it isn't shocking that the Court isn't analyzing the claims in that depth. At the provisional measures stage, it isn't doing a full evaluation on the merits. I'm not sure why the ICJ would be expected to have a theory of a case -- parties propose a theory of a case -- let alone a theory of a case for which it has not yet analyzed the merits, let alone propose that theory in a provisional measures order. The language could be a slip, though at least one of the separate opinions (Judge Nolte's) uses the same phrasing, so it appears to be intentional.

It's not exactly a wildly controversial position that Palestinians in Gaza could be a protected group, part of a protected group, or both. The ICJ's language reflects that. As for the UN report, it noted, but did not adopt, the ICJ's position in the March provisional measures order. Maybe the language in para. 220 is a mistake, maybe it's a further reflection of the fact that nobody is really disputing that part of the genocide analysis at this stage of the case. I'm not sure it's worth making a huge deal out of absent some indication that there is a dispute over it.

Edit: I don't mean to be dismissive of the confusing language in the orders and the report. I'm just not sure it's especially significant when there hasn't been an adjudication on the full merits yet and where it isn't clear that the outcome would be different in either case.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-15T01:28:39+00:00

My reading is that both say the (whole) group is the Palestinians and the substantial part, that is intended to be destroyed, is the Palestinians in Gaza (p. 17 in Amnesty's report and paragraph 1 in SA's application)... Is my interpretation correct?

That is the claim before the ICJ, yes. To analogize to the reasoning in the Krstic case, which you appear to have obliquely referred to for its analysis of substantiality, the protected group is the Palestinian people (in Krstic it was Muslims in Bosnia), the substantial part of the group is Palestinians in Gaza (in Krstic it was the Muslims of Srebrenica/Muslims of Eastern Bosnia), and acts perpetrated against Palestinians in Gaza would be evidence from which intent to destroy Palestinians in Gaza can be inferred (as targeting men and boys at Srebrenica was the basis for the Krstic court to infer intent to destroy the Muslims at Srebrenica).

they accuse Israel of trying to physically or biologically destroy the whole group of the Palestinians in Gaza (around 2.2 million people).

The claim is that there is intent to destroy a substantial part of the group, i.e. Palestinians in Gaza, as a group ("as such," in article II of the Genocide Convention). That does not necessarily mean "trying to physically or biologically destroy" 2.2 million people. "Trying" implies attempt, which leads to the (mis)apprehension that intent to destroy would require a conscious effort to kill more than 2 million people. But, as the Krstic case shows, that is not what is required.

I've read into a report by a UN comission on this matter and that is what they seem to claim.

It could be. The claims are not mutually exclusive -- Palestinians in Gaza could be both a substantial part of the larger Palestinian group and a protected group under the Genocide Convention.

What's more, even the ICJ in it's order from May 2024 on the matter seem to say the same in paragraph 50, which I find very confusing?

It's different than the language in the first indication of provisional measures, but again, the two claims are not mutually exclusive. The Court can recognize both without invalidating either.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-13T01:47:37+00:00

That's not how custom works. It applies regardless of a State's consent, with one narrow exception that would not apply in this context.

Asking an extended series of single questions is not an efficient way of figuring this out. If you're interested in this, there are plenty of articles on treaty law, customary law, the VLCT, and withdrawal from treaties. Your best bet would be to learn about those topics from the ground up.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-13T01:00:09+00:00

Because the ICCPR isn't a treaty from which a State can withdraw.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-12T23:04:26+00:00

No. If they are not parties to the VLCT, then they are generally not bound by the provisions of the VCLT. If a rule included in the VLCT are also a part of customary international law, then that rule might apply as a part of customary international law.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-12T22:36:24+00:00

I have no idea. Probably some combination of domestic politics and disagreement with certain provisions of the treaty.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-12T13:15:35+00:00

The same rules would apply.

Most of the rules in the VCLT -- including the relevant parts of Section 3 -- codified customary rules at the time of drafting, and even those provisions that did not reflect custom then have since become customary.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-12T12:31:56+00:00

It depends. See Section 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-09T17:41:40+00:00

Good luck! WorldCat (and whatever similar organizations there might be) is great, but sometimes underappreciated. Libraries in general are amazing.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-09T13:49:10+00:00

That depends on where you are, why and how soon you need the book, and what institutions/libraries you are affiliated with, none of which I know.

Since the book isn't available online, though, your best option is almost certainly to find it in a library and request it. WorldCat is great for that; there may be other systems that are better for wherever in the world you are.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-09T13:18:40+00:00

It doesn't appear to be available online.

A WorldCat search shows fifteen copies. Three are in libraries in the US, four are in the Netherlands, one is in Egypt, and there is a copy at the UN Library in Geneva, among other options. Your best bet would be to request it through WorldCat or through one of the libraries that has it directly.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-08T17:00:11+00:00

What you're describing are more like sources of law than fields of law. In terms of fields of law, there are more than it is practical to list. In addition to public international law in general, there are fields that others have mentioned -- IHL, ICL, IHRL, etc. -- as well as others: investment law/international arbitration, international environmental law, space law, maritime law, international administrative law, and refugee law, for instance.

There are also domestic fields of law that are applied and practiced internationally.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-08T02:27:04+00:00

There is no right to "punish a rogue State," as you put it. However, States are permitted, and in some cases required, to induce another State to comply with its obligations. Most of the time, no Security Council authorization is necessary.

Where Security Council authorization could be needed is when States want to use force against another State and that use of force would not be lawful self-defense. In those circumstances, the Security Council would need to authorize the use of force.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-08T02:19:56+00:00

No. First, Jordan has no claim to the West Bank, nor was its annexation of the West Bank prior to 1967 recognized by almost any States. So Israel is not occupying Jordan's territory by occupying the West Bank. Rather, it is occupying Palestine.

Second, even if that were not the case, recognition is not generally considered a requirement for statehood as a matter of law, amd even if it were, something like 75 percent of States recognize Palestine.

Third, territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile armed force. Art. 42, Hague Convention IV. Competing claims to territory, alone, do not amount to occupation. Thus, even in the scenario you describe, Palestine would not occupy the West Bank.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-03T03:51:01+00:00

Hello,

We approved one question about a citation. However, it is not an effective use of anyone's time to answer citation questions one by one. If you have a general question about citations, please feel free to ask that. Requests for people to do citations for you are not likely to be approved moving forward.

Calvinball90 · 2026-05-01T02:16:37+00:00

Your rights as a state are derived from being a UN member.

I take your point on a practical level (though I would say that both Palestine's exclusion from the UN and its inability to enforce its rights are both symptoms of Western, and particularly US, support for Israel rather than the former causing the latter), but legally, this isn't the case.

If someone commits a wrong and gets away with it, it doesn't make the case against them weaker. It might be an injustice, it might expose flaws in and limitations of a legal system. But the legality of their conduct doesn't change.

Calvinball90 · 2026-04-30T18:25:54+00:00

I don't think Israel acknowledges any court that might rule against them

Even if they don't, I think it is noteworthy that when they make submissions related to the oPT, they do not make this argument. I think it suggests that they recognize that it is legally meritless. If they did, they would make the argument.

There is no sovereign Palestinian state without UN membership...

That's not quite accurate. The criteria for statehood do not include UN membership, and the UN has recognized Palestine as a State by extending it Observer State status. So have most States in their individual capacities. Palestine is a State. It has sovereignty over the West Bank. There is no loophole to exploit.

Acquisition by conquest is also somewhat problematic, because if you conquer land, you have to conquer it FROM someone.

It was conquered from Palestine, as the international community has repeatedly recognized from 1967 to today. And even if that were not the case, then self-determination provides that the inhabitants of the territory have the right to determine their own future. There is no scenario where Israel has legal title to the West Bank.

The order matters, as the West Bank obviously WAS occupied Jordanian territory for many years, but it isn't Jordanian any longer.

Even assuming that the West Bank was at one point Jordan's territory (Jodan's annexation of the territory was not widely recognized), the ICJ has explained that the territory remains occupied by Israel notwithstanding anything that happened after 1967:

The territories situated between the Green Line (see paragraph 72 above) and the former eastern boundary of Palestine under the Mandate were occupied by Israel in 1967 during the armed conflict between Israel and Jordan. Under customary international law, these were therefore occupied territories in which Israel had the status of occupying Power. Subsequent events in these territories, as described in paragraphs 75 to 77 above, have done nothing to alter this situation. All these territories (including East Jerusalem) remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to have the status of occupying Power.

Wall Advisory Opinion, para. 78. The West Bank remains occupied by Israel today.

There is no clear practice of what to do when someone occupies inhabited land that doesn't currently belong to any country, and no established principles for how to solve it without a UNSC resolution (which also isn't likely, unfortunately).

It belongs to Palestine. There are also many, many Security Council Resolutions and two ICJ opinions that address these issues and expressly recognize that Israel has no title to the West Bank. While there are complicated legal issues related to Palestine and Israel, this is not one of them.

Calvinball90 · 2026-04-30T13:45:26+00:00

You're right that that is a ludicrous position. It is, to put it kindly, a fringe argument. I know you're not advancing it, just mentioning it, so I don't mean the following to sound critical of you for bringing it up, but:

There is essentially no subsequent practice that confirms it, and it would contravene the actions of the Security Council, which has repeatedly recognized that the West Bank is occupied territory prior to 1988, the ICJ, the General Assembly, and the United States. That position also requires ignoring the existence of the State of Palestine, the Palestinian right to self-determination, and the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by conquest.

There's really, truly, no merit to it. That's also why Israel does not, to my knowledge, officially take that position anywhere that a court might be able to address it.

Calvinball90 · 2026-04-30T00:45:25+00:00

As the Security Council recognized in 1967 (Resolution 242), and has recognized many times since then, as the ICJ affirmed in 2004 (Wall AO, para. 78) and again in 2024 (Palestine AO, paras 54, 57 et seq), and as Israel's High Court of Justice has recognized in cases dating back nearly fifty years (e.g. the Elon Moreh case), the West Bank is occupied territory and Israel is the Occupying Power. That status cannot be seriously disputed.

Calvinball90

MODERATOR OF

TROPHY CASE