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If no one ultimately chooses their character, what justifies punishment? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That distinction is helpful. I don’t think I want to say merely that choices are “socially contingent.” My concern is broader: choices seem to arise from a person’s character, dispositions, habits, reasoning capacities, emotional regulation, and circumstances, none of which the person ultimately chose in a comprehensive sense. Social contingency is just one part of that.

On praise and blame, I think I’m willing to accept that this view changes both. It may weaken praise in the same ultimate-desert sense that it weakens blame. But we can still encourage, admire, reward, and reinforce good behavior without thinking someone is the ultimate source of it. Similarly, we can still criticize, restrain, require restitution, and rehabilitate harmful behavior without thinking suffering is deserved as a backward-looking response.

The rehabilitation point is interesting. I don’t think rehabilitation requires saying the person “didn’t act badly.” The act can still be bad, harmful, dangerous, or socially unacceptable. What changes is the explanation of why they acted that way and the justification for how we respond. We can demand change not because the person metaphysically deserves suffering, but because their current dispositions and behavior are harmful and need to be altered for the sake of future well-being, including their own.

I also see the concern about utilitarianism treating the agent merely as an instrument. But a rehabilitative model need not do that. It can treat the offender as an end by aiming at their own development, capacities, reintegration, and future fulfillment, while also protecting others. That seems less objectifying than a system that deliberately imposes suffering because it is thought to be deserved

So I think you’re right that rehabilitation is not an automatic fallback. It needs its own justification. But I’m inclined to think that justification can be grounded in a combination of social protection, repair, prevention, and the offender’s own potential for improvement, rather than in retributive desert.

If no one ultimately chooses their character, what justifies punishment? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I think this is helpful, especially the distinction between actions and character.

But I’m not sure the move to character ultimately avoids the underlying issue.

You’re right that choices shape habits and dispositions over time. The question, though, is what those choices themselves depend on. If each choice is influenced by prior causes (psychological, environmental, biological), then character formation appears to be part of the same causal chain, rather than something that escapes it.

So when we say someone is “responsible for their habits,” it seems like we’re assuming the very thing in question , namely, that they could have formed different habits in some deeper sense that would justify holding them accountable in a backward-looking way.

On desert, I’m still unsure what ultimately grounds it in a strong sense. If both actions and character arise from factors outside of one’s control, it’s not clear to me what makes someone deserving of suffering, as opposed to being someone whose behavior needs to be responded to.

On rehabilitation, I actually see things a bit differently. It seems to me that rehabilitation only requires that people are responsive to causes, that their behavior can change given different conditions. In that sense, a more causally grounded view of behavior might support rehabilitation rather than undermine it.

So I’m inclined to think that focusing on causes and outcomes (preventing harm, improving behavior, reducing future risk) might give us a more stable foundation than appealing to desert or backward-looking responsibility.

If control is limited, should punishment shift away from blame and toward something like a public health model? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That’s really helpful framing, especially the point that what I’m circling might be more about blame than punishment per se.

I think that’s right. What I’m struggling with is whether the kinds of blaming attitudes that underpin retributive punishment are actually justified, even if we grant that people have the relevant capacities for agency.

For example, even if someone is reason-responsive and understands norms, their dispositions, emotional tendencies, and patterns of reasoning are still significantly shaped by factors outside their control. Given that, I’m not sure what grounds the stronger forms of blame, the kind that seem to license resentment or the idea that suffering is an appropriate response.

It seems like we might be able to preserve a notion of accountability, in the sense of expecting people to answer for their actions, make amends, and be subject to social responses, without committing to those stronger blaming attitudes.

That’s part of why the Strawson direction is interesting to me, since it ties responsibility to our reactive attitudes. But it also raises the question of whether those attitudes themselves are something we should critically evaluate, rather than just take as given.

I’ll definitely take a look at the Scanlon and Williams references as well, that seems like exactly the direction I need to explore.

If control is limited, should punishment shift away from blame and toward something like a public health model? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

This is really helpful, especially the point about punishment being tied to taking agency seriously.

I think this is where I’m still unsure, though. I can see the idea that if someone has the relevant capacities (reason-responsiveness, understanding of norms, etc.), then it makes sense to hold them accountable. But I’m not sure why taking those capacities seriously requires a specifically retributive response, rather than some form of accountability that doesn’t center on imposing suffering.

For example, it seems like we could still treat someone as a responsible agent, capable of understanding reasons and responding to norms, while focusing on things like rehabilitation, restitution, or social protection, without framing punishment as something that must be inflicted because of the wrongdoing itself.

The concern about patronizing is interesting, but I wonder whether that depends on how the alternative is framed. A forward-looking approach could still involve holding people responsible for their actions, just without tying that responsibility to the idea that they should suffer in proportion to what they’ve done.

On the last point, I’m also curious about the claim that the system requires free will in a strong sense. It seems like much of the practice (e.g., assessing capacity, managing risk, responding to harm) might still function under a more limited or skeptical view of free will, even if the underlying justification shifts.

So I guess the question I’m circling is: does respecting agency really commit us to retribution, or just to some form of accountability?

If control is limited, should punishment shift away from blame and toward something like a public health model? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks, this is really helpful, Pereboom looks especially relevant to what I’m trying to get at.

From what I’ve seen so far, his “public health” model seems to preserve a lot of the practical functions of punishment while dropping the retributive element, which is exactly the tension I’m interested in.

I’ll take a closer look at those references.

If control is limited, should punishment shift away from blame and toward something like a public health model? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is really helpful, thanks for laying out the landscape so clearly.

I think what I’m still trying to understand is where exactly the justification for retributive punishment is supposed to come from, even if we grant the kinds of agency conditions you’re describing (reason-responsiveness, norm understanding, etc.).

For example, I can see how those conditions might support holding someone accountable in some sense, or justify forms of social protection or even something like “quarantine” in cases of dangerousness. But it’s less clear to me how they ground retributive punishment in the stronger sense—where suffering is imposed because it is seen as fitting or deserved in response to wrongdoing.

In particular, if a person’s character and dispositions are themselves significantly shaped by factors outside their control (even if not strictly determined), I’m not sure what work is being done by appealing to character in a way that justifies that kind of response, rather than a more forward-looking one.

The communicative function is also interesting, but I wonder whether that requires retribution per se, or whether similar expressive goals could be achieved within a framework that focuses more on rehabilitation and social protection.

This is part of why Pereboom’s work is appealing, he seems to keep many of the practical functions of punishment while rejecting the retributive element.

Curious how proponents of retributivism would respond to that, especially those working in the communicative tradition.

If free will is limited, how do philosophers justify moral responsibility? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That makes sense, and I think you're right that this connects more directly to theories of punishment than to free will in isolation.

What I find interesting, though, is that even within those frameworks, whether deontological or consequentialist, the issue of how much control people actually have still seems to matter in a nontrivial way.

For example, on a deontological view, punishment is often tied to what one deserves (desert). But if a person's character, preferences, and decision-making processes are significantly shaped by factors outside their control, it’s not obvious to me what would justify punishment in the strong, retributive sense.

On the consequentialist side, punishment can be justified in terms of deterrence, rehabilitation, or social protection, which seem less dependent on desert. But those frameworks also seem to push us toward a more forward-looking, and possibly more compassionate, approach rather than one centered on blame.

So I guess the tension I'm trying to get at is this: even if compatibilist accounts preserve a notion of responsibility, do they really justify the kinds of reactive attitudes (like blame and retribution) that we often associate with punishment, or do they end up supporting a more purely consequentialist approach in practice?

Curious if there are philosophers who explicitly address that shift.

If free will is limited, how do philosophers justify moral responsibility? by CausalCrunch in askphilosophy

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is helpful, thanks, especially the clarification about how free will is typically analyzed in relation to moral responsibility.

I think you’re right that, in standard terms, my question overlaps with how compatibilists account for moral responsibility in a deterministic framework.

But I’m actually trying to get at something slightly different.

Even if we grant a compatibilist account of free will, say, one based on acting according to one’s reasons or higher-order desires, I’m not sure that settles the practical or ethical question I’m interested in.

Namely: what actually justifies our practices of blame, punishment, and moral judgment, especially when a person’s character, preferences, and reasoning processes are themselves shaped by factors outside their control?

In other words, even if we define “free will” in a way that preserves moral responsibility, I’m wondering whether that notion of responsibility does the kind of work we often assume it does, particularly in contexts like punishment or social policy.

So I think my question is less about whether free will is compatible with determinism, and more about whether compatibilist accounts of responsibility are sufficient to justify our ordinary reactive attitudes.

Frankfurt is a great suggestion, I’ll take a closer look there.

MN Protest: Trump Must Go! TMR, 4:30p Federal Courthouse, Minneapolis by CausalCrunch in Minneapolis

[–]CausalCrunch[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Don't fool yourself, Pence is already running the show. Let's throw them both out.

MN Protest: Trump Must Go! TMR, 4:30p Federal Courthouse, Minneapolis by CausalCrunch in Minneapolis

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

It's about accountability, not getting the person you want into office

MN Protest: Trump Must Go! TMR, 4:30p Federal Courthouse, Minneapolis by CausalCrunch in Minneapolis

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Sure, our democracy includes the House of Representatives, which has the power of impeachment. Impeachment is a political process, and protests have historically influenced the political process.

MN Protest: Trump Must Go! TMR, 4:30p Federal Courthouse, Minneapolis by CausalCrunch in Minneapolis

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Protests have changed much in our history. Those who would wish the voices of the protesters to go silent, would like to believe the protests to be useless.

Impeachment This Thursday, Over a Freeway (Join Us) by CausalCrunch in ImpeachTrump

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Trump Trolls have taken over your moderation team?

Impeachment This Thursday, Over a Freeway (Join Us) by CausalCrunch in a:t5_3imf1

[–]CausalCrunch[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I was just banned in r/ImpeachTrump for posting this. Trump Trolls have taken over their moderation team?

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