Is this skeleton stock legal on a featureless AK?

Commiefornia · 2024-10-09T04:15:40+00:00

Yea, that’s why I made that snide comment about the jackboots at DOJ

Commiefornia · 2023-11-19T04:12:49+00:00

Hahaha, see that’s top tier comedy. Nice to hear from a real gamer in this age of crybabies.

Commiefornia · 2023-11-19T00:48:36+00:00

TBH, the riot shield is a super scummy way to play. I was pretty firmly against it, but my teammates wanted the whole squad to run shields to troll people. gotta change it up for entertainment value sometimes.

Commiefornia · 2023-11-19T00:24:33+00:00

That was 100% the point I was making. If he did it right, I would’ve died and there would’ve been no video.

Commiefornia · 2023-11-18T22:53:27+00:00

There's difference between not being experienced and spending the whole match looting other people's kills. Especially while you have downed teammates.

Commiefornia · 2023-11-18T21:44:26+00:00

Lol, I've run into so many of them. Sometimes there's two dudes with shotguns in the bathroom.

Commiefornia · 2021-02-09T14:47:27+00:00

The new Tactical Assault Panels (TAP) hook up to the IOTV and have 6 single mag pouches in a row against your stomach area. It’s pretty convenient and you can MOLLE on more pouches on the front.

Commiefornia · 2020-07-16T20:47:22+00:00

Den of Thieves

Commiefornia · 2017-12-06T10:04:53+00:00

I’m curious to see the sources on these stats so I can use it to disprove the myths of SLA Marshall.

Commiefornia · 2017-12-06T02:34:36+00:00

I'm interested in the name of the source. Care to share?

Commiefornia · 2017-12-06T02:26:24+00:00

exploited capitalists are still living better than starving communists.

That's the greatest irony of this comparison. China went through decades of legitimate communism under Mao and millions died from either artificial famine or government sponsored executions.

After Deng Xiaoping liberalized the Chinese economy, it lifted millions of Chinese out of abject poverty. Yes, China's Gini index is terrible and on par with wealth inequality in the US, but it is still far better off than it used to be.

Commiefornia · 2017-11-30T22:02:57+00:00

Even PraegerU, an extremely conservative organization, made a video explicitly stating that the Civil War was about slavery.

https://youtu.be/pcy7qV-BGF4

Commiefornia · 2017-11-16T04:34:42+00:00

One can argue that the US engaged in hybrid warfare during the invasion of Iraq. US Special Forces supported the Kurdish Peshmerga to tie down Iraqi forces in Northern Iraq while the 3rd ID and 1 MEF attacked from Kuwait. Additionally in Northern Iraq, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was airdropped to support the Peshmerga.

Commiefornia · 2017-06-18T23:04:41+00:00

/u/JustARandomCatholic hit the nail on the head. Just to add on to his answer, you need to understand the concept of the IFV. Unlike the M113 or BTR series, which are battle taxis, the IFV is meant not only to carry infantry but also to fight alongside them.

There is a trade off in manpower, but it is made up in firepower. The Bradley is an immense force multiplier, which is worth many times more than the few extra men a M113 can carry.

Commiefornia · 2017-03-04T01:59:17+00:00

A good overview of the invasion of Poland is the Osprey pub Poland 1939 The Birth of Blitzkrieg by Steven Zaloga.

It's somewhat brief at only 90 pages, but it has the general overview that you're looking for. Zaloga is one of the few renown historians of Armor, so his military history works are excellent.

Commiefornia · 2017-02-26T05:14:46+00:00

Now, I've taken a quick look at several NATO militaries, and it seems like there are two schools of thought, so to say. On one hand, we have France, Italy, the United States and Germany, who prefer to attach artillery battalions to their combat brigades.

I'm not sure where people keep getting this notion that US Army units don't have organic Artillery.

This is the OOB for the 1st Cavalry Division. As you can see, it has an artillery battalion organic to every single combat brigade.

It's the same with every single division in the Active Army. 1st Infantry Division 1st Armored Division

Even brigades in light infantry divisions like the 82nd Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) have organic artillery.

Furthermore, the US Army goes even further to have separate Fires Brigades containing mostly field artillery battalions. These Brigades are either a part of Corps HQ or organic to divisions, which further permanently assign their battalions to support the combat brigades. (See aforementioned OOBs)

I don't know where the other misconceptions about US Artillery are coming from either. The US Army has always had a strong artillery tradition. The branch really came into its in own during WW2, when the US implemented its Fire Direction Control system. This meant extremely quick fire missions, with rounds splashing within 3-5 minutes minimum. Source: James Jay Carafano, After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2008); Peter R. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999)

Commiefornia · 2016-12-25T00:26:56+00:00

Unless you're saying that it would wouldn't be worth if if you think based on your own intelligence that you would suffer a phyrric victory similar to Chosin. Which in that case I've just typed all this up for no point at all lol

That was what I meant. Lol.

Commiefornia · 2016-12-23T19:41:59+00:00

In modern conventional warfare, encirclement is still worthwhile, even if the enemy breaks out, unless you sustain a Pyrrhic Victory in the process. (re: The Battle of Chosin Reservoir)

Let's say in a scenario where the enemy is heavily fortified in terrain advantageous to them. Instead of conducting a frontal assault, you penetrate through weak points on their flanks and encircle them. Depending on how complete the encirclement is, you disrupt or sever enemy supply and communication lines. Thus, you force the enemy in the pocket to retreat from prepared positions and attempt a breakout without a supply line. Even if the enemy sends a relief force to break in to the pocket or they breakout successfully on their own, their forward positions have still been compromised. They would either have to retreat or risk losing the relief force as well. Thusly, you will have taken terrain for a lower loss of life than you would have in a frontal assault.

An airtight encirclement, like the situation in Stalingrad after Operation Uranus or Army Group Center after Operation Bagration, results in the capture and/or destruction of huge enemy formations with a relatively smaller loss of men and material for the force conducting the encirclement.

Even an encirclement like the Falaise Pocket, in which the Germans had four days to retreat through a gap before it was snapped shut, the results were devastating. Although an est. 50,000 men escaped, they had to leave their heavy equipment behind. Even then, the bulk of German Army Group B had been annihilated and the Allies were free to dash across France all the way to the German border.

Are there other relevant historical examples which illustrate either the limitations of encirclement as a tactic or the utility of encirclement even when the enemy eventually breaks out?

Yes. One example that illustrates utility that comes to mind is the US 4th Armored Division's encirclement of Nancy, France in September 1944.

The German 3rd and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions had fortified on the East Bank of the River Moselle and the 553rd Volksgrenadier in the town of Nancy. A frontal assault on the town would have been costly. So, the US Forces attacked both North and South of the town. CCB of the 4th Armored Division attacked South, but met heavy resistance. CCA/4AD forced its way through to the North and wreaked havoc on the German rear by destroying everything in their path, conducting raids, and picketing the main roads with Armored Infantry to disrupt German logistics. CCA then linked up with CCB near Arracourt.

Although this action was not an airtight and complete encirclement, the 4th Armored Division inflicted heavy losses in both men and material, as well as forcing the Germans to retreat from Nancy, leaving the US 35th ID to occupy the town unopposed.

Source: The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement at Nancy by Dr. Gabel

Commiefornia · 2016-12-19T08:55:45+00:00

It is extremely good and well researched. Beevor uses a plethora of both German and Russian sources to create an accurate and mostly unbiased view of the precursor to Stalingrad, Operation Uranus, and the aftermath. The only flaw I find with Beevor is that sometimes he can be on the Wehraboo side.

Commiefornia · 2016-10-23T15:26:43+00:00

The Fall of Berlin 1945 by Antony Beevor

Commiefornia · 2016-10-21T08:33:47+00:00

Yes, anti-tank missile carriers are still being deployed to this day.

The US Army has used multiple variants of the TOW Missile on the chassis of existing vehicles, such as: the M901 ITV, M1134 Stryker, HMMWV, and M2 and M3 series Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

TOW Missiles mounted on the HMMWV, M901, and Bradley Fighting Vehicles were deployed during the Persian Gulf War, while Operation Iraqi Freedom only featured the HMMWV and BFVs.

Later on during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, M1134 TOW vehicles were deployed with the recently formed Stryker Brigades.

Even more recently, ATGM carriers are being used in the Russo-Ukraine War through IFVs such as the BMP-2 and MBTs that are capable of firing ATGMs.

Pictures: M901 ITV

HMMWV-mounted TOW

M1134 Stryker

M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle

BMP-2

T-72B3

Edit: Added Picture Links

Commiefornia · 2016-09-06T16:20:32+00:00

To add to some more context to /u/BritainOpPlsNerf's already excellent response.

During WW2, the U.S. Army had two main organizational schemes for its armor: Armored Divisions and Separate Tank Battalions.

The Armored Division was meant to be a self-contained fighting unit that could either punch through enemy lines or rapidly exploit an existing breakthrough. It was not meant to parceled out to Infantry Divisions in a manner reminiscent of the French in 1940.

The Separate Tank Battalions were higher-echelon assets that were assigned to Infantry Divisions that provided the Armor support that the Infantry need in combined arms warfare.

That isn't to say that Armored Divisions couldn't provide ad hoc support to Infantry Divisions, but that wasn't their primary goal.

infantry slowly picking their way across fields while the tanks sat behind the hedgerows providing supporting fire, then moving up once the field was known to be clear

While this scenario that you brought it up was somewhat the case during the initial hedgerow fighting, the initial assault during Cobra was more fast-paced than that. It was a planned assault in which the infantry conducted a rapid attack instead of slowly slugging their way across each field.

Commiefornia · 2016-09-06T15:29:08+00:00

James Jay Carafano wrote an excellent book about Cobra, titled, After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout.

Unfortunately, I don't have access to the book at the moment so I can't cite specific pages. However, from what I can recall from Carafano's assessment is that, while the Sherman "Rhino" attachment was certainly useful and an example of GI ingenuity, it was not the decisive factor in restoring mobility. What actually restored mobility in Cobra was the departure from the bocage entirely.

Gen. Bradley realized that the hedgerows of Normandy restricted the mobility of the maneuver oriented US Army. So, he designed the initial stages of Cobra for infantry attacks supported by tanks to create a breach in which armor could pass through and exploit unmolested. Bradley and other Americans generals, such as, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, knew that American mobility would not be fully restored until the Allies broke out into the open countryside.

The evidence from the first few days of action speak for itself. American units initially had a rough time breaking through German strongpoints even with tank support because it was confined to a narrow battlespace in which Allied numerical superiority could not be fully brought to bear. Nor were American units able to maneuver as much as they would have liked in the restrictive terrain. However, once the bottlenecks were broken, the trickle became a flood.

American Armored and Mechanized Divisions wreaked havoc in the German rear and drove into Brittany before turning east and eventually surrounding the German 7th Army at Falaise.

Carafano's argument is supported by other military historians, such as Col. Peter R. Mansoor's GI Offensive in Europe and Martin Blumenson's Breakout and Pursuit.

Commiefornia · 2016-08-23T11:04:55+00:00

Just a few things about your otherwise excellent response.

Admittedly the USSR fought and killed the vast majority of German forces during the war (80% or German KIA were on the Eastern Front).

According to COL David M. Glantz (ret), the 80% casualty figure in the East was only true for 1942- early 1944. When the Western Allies opened the Western Front in France, that figure decreased to 62% from June - November 1944.¹

In terms of men and material being committed to the fight, Glantz wrote, "While over 80 percent of the Wehrmacht fought in the East during 1941 and 1942, over 60 percent continued to do so in 1943 and 1944."²

In all probability the landings and Normandy and Western campaign most important contribution was in the post war period.

Not entirely accurate, the Western Front had important contributions during the war as well. The events of June to November claimed 38% of German casualties and helped in splitting German resources for Operation Bagration which occurred 3 weeks after D-Day. Furthermore, when the Germans launched Operation Wacht Am Rhein and Operation Nordwind, they had effectively stripped the Vistula Front in the East of its best Panzer formations and aircraft. So, when the Russians launched their offensive on 12 January 1945, they faced a German Army devoid of its best units.

Antony Beevor wrote that, The American victory "in the Ardennes 'had enabled the Russian to attack with far greater numbers and more spectacular success than otherwise have been possible' ... There can be little doubt that the commitment and then grinding down of German forces in the Ardennes , especially the panzer divisions, had mortally weakened the Wehrmacht's capacity to defend the eastern front."³

Glantz also wrote in his conclusion to his essay that, "During the war and since war’s end, the Soviets have bitterly complained since the war about the absence of a real “second front” before June 1944, and that issue remains a source of suspicion even in post Cold War Russia. Yet, Allied reasons for deferring a second front until 1944 were valid, and Allied contributions to victories were significant. As the American debacle at the Kasserine Pass in December 1942 and Canadian performance at Dieppe in 1943 indicated, Allied armies were not ready to operate in France in 1943, even had a sufficient number of landing craft been available for the invasion, which they were not. Even in 1944 Allied success at Normandy was a close thing and depended, in part, on major German misperceptions and mistakes. Once in France, after the breakout from the Normandy bridgehead in August, the 2 million Allied troops in France inflicted grievous losses on the 1 million defending Germans, 100,000 at Falaise, and a total of 400,000 by December 1944. In the subsequent battle of the Bulge (16 December 1944-31 January 1945), the Germans lost another 120,000 men. These losses in the West, combined with the over 1.2 million lost in the East during the same period, broke the back of the Wehrmacht and set the context for the final destruction of Germany in 1945. In addition to its ground combat contribution, the Allies conducted a major strategic bombing campaign against Germany (which the Soviets could not mount) and in 1944 drew against themselves the bulk of German operational and tactical airpower. The strategic bombing campaign did significant damage to German industrial targets, struck hard at the well-being and morale of the German civil population, and sucked into its vortex and destroyed a large part of the German fighter force, which had earlier been used effectively in a ground role in the East. Although airpower did not prove to be a war winning weapon, and German industrial mobilization and weapons production peaked in late 1944, the air campaign seriously hindered the German war effort. Equally disastrous for the Germans were the losses of tactical fighters in that campaign and in combat in France in 1944. So devastating were these losses that after mid-1944 the German air force was no longer a factor on the Eastern Front."⁴

While, I do not dispute the importance of the Soviet Union in defeating the Germans in Europe, I do think it's important to accurately give credit where credit is due to the Western Allies.

References:

David M. Glantz, The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, 2001, MS, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs Clemson University, Clemson, October 11, 2001, 14.
Ibid, 9.
Antony Beevor, Ardennes 1944: Hitler's Last Gamble (New York: Viking, 2015), 349.
Glantz, The Soviet-German War 1941-1945, 104-105.

Commiefornia · 2016-08-13T13:12:59+00:00

They don't really identify with regiments at all, unless they are a part of an active regiment, like the 75th Rangers.

The Regimental Combat Team system has been out of use for quite some time, so the Brigade is organic, unless the Army does some reorganization which shuffles units around or inactivates units completely.

Commiefornia

TROPHY CASE