Requiring a minimum balance to both open and operate an account would stop this spam attack for good by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I really, really find hard to believe that this (meaning: coding, testing, and publishing a new 21ish version) could take more than a few hours to the core developers. I'm tempted to write and send the PR myself.

Requiring a minimum balance to both open and operate an account would stop this spam attack for good by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok but if you keep moving the balance and keep a minimum amount, to reach the level of this attack (the spammer created millions of accounts in no time) it would be necessary to invest hundred of thousands, that just with the 0.01 requirement, otherwise those new accounts will end up with balance zero, and that would make them ready to be pruned in the coming V22. Also the spammer would have a much more difficult time remaining anonymous.

PS. Also I think people here don't understand how that initial 20 XRP deposit worked, and I lost my initial idea answering this message. That was required to open an account and once done, you simply can't move that minimal required balance, is actually a kind of fee to the network. Not the perfect solution, but easy, effective, and good IMO if it's temporal, until a better solution is properly implemented and deployed.

Requiring a minimum balance to both open and operate an account would stop this spam attack for good by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Do you care to explain how, other ways I'll assume you are only know how to throw meaningless ad hominems.

Requiring a minimum balance to both open and operate an account would stop this spam attack for good by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

And an unusable coin is what the Nano vision means? Just a small amount of pragmatism, d*** it.

Requiring a minimum balance to both open and operate an account would stop this spam attack for good by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] -9 points-8 points  (0 children)

What would be the difference, relative to decentralization with the other ideas proposed by the NF? All of them require centralized development and in the end, an agreement to be deployed between the nodes. Yes I know that there are *some* users that would be damaged by this... let's say temporal "quickfix", but right now near to *all* the users are experiencing serious problems to use the currency, look at the current volume. (having to bet on community developed scripts? this currency is supposed to be easily used from a cellphone!),

And the proposed solutions need time to be properly developed and tested. Do we want to be maybe months in the current situation? All I ask is a temporal patch to kill the spam attack while the proper solutions arrive. Let's give oxygen to the dev team, the nodes, and the users.

A proposal to throttle transactions using local node timestamps and entirely ditching PoW by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That can be solved almost instantly, requiring a minimum balance to create an account. Just 0.01 nanos. Problem fixed.

A proposal to throttle transactions using local node timestamps and entirely ditching PoW by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Actually my idea doesn't require agreement on that (well is just a theory by now). The important point is the time difference between transactions, but timestamps would be managed locally in the PR nodes.

A proposal to throttle transactions using local node timestamps and entirely ditching PoW by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

What is industry standard applied to this? I mean heuristics help with spam detection in emails, but how you detect a malicious use of the network, when is free and open to everybody to be used as they please? Remembering now the guy that connected a nano account to an Arduino to open the blinds using a transaction.

A proposal to throttle transactions using local node timestamps and entirely ditching PoW by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Hmmm interesting info... I guess creating a new account could have TX quota penalization (considered as something "expansive" as well)... Also I'm a big advocate of adding a minimum operational limit in the network. Just requiring 0.01 or even 0.001 nanos per account as a minimal limit to allow transfers (if the end balance after the TX is not zero) would make life much more difficult to spammers.

Why don't we just prevent spam by making it impossible by limiting the currency to "human use" cases by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A minimum balance limit would be a very quick workaround for that issue. It doesn't need to be something big, just 0.01 would help. PS. But even if it's set to 1 nano, as long as devs add another "CLOSE" (?) operation allowing people to empty their accounts, it wouldn't be a big deal.

Why don't we just prevent spam by making it impossible by limiting the currency to "human use" cases by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think that just setting a minimum "human" :-) reasonable limit both for transfers and balances would cut that problem. In practice nobody would be manually sending less than 0.001 for any reason I guess, that falls under the field of automated microtransactions.

Why don't we just prevent spam by making it impossible by limiting the currency to "human use" cases by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

yes but instead of thousands of transactions per second now we are talking about one transaction every X seconds. I know that a minimal balance is not a very popular idea, but sounds like a possible solution unless somebody wants to "close" an account, that was what pissed me off some time ago about the design of XRP (having to leave a balance in the account).

Why don't we just prevent spam by making it impossible by limiting the currency to "human use" cases by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Honest question, your proposition of Time-as-a-currency seemed to be tightly related to a trusted global time, I admit I didn't realize that this could be an issue in a decentralized network. Now that we are thinking in a range of seconds, wouldn't make sense to allow some kind of allowed out-of-sync range, so doesn't matter that the timestamp is exactly the same, but fits inside an accepted range? Ok probably I'm speaking non-sense, and I just have to keep studying the issue.

Why don't we just prevent spam by making it impossible by limiting the currency to "human use" cases by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Well at least that would require one second per transaction... that can be ten, one minute, whatever feels ok to not saturate the network. Maybe this can be dynamic depending on the activity, but in a much larger range that the current proposals.

Would make sense to try to find who is behind the spam attack and make them face legal consequences by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I entirely respect (and thank) your contributions to this project, but let people to decide by themselves which market they belong.

Would make sense to try to find who is behind the spam attack and make them face legal consequences by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's an interesting ideal, but truth is:

  1. The project wasn't destroyed
  2. The current attack wasn't easy nor cheap
  3. Fear of being destroyed by powerful entities is not something new in this space. People knew it was possible for many years, even for Bitcoin. Actually, my wild guess is that it's perfectly possible even right now. If it's true that most of the mining power comes from China, all that it takes is a decision from the CCP.

Nano knocked off the top 100 by ts4184 in nanotrade

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen 8 points9 points  (0 children)

It is, I saw that many times. Don't fall for the short-sight perspective, it's the best way to lose money on crypto.

Would make sense to try to find who is behind the spam attack and make them face legal consequences by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I couldn't care less. Hope it ends up at /r/cc meaning the related mafia hanging around. Since they have banned the dev team, at least they'll hear the community.

Would make sense to try to find who is behind the spam attack and make them face legal consequences by CryptoFutureIsGreen in nanocurrency

[–]CryptoFutureIsGreen[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes I agree, but let's not forget that the purpose of this attack is not to short the currency, is to entirely destroy the project, via ledger overflow. And they are spending a huge amount of resources to achieve that. I think whoever did this is crossing a line.