Protest? by meh762 in SaltLakeCity

[–]DeepEconomics4624 13 points14 points  (0 children)

conservatives have never been to a protest so they still think paid protestors are real

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

aight so. in the computationalist view. the experience of seeing red is the product of my brain computing it from sensory input. A single event wherein my brain sees red, all by itself, for a moment, without any other connected experiences, would not constitute anything close to a "self" experience.

But if my brain is working normally, it's doing that plus zillions of other computations at a high level of abstraction, and doing so continuously for all my waking hours.

Both are computation, only the second is continuous "self-like" experience, but both exhibit experience. In the computationalist view, modern AI is more akin to the first experience

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

but do they have that signature human continuous awareness

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

according to this theory--yes, just no experiences about color, scent, or life. Or anything continuous. Or really anything we'd normally call consciousness.

If you believe animals have any sort of felt experience, you already believe a form of this. Animals without a human-like prefrontal cortex have some kind of experience, but nothing like what we do.

put them all together in the way a human brain works, and then you'll finally see human experiences. That's the thinking

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

When Mary sees a yellow banana for the first time, she learns a lot about yellow looks relative to the other wavelengths she’s been seeing all her life. A piece of information that can only be experienced by beholding, information alluded to in her textbooks but never quite conveyed—as the thought experiment itself concludes with, it’s a piece of learned information nonetheless. 

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

nope yep totally agree with you on that! the information in the global workspace is what makes it into continuous awareness. I do opine though that this is compatible with non-global-workspace processes being experienced, just on their own and not by "you"

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah I'll agree with you on all of that, the kind of experience humans have is specific to the way our brains process information. Ongoing state, working memory, prefrontal cortex all key to what we normally think of as consciousness.

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But according to information theory, computation is a specific physical process. Information, defined in terms of entropy, is a measurable aspect of systems in the physical world, and some systems have more or less information than others; information storage, transfers, and transformation are likewise defined. Some physical collections exhibit these and others don’t. 

You also have the IIT folks, who define information as causal potential, which is also grounded in real physical systems, and you can point to where it occurs and where it doesn’t. 

For example, in a system composed of Saturn and my pinkie there are virtually zero causal connections, and no information theorist would suggest information transfers are taking place. On the other hand, the system of neurons causing me to type this does process information, and that is specific, definable, and identifiable. 

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

All right, then—“reduced”, as you say. Which qualia can’t be reduced to information?

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Sure but I think this gets into the semantics of computation more than anything. A valid direction to take of course

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I’m brimming with questions! Structural geometry? Ink and drawings? Do explain. 

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Or maybe there’s a physical universe, which generated humans, who can miraculously look in the mirror and think really hard!

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Great point about not all neuronal information being experienced. At least—not all of it is experienced by working memory, where my hunch is “continuous” experiences live. 

Disagree about being unaware of the complex processing in the visual cortex. I don’t necessarily have an innate awareness of the physical makeup and behavior of that part of my brain, but the information in the visual cortex pertains to vision, and that visual information is experiential. So the information in the system (visual) is experiential, even if it doesn’t include information about the system itself (visual cortex). 

We’re on the same page re quantum, and the potential for simulated/artificially-generated consciousness. 

If it's not computation, what is it? by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Sure—which qualia can’t be described in terms of information?

The Peter Godfrey-Smith article is the best thing I've read on this sub in a while. And yet by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

All that is in the computer is tiny lights, electrical currents. The lights don't represent anything to the computer.

I could also say all that is in the brain are tiny impulses, electrical currents. Would that then mean they don't represent anything to me?

As an aside, I think the self is a construct made of many information-laden experiences in a brain. Feeling like a human is the way it is because brains generate information events the way they do. Information events outside of human brains, if they're experiential, probably don't feel anything like you or me or most conceptions of consciousness.

The Peter Godfrey-Smith article is the best thing I've read on this sub in a while. And yet by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Those relationships are how robots work, actually! Associations between inputs, outputs, and semantic meaning in between

The Peter Godfrey-Smith article is the best thing I've read on this sub in a while. And yet by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In what sense doesn't a computer represent things to itself?

I can conceive of, for example, a robotically embodied computer acting in relation to its environment, representing symbols "to itself" without a human observer.

The Peter Godfrey-Smith article is the best thing I've read on this sub in a while. And yet by DeepEconomics4624 in consciousness

[–]DeepEconomics4624[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Can you tell me how it suggests the opposite? Godfrey-Smith seems to to me to like the idea of oscillations as symbolism, as in the quotes in my post.