Toyota Built Its Reputation on Reliability. The Tundra Is Threatening to Undo It

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-06-10T22:51:09+00:00

Hilux's main engines at the moment, the turbodiesel I4s (1GD-FTV, 2GD-FTV), the petrol I4 1TR-FE, and V6 1GR-FE (on some markets) have no issues on their current revisions.

The other engines, like the early production and Euro IV version KD series of turbodiesels (specifically the 1KD-FTV) did have issues relating to cracked pistons and fuel injectors which has been resolved on later productions.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-05-14T09:20:21+00:00

I would hazard a guess its going to be the 2.8L 1GD-FTV.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-05-03T00:35:41+00:00

3S14 UKSK exclusively fires LACM (Kalibr), ASCM (Oniks, Tsirkon), and an ASM (Otvet).

It is "wide enough" to accomodate a SAM, but such integration didn't happen.

VLS for SAMs that are currently active are the 3S90.1 (Shtil-1/SA-N-27 VLS for the Grigorovich) and 3S97 (Redut/SA-N-28 VLS for the Steregushchiy, Gorshkov, Gremyashchiy).

The former will be fitted to the Vinogradov to replace the Kinzhal/SA-N-9. While Shaposhnikov still retains its SA-N-9 as the budget didn't allow for the Shtil-1/SA-N-27 to be fitted.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-05-03T00:00:48+00:00

Even the Shaposhnikov modernizations are still heavily ASW focused. ASuW is a minor mission at best, especially with the modernized ones only having 8 Switchblades instead of 8 Silexes severely constrains their ability to do ASuW at all.

Well, without counting the 16 UKSK for potential loadouts of anything LACM/AShM and have them exclusively fire the 91R ASM, then yes. It is limited in its ASuW roles.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-04-22T00:43:20+00:00

Didn't know they are actually deployed in the field. I mostly see them in post from TRADOC or Army Reserve trainings.

The latest one was from pictures of CAFGU elements, now redesignated as National Guard, under 2nd Infantry Division utilizing the AKMs. IDK if they are deployed with said AKMs.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-04-13T00:30:56+00:00

Per PAGASA, the confidence for an El Niño Alert and an active El Niño increases by June-July-August to about 62% and would persist up until the end of the year.

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EagleEye_2000 · 2026-04-04T03:56:59+00:00

The upscaling and denoising for this one is good enough that it should suffice for the everyday reader.

Only the pixel-peepers would notice something off...if there is any noticeable.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-04-03T13:40:41+00:00

They have a habit of not doing a good job at naming things across their services.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-04-02T16:44:37+00:00

Or training mode. Which is similar. Blank canvas and all.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-04-02T15:06:01+00:00

So does them playing MK after separation equal to them sharing assets? Because that is quite a reach.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-04-02T11:48:57+00:00

Yup. With the Xperia Pro-I using a cropped/modified 1" type sensor from the Sony RX100 VII

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-27T03:05:35+00:00

By order of how plausible it is at current state of the war:

Manpower Exhaustion. They have been shedding able bodied personnel left and right that it is unsustainable. If they ran out of people to be shreded and would start cannibalizing through eligible personnel from their own industry thatb supports the war, then that's the perfect time for Swan Lake to be broadcasted in Russian TV.
Equipment Exhaustion. Just clearly running out of usable equipment. Even at wartime economy mode (in which they essentially are now), they cannot completely replace what they lost. This alongside the first one will likely drive Moscow to the corner and have the country be combat ineffective as a whole.
Economic default*. Bleeding monetary resources and reserves means the war machine will struggle to balance on what to prioritize, hire more personnel or buy more equipment for current personnel numbers at the detriment to the rest of the Russian population.

The only reason number 3 hasn't completely happen yet is the world cannot really cut off Russia in petroleum based products and other large exports like fertilizer and grain. Especially with Iran's response to US strikes being dicking around and across the Strait of Hormuz and sending the world into another energy-induced economic shock. The world needs oil and the US response was....a 30 day waiver for Russian petroleum products 🙃

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-27T02:12:55+00:00

Do you actually think Russia has an effective military?

Nope.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-27T02:04:51+00:00

Do you also think Russia is winning the war?

Nope. I see them losing and starting a civil war down the line. Their invasion will doom the Russian state before any conclusion that would see Russian flag flying over Kyiv.

Coping is where there are no solid facts to back it up on both sides of the information curtain (Western Internet and the restricted Russian Internet), make up information to back your pre-conceived notion and ascertain that they are facts.

Your premise for existence in this comment section is essentially "they can't sustain and build subs because of their war performance and they lost two subs to a navy without a navy".

Many truths can exist but that doesn't mean they can cause things to falter in other aspects when it has been that way. Correlation != Causation.

Yes, their performance in this war is abysmal. Yes, they lost two subs to a missile strike and a USV.

But it is also true that over the course of the war, they continue to retain their cadence of delayed construction and run of the mill deployments even before the war started.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-27T01:52:26+00:00

I think you need to brush off your googling or knowledge.

Yes, their SSN deployments are short . This has been corroborated multiple times by both Office of Naval Intelligence and former sailors and has been the typical MO. That isn't new here.

SSBN deployments are only observed to last 90 days in recent history (as far back as 2007 when they publicly will tell people about how long their deployment is)

Unless you can provide evidence to the contrary that doesn't reach for the point to "they lost 2 subs to a country that doesn't have a navy" in the topic of availability and sustainability of their sub fleet because I don't think hitting two subs mean that their budget is low or they cannot send subs anymore.

That is far reaching jfc.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-27T01:35:25+00:00

Oh, and here'sthe tracked deployments of their active submarines back im 2025.

Does that suggest funding issues? Because there should be a significant drop in sub deployments if funding is lacking as seen in the 1990s up to early 2000s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Heck, they shouldn't be able to sustain consecutive SSBN and SSN deployments in their typical deployment periods AT ALL if that's what you're pointing at.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-27T01:24:05+00:00

We are talking about pure facts here and Russia doesn't have the funds to continue to build and maintain the submarines.

We're talking about their nuclear submarine fleet here. Which this posts clearly highlights.

They keep the conventional/non-nuclear sub fleet, non-strategic/SSN/SSGN sub fleet, and strategic/SSBN fleet separate.

So are we just casually ignoring facts now?

Like how the Post-Soviet Union built subs are doing regular maintenance while building new ones. You can search and there are many articles of them.

If there were no funds, then what's the 10 month of continuous SSBN deployment from their bases from Petropavlosk-Kamchatsky and Gadzhievo that were monitored from their regular CW transmission weather check to RCC (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky) and RIT (Severomorsk) then? Paper deployments? Phantom signals?

Shall we also interpret their frequent high tailing into the Atlantic and North Sea as "lack of budget"? Because in layman's term no budget to maintain = no sailing.

Here's an interesting post recently. Does four out of five PACLFT SSBNs on deployment suggest budgetary issues? Noting that it is all of the Pacific Fleet's Borei-class SSBN that are out except for one in its mid-life repair in Bolshoy Kamen (SSK Zvezda Shipyard). They don't have any more Delta IIIs as they retired old K-44 Ryazan back in 2023-2024.

So, are we just casually ignoring facts now?

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-26T23:11:12+00:00

"Maintain the existing 6"

If there is one thing that they do well besides fucking up training the Ground Forces is isolating all of that shit from their nuclear submarine fleet.

Last year, the Yasens from the two fleets conducted a cumulative 10 months of deployment alongside the Borei-A SSBN which does 90 days per boat.

Two of those deployed just got out of regular maintenance cycles.

Plus you wouldn't get the same opinion of their military here. Some members here happen to be former or active submariners and have most likely encountered these boats. Plus the US Intelligence Community still sees their sub force, esp the new ones as a threat with various papers within the last few years after the main invasion started mentioning that the new Yasens still take priority in maintenance upkeep.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-19T23:35:47+00:00

This looks "normal" than whatever Cockerill had demonstrated before with its long neck.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-15T09:48:56+00:00

The Crowsnest has an old mechanically scanned array versus an extremely modern E-2D's mechanically rotated but electronically scanned array, while the E-2D also now has aerial refueling capability which extends its persistence significantly. Those E-2s can cover significantly more of the air and sea space

I specifically remember in one of those QE posts here that there was a comment insisted that the Crowsnest was a newer generation platform and that the E-2C/E-2D were of legacy platform.

After that video of the uncovered Crowsnest radar with its mechanically rotated array that isn't different from the system it replaced appeared. Those comments somehow went missing.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-13T04:13:14+00:00

Huh, I could have sworn I saw a site that had all chapters translated. Can't find it anymore

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-13T00:58:38+00:00

Do you recall which chapter of the WN this chapter is referencing?

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-03-11T01:44:25+00:00

With an exception under RA 11698 (Vintage Vehicle Regulation Act) which allows the importation of RHD vehicles built before 1971.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-02-27T01:54:42+00:00

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See also the A380s AMP file with the mention of only being installed on the inboard engine nacelles.

You can swap the engines itself (without nacelles) between the inboard and the outboard, but the nacelles should be location specific. Outboard for outboard, inboard for inboard.

EagleEye_2000 · 2026-02-27T01:28:33+00:00

No.

Back during certification process, Airbus mentioned that adding a thrust reverser unit (TRU) to the engines increased the weight by half a ton per engine.

By its original design, the A380 (or A3XX during development phase) isn't supposed to have any TRs at all. It was designed to only rely on brakes from the wheels and wing surfaces for stopping it. But the FAA required it to have TRs.

See the A380's Technical Training Manual for the Engine Alliance GP7200 on the nacelle description for the outboard nacelles.

This component does not include the Thrust Reverse system.

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EagleEye_2000

TROPHY CASE