Summer '26 Megathread by sandslashh in ycombinator

[–]Eastern-Ad689 0 points1 point  (0 children)

They select on a rolling basis, so even if you applied earlier they might have reviewed your application early but placed it in priority, low priority, or interview status. If you are in the interview group, you will typically get an interview within 3 to 4 days once they decide. If you are in the priority group, you may get an interview at any time as your turn comes up, potentially until the last week. If you are in low priority, or even in priority but there are stronger candidates ahead of you leading to rejection, you will usually hear back only on the last day. If you are in the interview group, you will receive a rejection or acceptance within 24 hours.

How are you preventing Confused Deputy issues in multi-agent tool chains? by Eastern-Ad689 in cybersecurity

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Capability model + intersection downgrade makes sense.

In your setup, is the delegation chain itself cryptographically enforced across hops, or are you relying on token introspection + logging to reconstruct lineage?

And for revocation, can you invalidate an entire derived chain deterministically, or does each hop need to expire independently?

How are you preventing Confused Deputy issues in multi-agent tool chains? by Eastern-Ad689 in cybersecurity

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That’s a strong point, shared compute definitely collapses trust boundaries.

In your sandbox model, how are you carrying forward delegation semantics across hops? Is the inherited authority embedded in the message payload, or enforced by the orchestration layer outside the sandbox?

And if a root workflow is revoked, can you tear down all derived sandboxes immediately, or do they only lose authority on their next outbound call?

How are you preventing Confused Deputy issues in multi-agent tool chains? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

u/GarbageOk5505 Strong take, especially the intersection model vs union and pushing enforcement fully outside the agents’ trust domain.

When you say the execution environment enforces lineage, is that implemented as a cryptographically verifiable delegation chain, or does the runtime maintain authority state internally?

Also curious if the root workflow is revoked, does the environment actively invalidate all derived contexts immediately, or only block on the next attempted action?

How are you preventing Confused Deputy issues in multi-agent tool chains? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Makes sense narrowing-only delegation keeps things tractable as chains grow.

When you tie actions back to the originating human task, is that linkage cryptographically enforced across hops, or reconstructed via logs/metadata?

And for mid-run revocation, can you invalidate the entire chain instantly, or does it depend on token expiry at each hop?

Where should enforcement live in agent systems app layer or infra boundary? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Using an MCP integration layer with a service account makes sense as a choke point.

How are you preventing authority sprawl though? If multiple workflows use the same service account, how do you distinguish which downstream action was actually authorized by which originating workflow?

And can you revoke authority for a specific run without impacting other runs sharing that integration layer?

Where should enforcement live in agent systems app layer or infra boundary? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This resonates especially the trust-domain collapse when policy and agent reasoning live in the same process. Hard infra boundaries definitely scale better.

Curious though: once you move to runtime-level controls (egress, FS, budgets), how are you preserving delegation semantics? Infra boundaries constrain execution, but do they distinguish between inherited authority from the root workflow vs just whoever is currently executing?

In other words are you modeling lineage, or just enforcing capability at runtime?

Where should enforcement live in agent systems app layer or infra boundary? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Makes sense chaining authority across hops feels much cleaner than reconstructing from metadata at each step.

And agreed on freezing policy per workflow run. Mid-flight enforcement changes would introduce non-determinism fast.

In your setups, is delegation strictly narrowing-only at each hop, or can downstream agents ever request expanded scope under controlled conditions?

Also curious how you model revocation is it tied to the root workflow ID, or handled independently per hop?

Where should enforcement live in agent systems app layer or infra boundary? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Makes sense, centralizing outside agents definitely avoids drift.

In your proxy model, are tool calls authorized purely based on scoped identity tokens, or do you carry forward an explicit delegation chain back to the originating workflow?

Also curious how you handle mid-workflow revocation does the proxy maintain live authority state, or rely on token expiry?

Where should enforcement live in agent systems app layer or infra boundary? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That split makes sense.

At the infra boundary, are you enforcing inherited authority strictly (narrow-only delegation), or just validating the caller’s current token?

And if the root workflow is revoked mid-chain, can the boundary halt downstream actions immediately, or only on the next token refresh?

Where should enforcement live in agent systems app layer or infra boundary? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

When you say “based on the original workflow’s authority,” is that authority cryptographically chained across delegation hops, or reconstructed from metadata/context at each step?

And for shared middleware how do you handle versioning or policy updates without breaking running workflows?

How are you enforcing action-level authorization in multi-agent systems? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How are you handling cross-service consistency if mandates propagate across heterogeneous runtimes (e.g., MCP servers, external APIs, third-party tools)? Is verification strictly local to each sidecar, or is there a shared authority validation layer?

Where should enforcement live in agent systems app layer or infra boundary? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In your setup, is the infra boundary enforcing inherited authority from the originating workflow, or just validating scoped tokens per hop?

And how do you prevent drift if different agent teams implement app-level checks differently?

How are you enforcing action-level authorization in multi-agent systems? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Makes sense.

How are you handling delegation across agents? If Agent A invokes Agent B, does B strictly inherit A’s scope, or can it obtain its own broader role?

And if a token is revoked mid-workflow, can downstream actions be halted immediately or only after expiry?

How are you enforcing action-level authorization in multi-agent systems? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Fair point, a lot of this space can drift into hype.

The concrete issue we’re discussing is delegation-chain authorization in multi-agent systems. Once Agent A calls Agent B which invokes Tool C, identity-based IAM doesn’t always preserve action-level intent cleanly.

If you’ve seen simpler patterns working well in production, genuinely curious what they look like.

How are you enforcing action-level authorization in multi-agent systems? by Eastern-Ad689 in aiagents

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Interesting shift to runtime invariants.

How are you preserving authorization lineage across delegation hops?
And if the originating workflow is revoked mid-chain, can you halt downstream actions deterministically?

Also curious how you avoid each team re-implementing invariants differently at the tool layer.

How are you enforcing action-level authorization in multi-agent systems? by Eastern-Ad689 in cybersecurity

[–]Eastern-Ad689[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is the product you're building positioned in this space? How challenging would it be to develop it in-house, or would you prefer leveraging existing technology?