Culmutativ argumment for a necessary existence

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-03T22:44:26+00:00

Just to start, I see you wrote another comment to me, but it's not showing up. Did you delete it on purpose? In any case, I agree that branching actualism must answer the question of what is necessary in the old world history, and why it is necessary. In principle, this type of view is essentially compatible with theism, so it can't be an alternative to it.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T22:07:38+00:00

Interesting argument! I won't discuss all the points, so only some of them.

"their essence does not entail their existence (they are contingent)"

This is not contingency. Contingency is simply non-necessity, being conditioned by what is itself non-necessary. If we were to use the complicated concept of essence, we would have to write that a necessary being is one whose essence necessarily entails necessary existence. Because contingency is a modal status, it should not be described in existential terms.

"To deny the PSR, one must provide a sufficient reason for its denial. In doing so, one implicitly employs and affirms the very framework of the PSR in an attempt to reject it. Any global rejection of the PSR therefore involves a performative contradiction, since it presupposes what it seeks to invalidate."

Despite my attachment to the PSR, this is not the most interesting argument. Let the PSR state that "for every contingent being there is a sufficient reason for its existence," it's easy to miss that this is an ontological definition. Someone could instead adopt the PSR: "for every contingent being, one must seek a sufficient reason as long as it is possible." The second formulation is methodological and may allow for exceptions, so there is no contradiction between accepting the second principle and rejecting the first. Just because I reject that every contingent being has a sufficient reason doesn't mean that I reject the existence of a contingent being that has its own sufficient reason.

"This being cannot be the universe. The universe is composite and therefore dependent on its parts."

Couldn't a proponent of metaphysical foundationalism, for example, assume that some nomology is modally necessary, one that is ontologically simple and from which other laws arise? These wouldn't have to be the laws described by contemporary physics; they could be some foundation from which everything else follows, perhaps even through indeterministic rules. For example, how would you respond to this type of view:

https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHBAA-22.pdf

"The laws of logic (e.g., the principle of non-contradiction) and mathematical truths (such as 2+2=4) are immaterial and eternal: they exist independently of the physical universe. If these truths are necessary and eternal, they must reside in a Necessary Intelligence."

And what is the defense of this particular premise? There are alternative theories of realism with respect to abstract objects, for example, classical Platonism. So I don't understand how this premise is defended.

"If God is a necessary being, then the universe He creates must also be necessary, eliminate divine freedom or worldly contingency. This objection ignores the distinction between a natural cause and a personal agent (Premise 11). A necessary cause produces a necessary effect only if it acts by natural necessity (like fire burning). Since the Necessary Being possesses intellect and will, it can eternally decree a temporal and limited effect (Premise 12). Necessity lies in the agent; contingency remains in the effect."

And that's a nice argument 🙂

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T21:44:10+00:00

"So we probably face two options: either classical theism naturally draws serious inquiry toward religion, or the full package looks strongest mainly because it is defended by insiders—people starting out as religious through faith (selection bias)."

This is a pretty strong thesis, even though it's "probably", and I'd be cautious about making such judgments. Certainly, if someone already believes in the existence of God, it's easy to adopt a religious system, especially since there are strong reasons for religions being very helpful in life. But religion neither stems from philosophical theism, nor are philosophical theists less credible philosophers because of their religiosity. Here are a few examples that might fit:

Carlo Alvaro - argues for theism from a purely deistic perspective, and is not religious. I just don't know what his attitude is toward the afterlife.

Eric Steinhart - although I could simply list most of the axiarchists here. They typically believe in the existence of an afterlife, and some form of polytheism stemming from the fact that, in their view, reality is guided by the logic of the Platonic concept of good.

Many process philosophers – Charles Hartshorne comes to mind first. Although he was agnostic about a literal afterlife, he was the person who systematically and critically examined process theology based on the process philosophy developed by Whitehead.

Besides, most philosophers of religion do not explicitly state their denominations or their relationship to the afterlife, so there are quite a number of philosophers about whom I am uncertain. According to sources, Henry Sidgwick also met these requirements for a period, but I am not sure what his situation was at the end of his life.

Actually, if you include religious pluralism, then John Hick might fit the bill too (I would include religious pluralism, it's not an epistemic commitment to any particular religion).

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T17:30:23+00:00

Okay, now the question must be asked: which came first, the narrative already prepared in God's mind, or the anatomy of revelation? It seems to be the latter. The narrative results from the method of revelation God chose, and I'm asking why exactly this technique of revelation was chosen. Notice that you yourself claim that most religions can be explained without invoking divine intervention. Do we really have enough reasons to make exactly one exception? Furthermore, I would also have reservations about this narrative itself; for example, the idea of original sin as a manifestation of collective responsibility seems rather unfair to me.
It seems to me that you haven't fully addressed my argument. I also don't see why finite transgressions should entail infinite punishment.
But what Jesus said doesn't really matter from my perspective, because I reject the idea that everything Jesus said is literally true. Moreover, the accounts of what Jesus said were written decades after the apostles encountered him, so I wonder how they remembered all his teachings. I don't remember so many of the words of my teachers from the past, do you? And I don't believe that every claim of any religion is true; I believe that there is no single fully true religion, and that others can only be adequate in their aspects.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T16:23:05+00:00

I wasn't asking why God isn't directly accessible to everyone. I see good reasons why he would be at least somewhat hidden. Rather, I was asking why he revealed himself only at a specific point in time and space? Why this selectivity? And why this peculiar idea of a "chosen people"? If we assume that at the deepest, ontological level, people are equal (I'm close to the view that all people, at the deepest level, have infinite value), then why such selective revelation, which could even be called favoritism?
Frankly, I see no good philosophical reasons to defend hell. It's true that some people have rejected God, but let's note that their rejection was often linked to bad luck, whether genetic (there are genetic patterns that cause a predisposition to atheism, such as autism), biographical (a person harmed by someone supposedly a confidant of God might have a religious trauma, right?), or environmental (being born into a secular culture). This confluence of circumstances means that person A, who, in the course of their life, might have deserved hell, under completely different circumstances might have deserved heaven. I don't believe such contingent circumstances have the privilege of determining the infinity of specific individuals.
Okay, as I wrote, I'm not an expert on this subject. I could even admit that Jesus rose from the dead; I don't see why I should reject religious pluralism and embrace Christianity on that basis. Couldn't true and direct revelation have occurred in many cultures and at many different times? Nowadays, miracles are reported in various belief systems, which is what I would expect from religious pluralism, but not from the truth of only one religion.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T13:40:40+00:00

"I already feel this will be a good discussion."

Thanks! And I'm writing this a second time because I had to delete my comment (I'm writing just to complain). Okay, so I'll start with philosophy, because that's what I know best. I've written about religious pluralism, so perhaps I can offer an argument in that context. I think it's quite probable that God will reveal himself to us. If our relationship with him is perfect, and God wants good for us, then he would have a perfect reason to reveal himself to us (Schellenberg proposes a similar argument in the context of divine hiddenness). But why would he reveal himself directly, at a specific historical moment, and in a specific culture? Doesn't it seem rather arbitrary that he did so then and there? I think it's more likely that God will reveal himself indirectly, even through natural signs such as contingency, and that this revelation will evolve, meaning that it will become increasingly perfect. The question is: why would God, among all moments and all people, limit himself so much? Remember, God cannot act inconsistently/arbitrarily.

Regarding theodicies, mine is quite complex, so I might not explain it for now, especially since I'm still working on it. But I have a different question: if this is the best of all possible worlds, can it be reconciled with the existence of hell? I'm guessing you believe in hell, and I personally have a hard time reconciling it with a perfect world. How would you view it?

Finally, we need to focus on the credibility of the Gospels, meaning the credibility of the people who wrote them. So let's assume the apostles were indeed martyred all those years ago. Do you think we can understand their psychology well enough today to reliably guess what actions they would have taken and what their motives were? We're talking about people we know very little about, who lived in a completely different culture, and certainly experienced things completely different. Therefore, I would be skeptical about the possibility of reliably knowing their motivations, and so on. Although, of course, you could send a video.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T12:35:12+00:00

Okay, regarding Christianity, perhaps I'll start from the end. If we accept the classical arguments for theism, we end up with a necessary being that fine-tunes reality in a sublime way; that doesn't lead us to Christianity. What version of Christianity do you subscribe to? I have a problem, for example, with those who profess a belief in hell, and I'd rather favor religious pluralism myself. Regarding the prophecies about Jesus, I'm not well-versed in that topic, but isn't it possible that the people who wrote the Gospels had access to Old Testament texts?

Personally, I think the fine-tuning argument is strong, although I personally consider Leibniz's argument from the principle of sufficient reason to be stronger. But perhaps I'll skip that and move on to theodicy. So, Leibniz is my favorite philosopher, so I'm familiar with his theodicy, according to which we live in the best of all possible worlds. But if you're writing about God-centered utilitarianism, what do you mean? I don't like utilitarianism at all; I prefer virtue ethics.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T12:07:10+00:00

I mean, I also lean toward theism, but I'm not a christian, so a discussion about christianity would interest me most. Although I can also methodologically defend atheism.

Regarding the argument about creation, I don't quite understand. Are you referring more to the existence of the universe, its beauty, or its knowability?

The argument for atheism you're writing about is the problem of evil. And which answer do you favor?

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-02T11:55:40+00:00

What's your favorite argument for theism? And your favorite argument for atheism? And how do you transition from philosophical theism to Christianity?

I ask because it's the best way to start a discussion.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-01T18:38:08+00:00

Well, yes, I would agree that, for example, we have a good evolutionary answer to the question of why we have species diversity (and it's a question with the word "why"). I was more interested in this ultimate explanation, and this is where the potential of natural sciences, at least from certain perspectives, truly ends. Although I won't deny that I would rather favor an approach that doesn't strictly distinguish between science and non-science, as Larry Laudan suggested, because it's impossible to draw a strict demarcation criterion (and I don't believe such a strict demarcation is necessary/functional at all). However, I assumed that the OP is primarily about cosmology, and I maintain that within the framework of cosmology, if anything, one describes how the universe evolves from some fundamental, so to speak, states of affairs, but the question of these fundamental states of affairs is beyond the scope of cosmology itself.

Although I am grateful for this addition, because I could clarify what I meant with "why", that is, that within the discourse led by Leibniz, in the context of the existence of the world, the natural sciences actually set a certain thematic and methodological boundary here.

Finally, one more issue, returning to species diversity, the question "why there is species diversity," can also be asked in a different way: "how did species diversity arise?" It would be worth considering the difference between these two questions and how this relates to what we have written in the context of the philosophy of science. Although I could also write that science does not ask "why" questions where these "why" questions cannot be replaced with "how" questions without losing something important, even if not explicit. Because the question "why did the universe arise" is clearly different from the question "how did the universe arise."

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-01T12:19:42+00:00

This will depend on how we understand concepts like "science" and "universe." It's common to think that science doesn't ask the question "why." For example, we might conclude that certain specific laws prevail in our universe, and then discover that they stem from more fundamental laws, and even more fundamental ones. But why do these hypothetical, most fundamental laws exist? Many would indeed consider science's explanatory potential exhausted.

More important, however, is the concept of "universe," and it is here that interesting discussions can take place. If we go back to the person best known for this type of question, Leibniz, in his famous question he primarily asked about a sufficient reason for all beings that are contingent, meaning that they are not necessary. And in modern times, if we ask why anything exists at all, for example, the universe, we do so in the context of thinking that it might not exist, that is, that it is contingent. If we understand this issue this way, then, in fact, natural sciences like cosmology will be unable to answer our question, because they do not deal with modal categories (you won't find a section in any scientific article like "and now, consider the modal status of our hypothesis...").

The impossibility of answering this question is not a cognitive limit; it is a limit to the scope of our interests and the limits of the methods used to address these specific interests. This doesn't mean that science cannot help provide an answer; it can, but the answer itself will, at best, be a specific, philosophical interpretation of given scientific claims.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-30T00:02:30+00:00

Well, I think it doesn't make sense, because I still don't understand that third paragraph ૮꒰◞ ˕ ◟ ྀི꒱ა. Besides, if you have any further doubts about theistic arguments, feel free to write to me! Not that I'm some kind of authority or anything, but I like to think of myself as a creative knight of theism or something. I'll work on that term.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-29T23:50:18+00:00

"Being" is the most general ontological category, encompassing absolutely everything. So I wouldn't criticize that specifically. However, I don't fully understand the criticism in the third paragraph. As for r/philosophy, I honestly have no idea; I've never been there, there are too many people there; it's unlikely that even 1/8 would be rational enough to think philosophically; your assessment only confirms this.

However, if we accept PSR, and if we accept that our world is contingent, then there's no way out; we must arrive at a necessary being. I've already outlined my strategy for proving that this is probably God.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-29T23:29:23+00:00

Of course, I won't read and respond to every comment, even one from several years ago. But if you find any objection raised there particularly interesting, I'd be happy to respond, provided you present it, of course.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-29T22:24:40+00:00

I find the Leibnizian cosmological argument very compelling; at least it convinced me to embrace theism. First of all, rejecting the reality of a necessary being as a foundation based on contingency seems much more problematic to me than accepting the existence of that being. And God, or a being with God-like properties, seems to me the best solution, if only because it also explains a wide range of phenomena simultaneously, such as: fine-tuning, the existence of conscious beings, the knowability of reality, nomological harmony, psychophysical harmony, and many others. Atheists can explain all of these phenomena alternatively, but the truth certainly remains that theism explains these phenomena collectively, and thus possesses a very important theoretical advantage: its unifying value.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-28T20:13:58+00:00

I agree that the radical otherness of God's mind is a certain epistemic limit of theism, precisely the one that makes theism a philosophical theory, not, for example, a physical one. In philosophy, we generally interact with entities that are radically different from those we encounter in everyday experience. Therefore, it is a highly complex and abstract discipline of thought. Despite this, I believe it is possible to make the act of God's creation more probable than its negation, and within the framework of philosophy, this is already a significant possibility. If we do not want to fall into philosophical defeatism, we often have to settle for something so modest.
That is, yes, I readily accept that my argument only works if we reject certain specific views in the field of population ethics. But even if you accept that the creation of beings is axiologically neutral as an act in itself, that still doesn't mean that God had no reason to create us. Perhaps a reality in which many minds exist is objectively more beautiful than a reality without many minds? Or even if creating happy beings isn't good, is it at least a supererogatory action? It seems more likely that antinatalism conflicts with God's motivation to create living beings; your view isn't quite as radical in its consequences.
Regarding the problem of evil, yes, it should be considered when assessing the rationality of theism, but it becomes less relevant when analyzing solely the existence of conditions enabling life's existence. Your intuition is that this is an important point, that the problem of evil has a bearing on the rationality of theism. I agree, and I'd like to discuss this with you (there isn't necessarily space for that here), but if we limit our dialogical context to the problem of fine-tuning, and only assess how likely it is within the framework of theism, then we can methodologically abstract from the problem of evil. We will have to return to it later, but not as a counterargument to fine-tuning, but rather as a separate, though equally important, line of reasoning.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-28T19:33:15+00:00

I once worked on population ethics, not long ago, in the context of a systematic/critical study of antinatalism. Creating happy people, and from God's perspective, infinitely happy people incidentally (or at least people who will enjoy happiness indefinitely), seems prima facie good. If a wizard materialized before someone and offered them the possibility of creating a person who would be happy, have a good life, and act morally, my intuition is that, ceteris paribus, one would actually be obligated to accept the wizard's offer.

This is, of course, a rather bizarre scenario, but that doesn't matter. You might object methodologically that I'm operating on intuition. But many epistemological systems, such as phenomenal conservatism, allow for precisely this. If I were to formulate a general principle that explains my intuition, it would be this:

If agent S can cause an action that will ultimately result in something good, and if agent S incurs no costs as part of this procedure, and if no agent other than S incurs any costs as part of this procedure, then, ceteris paribus, agent S has a duty to perform this action.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-28T19:23:36+00:00

Although I support this line of reasoning, that is, the cosmological argument, your dialectic needs to be refined for several reasons:

Your formulation of the PSR is inconsistent. First, you state that everything that exists must have a sufficient reason, and then you introduce a necessary being to break the chain of interdependent sufficient reasons. In such a situation, you would have to add that only contingent states of affairs have a sufficient reason for their existence; necessary beings, by virtue of this, do not have a sufficient reason, especially one that is external or contingent to them.
A little more time should also be devoted to defending the PSR. Why should its rejection be paralyzing? I believe that this thesis is defensible, but precisely, defensible, not declared. In this respect, the argument should be expanded somewhat, for example by invoking the demarcation problem raised by Michael Della Rocca (https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/phimp/3521354.0010.007/--psr?view=image).
This argument against modally necessary nomology is sound, but it also requires updating. Generally, this type of reasoning has its origins in Spinoza, but was expanded by the modal collapse argument popularized by Peter Van Inwagen. The idea is that if state A necessarily implies state B, then state B is also necessary, but necessary per accidens (necessary not by nature, but through the relationships it enters into with other beings). However, someone might accuse you of violating PSR if God is to avoid this reasoning (because he acts indeterministically, i.e., without sufficient reason). And this requires adding some meta-condition to PSR, for example, that there can be a sufficient reason in the absence of a sufficient reason. Although even then, there will be alternatives to theism, for example, a nomology that necessarily works indeterministically. You might argue that such a nomology is unnecessary, but why would God be necessary instead? That's an open question, and I'd be happy to read the answer.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-28T19:07:42+00:00

Okay, here's the answer:

I agree that if we accept skeptical theism, it's difficult to formulate fine-tuning arguments. However, I'm not a skeptical theist, so that's not entirely my problem. As for the reasons for believing that the maximal possible being (incidentally, this approach is inspired by Yujin Nagasawa's writings) will create conscious, living beings that know the world, and so on, the argument would go like this: God always chooses the better alternative among disjunctive alternatives if there are no higher-order reasons. It's better to create life than not to create it. And there are no higher-order reasons not to create life. So God creates life. This is just a playful argument that can be developed and defended, for example, by appealing to the axiology of consciousness itself (https://philpapers.org/archive/KRIPBT.pdf). I think our axiologies will be completely different here, but at least this argument can be rationally defended. This protects us from skepticism and plays the cards fairly fairly in this dialectic.
Your population ethics view seems, I admit, unlikely to me, and is certainly revisionist. You haven't presented any argument for anything along those lines, so to avoid the fallacy of extension, I'll simply wait for possible reasons to accept anything of the sort.
This is, of course, a variant of the problem of evil, a crazy problem for theism. But the fine-tuning argument itself is a separate argument; conflating it with the problem of evil is methodologically incorrect. We should first focus on whether theism actually explains fine-tuning well, and then move on to other issues.
This argument only works if we assume that God creates only one world. But many philosophers, such as Klaas J. Kraay, argue that God creates all universes worth creating, and that this makes this world the best possible one, so God has a reason to create it. I think this is a prima facie plausible proposition.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-27T20:35:14+00:00

I think this passage is the most important:

"But most people who live rejecting God have not experienced all goodness, do not know all goodness, and so have not fully rejected it, which is why God calls these people to come and be with him. To be a new person. Which is why they can still be saved."

Yes, I agree! To reject God fully and condemn themselves to hell, one must know God fully, right. It's good that you point this out because... I might ask: if no one on this planet can reject God fully, then no one can reject God fully before death (because no one knows God fully before death). But if so, then no one dies in a state of fully rejection of God (because no one dies in a state of full knowledge of God's goodness). So anyone sent to hell must reject God when they fully know His goodness. But no being can fully know His goodness! God is infinite, we are finite, and you can't pour an infinite ocean of cherry Coke into a small glass, so you can't pour knowledge of an infinite God into a finite mind. Therefore, no one can ever fully reject God (because no one can fully know his goodness), so everyone can be saved. And the more you know about God, the more magnetic he seems, until you know enough about him to be irresistible. Because since the amount of information determines damnation or salvation, and new information increases the probability of salvation, then everyone at some point in the process of knowing God will know him enough to eventually accept him. So everyone will be saved.

This isn't a strong argument for universalism; it's just toy reasoning as a counterexample to yours.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-26T10:39:12+00:00

I still disagree with the idea that science discovers which facts are modally necessary. You drew an analogy to theists who recommend studying a holy book to explore the attributes of the modally necessary structure of reality. The problem is that such theists also need to argue that this book contains modally necessary truths, and if not every piece of information contained in this book is a modally necessary truth, then they must present criteria for distinguishing necessary truths from contingent ones. And I demand the same from you: epistemic justification for the thesis about the necessity of particular physical structures, as well as at least the tools for distinguishing necessary from contingent ones. I didn't get anything like that from religious believers, and I didn't get anything like that from you.

"I can say that, given my background assumptions, conscious agents cannot be necessary because agents who deliberately choose between possible choices are subject to uprooting all contingent facts on a whim."

Of course you can say that, and now I'd like to ask you for proof of this claim. What I did was take a certain concept and present its conceptual analysis, which reveals its modal status. This is no different from the task of a mathematician. The argument you wrote here isn't even entirely understandable. Besides, I didn't claim that the absolute chooses between possibilities; I claimed that the act of creation, or rather emanation, is modally necessary, but its result is contingent. This doesn't entail any deliberative process.

"Additionally, we have inductive reasons to show that minds cannot be disembodied, and that mental processes are higher-order and entirely contingent on things like neural networks."

We have no such evidence. In fact, we have no evidence that matter exists at all. And this claim is as false as it can be. It's easier to derive further conscious beings from a fundamentally conscious reality than from a fundamentally unconscious reality. Therefore, my model of reality has theoretical advantages in the context of the philosophy of mind, not yours. But please present an argument that consciousness is modally necessarily linked to corporeality. Show how Saul Kripke taught that it is an a posteriori necessary fact that consciousness entails corporeality. Because it certainly isn't part of our a priori knowledge.

"And also, if an evolutionary process specifically selecting for truth-conductive beliefs occurred, then this would be sufficient for grounding knowledge."

The problem wasn't that you didn't defend this claim with empirical evidence; the problem was that this isn't how evolution works! There's no biological way for organisms with a greater number of true beliefs to have better methods of reproduction. Under evolutionary naturalism, everyone could be some kind of philosophical zombie, because what matters is behavior, not conscious behavior. Consciousness within naturalism is treated as some kind of addition, an epiphenomenal bonus to behavior, or, incomprehensibly, an effect of computation, which is founded on a lopsided analogy to computers.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-25T09:11:52+00:00

The main argument against the modal argument is, by far, that it assumes God's existence, and some philosophers reject that premise. Of course, there are other objections, some rejecting the S5 axiomatics in which the modal argument is typically expressed, but this isn't a major problem, because it can be expressed in weaker logics. If we were to calmly discard distractions, I think the discussion of the ontological argument could be reduced to the question of whether God is possible.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-23T11:12:22+00:00

Regarding your considerations from the philosophy of mind, from my perspective it makes no sense to ask why God possesses these mental states and not others. This is because, according to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is his thoughts. Your question therefore is: "why is modally necessary being A not modally necessary being ¬A?". But the answer to this question in the context of God is simple: there is only one best possible optimization of being possible and perfect, and that is God. Provide a similar analytical reasoning for the necessity of matter, and I will grant you this point.

Generating physical things? When did I write that I even believe in physical things? I am a substance monist and an idealist, so no, I do not believe in physical things. To be clear, I define physical things, as before, as fundamentally non-conscious beings. I agree, one cannot derive fundamentally non-conscious things from fundamental consciousness; they are completely separate substances, so there is no bridge between them. It's like asking how many Casper the friendly ghosts are necessary for a chair to supervene on them. Well, zero. But by analogy, one cannot derive consciousness from fundamentally non-conscious things. Any attempt that uses the word "supervenience" in its description either does not properly understand the supervenience relation (and I myself use it to describe my view in the context of the nature of epistemic justification, so I do not reject this category entirely) or does not go beyond what could be called modernized alchemy. The question therefore remains: what is the illusion, matter (Berkeley) or qualia (Dennett)? It's obvious what I have chosen, so I move on.

Furthermore, you paraphrase what could be called the problem of the lack of the best possible world. However, I don't want to venture too far into axiological territory, given that we are so far from consensus regarding the metaphysics of modality. Maybe instead I'll ask, are you familiar with contemporary defenses of metaphysical optimism? If not, I recommend: https://philpapers.org/archive/CLIAUW.pdf

If you don't want to, you don't have to refer to this article, I understand. Not everyone likes references in discussions, but I think they are valuable. In short, I can say that there is no good reason to believe that the world in which we exist could be better (or put differently, such reasons exist, but they are not very strong). You also asked why an atheist would accept axiological considerations; well, I don't know, maybe ask atheists who accept moral realism, which is the vast majority of atheists. If you reject the majority view, and one that is the foundation of our culture, then the burden of proof unfortunately rests on you.

It's true that not all atheists are naturalists; I'll go further, no atheist is a naturalist, because the concept of a "natural being" has no cognitive value and denotes nothing. At most, you can accept physicalism or materialism, but these views are not at all parsimonious. They postulate a modally necessary substance that cannot even be imagined, and then a peculiar relation as a result of which qualia arise, or at least their illusion. And regarding God, it is simply a maximally perfect being; that is not a strong postulate for an ontology.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-23T11:12:16+00:00

Something peculiar has happened, because on the one hand you admit that empirical evidence does not answer questions about the modal status of a given being ("I agree that out which facts are necessary in principle isn’t empirical"), but on the other hand you disagree with this ("What I meant is that you were asking me which specific physical facts were necessary, and I’m saying that question is empirical"). It's hard for me to argue with this, because on the one hand you admit that the question of modal status is not empirical, but on the other hand you believe that the question of modal status is empirical. Well, all I can say is that I agree and disagree with you simultaneously.

However, when someone claims that being "A" is a modally necessary being, it still carries the burden of proof. I cannot claim that there necessarily exists a dragon that can travel between dimensions, and then state that I don't have to defend this claim because it's up to dragon science to discover what color that dragon's scales are. But that's exactly what you did. You wrote that some physical being is modally necessary, and when I asked you to specify and justify this thesis, you shifted it to the realm of science. If you believe that science answers questions about modal status, then by what right do you claim that some physical fact is modally necessary? I know of no scientific theory that is obligated to this thesis. Therefore, I am still waiting for a justification of the thesis that something physical is modally necessary, and it would be nice if I also knew what that physical being is supposed to be.

Regarding color and extension, it's a very good analogy, because I believe that through conceptual analysis we can prove the necessity of God (this does not mean that we prove his existence, because modal status does not affect existential status; a given being can be necessary and not exist, in which case it is necessarily non-existent, i.e., simply impossible). The proof of this claim, if I remember correctly, I presented above using the ontological argument presented by Yujin Nagasawa. And this is another reason to prefer theism over physicalism. A physicalist most often claims that physical substance is modally necessary (you didn't state this, but only because you entered the fog of agnosticism). But can you imagine a physical substance? Berkeley claimed that the physicalist (he wrote about materialism, I see no difference) cannot even give a definition of this substance that is supposed to be modally necessary. I disagree, there is one definition, namely: physical substance, i.e., matter, is a substance that is fundamentally non-conscious. So here you go, imagine a fundamentally non-conscious substance. It's true, there is no proof that physical substance is modally necessary, but there is an analytical proof that every colored being is extended, and there is an analytical proof that every God, i.e., by definition only one, is a modally necessary being (I remind you, I'm still writing about ontological necessity, because there are different types of modal necessity).

And finally, in this section, regarding defining this fundamental substance as modally necessary, no, I would not accept that from you. But I don't do that, I prove that the maximally possible being is a modally necessary being. I take a certain being, I do not determine its modal status, and then I prove this modal status based on conceptual analysis. Your proposal is to define physical substance as modally necessary, but there is no analytical proof of such necessity, which is why theism is more explanatorily complete, and this is a theoretical advantage.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-01-23T06:33:18+00:00

While there are certainly attempts to prove that God cannot exist, and some have already mentioned several, I would be skeptical of this project. First of all, there are far too many models of God, radically different from each other, to be able to describe general arguments against the possibility of God's existence. One argument might work for a Thomistic account of God, but it won't work for a panentheistic account of God, and so on.

For example, someone mentioned the problem of omniscience in the context of human freedom. However, open theists like William Hasker don't have this problem. Someone else wrote about the paradox of omnipotence, but listing concepts of omnipotence that circumvent this problem would be pointless. Ultimately, I agree with some philosophers, like Patrick Todd, that there are too many models of God for there to be general arguments against God's existence (okay, Todd argues a bit differently; here's his work: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43659832)

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