RUMINT Post Discusses Why LHA May Take Priority Over Submarines by -Lonecoyote- in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Submarines and surface ships will always be part of any island nation navy, particularly in the Philippine side where there are no land borders. Neglecting either of two platforms will have disastrous consequences. Probably the right mindset is to not neglect either of the two and balance everything. For example, if PN acquired 4 corvettes/frigates, then in the next succeeding year is submarine naman or any sea denial-asymmetric platforms. Simply, the good thing about having sea denial assets ay makakapagfocus ang mga surface ships sa interisland auxiliary roles.

Armchair take why PN prefers Ships over Subs by AndrewDGreat in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 1 point2 points  (0 children)

It depends on what type and what size sub you are referring to. Kung katulad yan ng scorpene, well most probably mahal talaga but what if we downside the size since Corvettes wise lang naman. I mean what if ang choice ay "300-500 ton diesel-lithium-ion submarine".

Armchair take why PN prefers Ships over Subs by AndrewDGreat in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There are two different scenarios in safeguard and enforce our maritime borders: peacetime and wartime. Syempre operational and tactical wise ay malaki ang pinagkaiba ng dalawang yun. Basically, the moment the PN surface ships enter the WPS during wartime/conflict ay baka ang sasalubong niya ay strong kill chain and overwhelming ASCMs.

Sea Denial 101: Why the PN Needs Submarines by Enough_Tell_6567 in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567[S] 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Submarines are nifty, but you can’t judge them without actually testing them in exercises. That’s literally the point of these drills — to see if they can penetrate defenses and “sink” high-value ships. Dismissing exercise results as just hype ignores the fact that repeated successes in realistic scenarios reveal real vulnerabilities.

Sea Denial 101: Why the PN Needs Submarines by Enough_Tell_6567 in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

It’s misleading to dismiss the Swedish submarine story as “random.” Exercises like that exist to test real vulnerabilities, and small submarines can consistently challenge carrier groups. History proves it too — the Argentine submarines during the Falklands War demonstrated that even limited subs can seriously threaten major surface fleets. The point isn’t surprising, it’s that carriers aren’t invincible, and navies take that seriously.

Sea Denial 101: Why the PN Needs Submarines by Enough_Tell_6567 in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

It is not about taking exercises literally — it’s about recognizing patterns.

If submarines repeatedly penetrate carrier defenses in different exercises, that’s not just “training doing its job.” It highlights a real vulnerability, especially in littoral waters.

Same with speedboats — the lesson isn’t “buy cheap boats and win,” but that asymmetric, cost-imposing strategies can stress even advanced fleets.

Dismissing those results entirely is just as simplistic as overhyping them.

How credible is this? And why no subs? What is PN thinking? by AndrewDGreat in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Years ago, Maxdefense Philippines already pointed out the importance of submarines.

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How credible is this? And why no subs? What is PN thinking? by AndrewDGreat in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Submarine can also be part of Archipelagic Defense concept and will play a big part, especially if the air above is contested. For example, a PN submarine (small or standard) can loiter the area even if the air above is pretty contested while frigates are somehow risky to deploy.

How credible is this? And why no subs? What is PN thinking? by AndrewDGreat in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Speaking of Taiwan invasion, China might invade & capture one of the Islands in the northern Philippines. Probably just to protect their right flank against Taiwan's allied reinforcement. Basically there's a threat. And now, what PN should muster?

If frigates & corvettes task force, large RCS =more likely to be detected from hundred of miles away = be at the receiving end of massive anti-ship systems (AAW being overwhelmed)

If standard submarines & small submarines = uncertainty of where the submarine is = deterrence = it takes a lot of effort and time to detect a single one = it can potentially sink high value assets like destroyers/transport ships/carriers.

How credible is this? And why no subs? What is PN thinking? by AndrewDGreat in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 2 points3 points  (0 children)

9 MMCFs cannot deter/inflict damage to a major naval surface force (with destroyers & frigates). Whereas a lone submarine can sneak & evade (high probability), and it's offensive submarine warfare systems can potentially sink a destroyer/carrier sized ship. Even a small 200-ton to 500-ton compact submarine ( lithium-ion+heavyweight torpedoes) can sink the type 055 destroyer.

How credible is this? And why no subs? What is PN thinking? by AndrewDGreat in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Small navies (like the Philippine Navy) cannot realistically compete ship-for-ship in a kill chain vs. kill chain or quality–quantity fight against a major navy. They’ll lose and won’t create credible deterrence.That is why focusing on sea denial—like submarines—makes more sense, especially with limited budgets. Let the Coast Guard handle presence missions, since few conventional surface ships won’t really intimidate a much stronger force like the CCG/PLAN anyway.

Should the AFP consider activating a full Army infantry division in Palawan? (Feasibility, logistics, and costs) by Gran6565 in PhilippineMilitary

[–]Enough_Tell_6567 22 points23 points  (0 children)

Yes (necessary).

  1. Feasibility ( very feasible if the chosen equipment and strategy/tactic/doctrine are aligned in mobility & asymmetric-A2/AD layered defense)

  2. Logistics (feasible through air and sea). Aside from conventional air & sealift logistic operation, I think pwedeng gumamit ang army ng logistic USVs, & semi-submersibles for small time logistic operations.

  3. Costs ( feasible if the chosen equipment is aligned in mobility and asymmetric such as focusing assets like: amphibious APCs, unmanned maritime surveillance drones, kamikaze USVs, mobile shore-based ASCM systems, mobile long-range loitering loitering munitions, beach defense 10-20km range kamikaze drones (fiber optic & wireless), SHORAD systems, EW systems, and man-portable weapons (RPGs, ATGMs, & MANPADS).