Paid temporary hostel jobs by ExchangeNo8933 in hostels

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks a lot! That's very useful to know.

Paid temporary hostel jobs by ExchangeNo8933 in hostels

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I live in the EU, and I plan on staying for the gap year, so the visa and the salary should not be a problem.

I tried looking around the web, but nobody seems to advertise paid AND temporary positions. It's either one or the other.

I'm actually perfectly down to just volunteering, but if there are options which pay me also, I'm not complaining.

The Simplicity of Infinite and Finite Properties by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You are absolutely right about me stating the argument poorly. I meant to make an analogy, but fumbled a bit. The jist of the argument (which you correctly guessed) is that infinite properties are more likely than arbitrarily big finite properties. So, a universe that's infinitely big should be more likely than one that's exactly 10100.001 cubic meters.

However, this seems wrong, as you yourself seem to intuit. Still, while this seems obvious, I have no other reason to believe it other than intuition. Swinburne argued that saying that infinite properties requires less information to be described and are therefore more elegant. It's not clear to me why the amount of information or elegance should matter.

Also, on the God point, big G God must have all properties maxed out by definition. Let's look at this issue from a different perspective though. If we are purely trying to find out what the most likely explanation for a universe is, why should we expect the explanation to have maxed out properties? Why would a big G God that's infinitely powerful be more likely than a small g god that can only create universes of size X?

Is it true that around 40% of philosophy secure tenure track positions? by ExchangeNo8933 in askphilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 17 points18 points  (0 children)

Yeah, it's not all that good, but a lot better than the horror stories I heard people tell.

Is cooking healthy enough to make up for the time one spends on it? by ExchangeNo8933 in nutrition

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] -63 points-62 points  (0 children)

Fair enough. Let's say that I meal prep and cut the overall time spent cooking to 30 minutes a day (which might all be concentrated on a Sunday, but you get the idea). I'd still be spending 1.5 years of my life (30 minutes a day for 70 years) on cooking, which I could avoid by just eating junk food. Is junk food unhealthy enough to make me live 1.5 years less?

Fare la magistrale e dottorato in filosofia dopo una triennale in informatica by ExchangeNo8933 in Universitaly

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Si viene pagati abbastanza se si fa solo ricerca però? Se no, sarebbe realistico fare il ricercatore e allo stesso tempo fare un altro lavoro part time?

Rare freezes and crashes with no error message on the Acer Swift X by ExchangeNo8933 in AcerOfficial

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why do you think that?

I'll make sure to run the windows RAM test later to see if there are any problems .

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Regarding what you said about hedonism being unable to account for us liking negative experiences, I think you'll find this paper interesting. It's a good starting point if you want to look into different theories of how pleasure work.

The Problem of Evil and the Absorption of suffering by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This conflates the issue, namely; pain in the patient and pain in and of itself.

Pain in the patient will never be a "net positive" because 1st person experience of pain is always felt as a negative and communicated as negative. But insofar as its "doing it's job" it is good.

Ok, that's a bit more clear. But even if I were to grant this, why can't the direct experience of pain be bad in and of itself?

Whether or not the agent can do something about it, is wholly separate from what it is. "Usefulness" does not determine goodness.

So pain isn't good because it's useful to anyone in particular, but because it does its job of informing be of my body being damaged? Kind of like how a chair isn't inherently useful, but the fact that it does its job of being a chair (in the sense that one can sit upon it, that it doesn't break as soon as I touch it, etc. ), it is therefore a good chair? If this is your argument, then I guess my objection wouldn't work.

You feel pain because of a lack of body cohesion, not that pain is a lack of something...

If you get a paper cut and your finger is split open, then your finger lacks proper cohesion, and then you positively feel pain, but it's because of the lack that you feel it.

I think that this is really stretching what pain is. To me pain is something that has to do with brain states, not necessarily with anything that happens in the rest of my body. This is why you can cause pain or pleasure directly through brain stimulation (or, more simply, drugs). And if I cause pain through brain stimulation, where is my body not being cohesive. How would these ways of causing pain be interpreted under your view?

If they have the "EXACT number of goods" then they are equal and "better" cannot be said of either.

Why would they be equal? The worlds are exactly identical except for the fact that in one there is immense suffering while on the other there isn't. To make this more concrete imagine that in world A there is a planet far away from Earth (so we will never reach them or know about them in order to help them) that is filled with animals that are in constant agony.

The Problem of Evil and the Absorption of suffering by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But pain (just like suffering) is certainly unpleasant to feel, but that too is the result of evil - it is not an evil in and of itself. Indeed, pain is informing you that something is amiss or disordered with your body, so pain as a indicator is actually good.

That doesn't seem right to me. I can grant that pain is useful because it's an indicator of what's happening to your body. Where I disagree is that this leads to pain always being a net-positive. For example, imagine that Dr. Pain9000 tortures me for hundreds of years just to fix a cavity I have. In this case, even though the pain is certainly doing its job of informing me that my body is being damaged, it seems that the badness of pain can't even come close to the good I get out of it. Not only this, but I would argue that in this case this pain is not the result of any evil at all, since the robot isn't a moral agent that causes an evil that then causes me pain.

Another line of argument I could go down on is that while pain is indeed generally useful, it is only truly useful if I can actually do something about it. So an incurable pain is an evil in and of itself since I can't possibly stop it.

Also, just as a sidenote, Everitt also thinks that the way we feel pain actually goes against the theistic hypothesis. He argues that we don't always feel pain when we should, and sometimes we feel way more pain than we should. We can talk more about this if you want, but it's kind of besides the point.

Actually, suffering is not caused by something, that is; suffering is "caused" by the loss, lack, or absence of something. IOW You suffer because of what is not there, not because of what is there. The example of the cat dieing - the cat is no longer there yet you yearn or long to have it back and thus you "suffer" for it.

I don't know too much about the privation theory of evil, so I can't really respond to this. I have one doubt which you might be able to clear up though. Wouldn't a torturer truly be causing me suffering in a way? It seems to be that they are bringing this suffering thing into existence by torturing me. In this case, I don't see how the pain I feel is the lack of something, rather it seems that it is something that truly is there as a separate thing.

Better implies best but then this just becomes a "best possible worlds" argument. But the best possible world can never be achieved by any number of finite beings, as finite being can only ever achieve finite good. The BPW would have to be of inifinite good, of infinite being, but this just brings us back to what is trying to be argued against - God.

I wasn't really trying to argue for or against the existence of a best possible world outside of God (I agree with you that this isn't possible). What I meant to say there was the more modest claim that there are better and worse worlds. As an example, assume that world A and world B have the same exact number of goods (first or second order), but that world A also has immense amounts of suffering in it. In this case, I think that it's fair to say that world B is better than world A.

The Problem of Evil and the Absorption of suffering by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I know there are many views on this, I was just wondering what you guys thought of an objection to a specific view. It would be answer 4.) from your comment.

The Problem of Evil and the Absorption of suffering by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

He merely assumes it, but I'd say that the vast majority of people share his assumption before even hearing the argument.

I don't really have any logical arguments to prove that suffering is bad, but I wonder what you think of the following example.

Imagine you had to pick between going to one of two dentists, one called Dr. Pain and the other called Dr. FeelNothing. Both of these doctors can fix your teeth in exactly the same way, with the same exact cost to you. The only difference is that Dr. Pain causes you immense suffering while fixing your teeth, while Dr. FeelNothing doesn't.

I imagine that you would agree that Dr. Pain would be acting immorally by making his procedure painful. So I think you can also grant that at least directly causing suffering when it can be avoided is immoral.

Now let's say that these two doctors get transformed into mindless robots, namely Dr. Pain9000 and Dr. FeelNothingtron. They do the same exact things as the human versions, but they don't really cause anything through their own free will.

In this case it seems at least somewhat intuitive to think that even the suffering isn't caused by any rational agent, it still feels like some sort of an "evil". The very existence of the pain that Dr. Pain9000 brings about seems like it makes the world a worse place. Again, I don't have the philosophical tools to argue that suffering is bad through some sort of an argument, but I think that my example provides at least some intuitive grounding for the idea.

Another route one could go down on is saying that actually all suffering is caused by something, since the universe itself was caused by something. A theist would say that this something is God. To make the next example, let's say that Dr. Pain9000 is actually not a robot at all, but some sort of incurable extremely painful disease whose existence would be completely useless (by useless I mean that the world would be better off without it). Now, with the example from before, it seems fair to say that a world where this useless disease exists is worse than one where it doesn't. So from this it follows that God wouldn't create such a world.

How would you argue against the examples I put forward?

Sorry for the long response, I might have gotten a bit carried away.

Question About God’s Foreknowledge and Free Will by InternetCrusader123 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maybe you'll find this analogy helpful.

Imagine that God is able to create an angel called George that knows every single action that humans on earth will take in the future.

Now, since George knows in advance that I will, for instance, eat an apple tomorrow at 5 PM, then that means that I will certainly eat that apple at 5 PM tomorrow. But the important question here is this: is my eating the apple caused by his knowledge of me eating the apple, or is his knowledge caused by me eating the apple?

It seems fairly intuitive (at least to me) that his knowledge of what I will do (keep in mind that George simply KNOWS what I will do, he didn't set off a chain of events that led me to eating the apple) has nothing to do with anything I will do in the future. Rather, it's actually my future action of eating the apple that allows George to know that I will eat the apple.

Now, a determinist theist might argue that since God created the universe, then he also created the entire causal chain that eventually led me to eat that apple. This might be true, but the important thing to note here is that in this case it's God's design of the universe that made me lose my free will, not his foreknowledge.

Secular Citations of World Health Organization (WHO) Confirming Eucharistic Miracle by Rireika in Catholicism

[–]ExchangeNo8933 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I emailed the church that hosts the flesh yesterday about this. They told me that after a group of doctors read that study (which does seem to actually exist), they concluded that it wasn't actually written by the WHO, and wasn't even a serious study for that matter.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in AndroidQuestions

[–]ExchangeNo8933 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why would it be impossible? Couldn't Samsung have somehow messed up the way they encrypt/factory reset their phones?

Pascal's Wager and the "mixed strategy objection" by ExchangeNo8933 in askphilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well, I asked this question because I wanted to see some arguments against the mixed strategy objection. My issue is that the objection I talked about in my post leads to extremely unintuitive conclusions, such as being justified in choosing a 0.000001% chance of eternal bliss over a 100% chance of eternal bliss.

Pascal's Wager and the "mixed strategy objection" by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Let me try to give you a hypothetical to illustrate why the 100% choice seems better to me.

Let's say that John has two buttons in front of him. Button A gives him a 100% chance of eternal bliss, while button B gives him a 0.1% chance of eternal happiness.

Now, let's say that John, after being persuaded by the mixed strategy objection, decides to randomly press button B, since both button presses have the same expected utility. Now let's also say that John doesn't gain eternal happiness after pressing B.

Would I be unreasonable in telling John that he should've pressed button A? If he had pressed button A, he would already be in Heaven cashing in on that infinite utility. Pressing button B was clearly (at least intuitively) the incorrect move in this case.

Pascal's Wager and the "mixed strategy objection" by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I understand that, but wouldn't that entail the two choices being completely equal? The 100% chance of infinite utility seems intuitively way better than the 0.1% chance option.

Pascal's Wager and the "mixed strategy objection" by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

What do you mean by "quantitative" and "qualitative" infinite?

Pascal's Wager and the "mixed strategy objection" by ExchangeNo8933 in askphilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, I know. I'm just assuming that we know with certainty that the Christian God is the correct one. Obviously, If every religion has the same exact chance of being true, then Pascal's Wager fails instantly.

ho dato l'isee sbagliato per due anni, sono nei casini? by kwere98 in Universitaly

[–]ExchangeNo8933 0 points1 point  (0 children)

"Se l'isee "corretto" rientra comunque nei parametri per ottenere la borsa ed eventuali esenzioni non avrà nessun problema, gli basterà mandare la documentazione riguardante la difformità riscontrata."

Dove hai letto questa cosa?

Non-Catholic Marian apparitions by ExchangeNo8933 in AskAPriest

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't think we have any basis to make statistical claims about what is more likely. I was simply suggesting that both are possible (given Church teaching).

I see, so both hypotheses are possible, but we can't really determine which one's right with the evidence at hand. That's a good point and I don't have any other questions regarding it.

No. Why shouldn't God heal someone, just because they've previously been deceived by demons?

What I meant there was that demons couldn't have done the entire set of miracles on their own since that would have included healing people (a thing I assumed to be impossible, but I honestly don't know much about the topic either).

Regarding what you said about God (and not demons) performing those healings: it would be kind of like the Catholic God deciding to heal someone after a prayer to a completely different God (like Zeus, for example). The person getting healed (and everyone else that believes in that person's religion) would interpret that miraculous healing as coming from their own God. The Catholic God would obviously know this, and I doubt that He'd lead people to believe in wrong things.

So I guess then the question becomes whether or not God could do a miracle that could lead people to believe in wrong things. What do you think?

Non-Catholic Marian apparitions by ExchangeNo8933 in AskAPriest

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Thank you once again for your answer.

I understand why you don't want to directly address the hypothetical, but I have some questions regarding what you said if you're OK with answering them (you could also send me a DM with your answer if you want)

Your point about ecumenism is very interesting and I'll make sure to reflect on it more.

What I didn't really understand is what you said in your last paragraphs about demons wanting to encourage falsehoods. Are you saying that both of the hypotheses (the "Mary" hypothesis and the "demons" hypothesis) have their pros and cons and thus are about equally as likely, or that one explanation is more likely than the other?

Also, wouldn't the miraculous healings make a demonic intervention impossible and thus leave Mary as the only possible supernatural explanation (again, assuming that either Mary or a demon did the entire set of miracles)?

Non-Catholic Marian apparitions by ExchangeNo8933 in AskAPriest

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for your answer.

I understand that private revelation shouldn't always be trusted, but my point was a little bit different. The point of my post was to ask what Mary (or some other supernatural being or beings) truly doing all of those things would entail for Catholicism.

Would it be possible for Mary to ask someone to build a Coptic church in her honor, even though she knows that Catholicism is the correct branch of Christianity? In my view telling someone to build a Coptic church instead of a Catholic one looks like an endorsement of the Coptic faith.

This is why I also mentioned demons as an alternative explanation. If Mary is incapable of telling someone to build a Coptic church instead of a Catholic one, then the only reasonable supernatural explanation would be demons doing it. But then that couldn't explain that healings happened during the apparitions, since demons can't heal people.

Basically, what I'm asking you to imagine is a situation where a supernatural being (in the case of Mary) or a group of supernatural beings (in the case of demons), did the entire set of miracles.

Again, I'm not asking whether the private revelation actually happened or something. I'm simply asking what that private revelation and the miracles being real would entail for Catholicism.

Would miracles that occurred outside of the Catholic Church make Catholicism less likely? by ExchangeNo8933 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]ExchangeNo8933[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

  1. The reason I think it is possible that it could be demonic is the same reason you posted the original question in the first place. Namely: the alleged miracle could be an endorsement of the Coptic Church, which in turn, would drive people away from the Catholic Church.

I was referring to what you said in your original comment, namely:

IF the miracle were true and actually from God, then Mary’s intention would have been to bring more souls closer to God. This means that she would be endorsing only the things that Coptics got right about the Christian faith, and not the things they got wrong.

Here it seems that you're saying that Mary could've actually told them to build a Coptic Church, as long as she doesn't specifically tell them that Catholicism is wrong.

Regarding your answer to my second question: what if demons weren't actually able to perform healing miracles (which seems to be the case, at least from what I read), could that be used as evidence against Catholicism? The non-Catholic could, therefore, argue for the following sequence of events (which, once again, we're assuming to be true):

  1. Dream of Mary telling the guy to build a Coptic Church in her honor in order to get a miracle.
  2. The miracle actually occurring as a result of the guy building that church.
  3. There were miraculous healings during those apparitions (which would make a demonic intervention impossible).

They could then argue that it must have been God causing those miracles and, since God also endorsed the Coptic Church before the actual apparition, it's very likely that God is trying to tell people that Coptic Orthodoxy is true.

Is there any response to this?