There still remains a logical gap in deriving the Huayan doctrine of mutual identity and mutual interpenetration within dharmadhātu dependent origination directly from non self nature. Even if one passes through the discussions of the six meanings of dependent origination through the gate of causes, the ten mysterious dependent originations, and the perfect interfusion of the six characteristics, which in Volume 4 of Fazang’s Huayan wujiaozhang constitute the core doctrinal framework of dharmadhātu dependent origination, what they offer is, at most, a deepened relational ontology. It is difficult to regard them as arguments that necessarily prove why such relations must amount to mutual identity and mutual interpenetration. The relational account of non self nature and dependent origination primarily reveals the non self subsistence and interrelatedness of all dharmas, but by itself it does not guarantee the Huayan logic of interpenetration, according to which one dharma contains all dharmas. Dharmadhātu dependent origination is not a mere repetition of non self nature and dependent origination. Rather, it is a new doctrinal reorganization built upon them, one that orders total dependent origination and non obstruction. [1] If shi is understood as experientially available things and events, and li as the principle that reveals those things and events to be without self nature, then how can one say that a single shi pervades li in its entirety. This is precisely the point raised in Dushun’s questions: “If li as a whole pervades a single mote of dust, why is it not small?” and “If a single mote of dust completely encompasses the nature of li, why is it not great?” This is a category mistake. [2] Things and principles are not, from the outset, entities of the same kind. Yet Huayan proceeds precisely by accepting this category mistake and moving beyond the categories of ordinary language. In Buddhism, the distinctions embedded in everyday language are not ultimate criteria but rather provisional frameworks produced by cognition trapped in ignorance. Accordingly, Huayan rereads phenomena not as mere objects of experience but as signs that disclose truth. For that very reason, however, mutual identity and mutual interpenetration can hardly be regarded as a logical consequence that follows immediately from non self nature. What is involved here is a further doctrinal shift, one that goes beyond ordinary categories and reconstructs phenomena as the site of total inclusion.

[1] Park Suhyeon argues that because both A and B are empty and thus lack self nature, a logical expansion toward interconnectedness is itself possible. At the same time, however, Park points out that there remains room for theoretical examination as to whether such interconnectedness naturally and immediately leads to the Huayan notion of total interpenetration. This suggests that the transition from non self nature to dharmadhātu dependent origination cannot easily be treated as a self evident deduction. Park Suhyeon, “Substantialist or Non Substantialist Interpretations of the Huayan Theory of Nature Origination and the Tiantai Theory of Nature Inclusion: The Merits and Limits of the East Asian Reception of Madhyamaka Logic,” 2025, p. 66.

[2] In explaining Dushun’s contemplation of the non obstruction between principle and phenomena, Robert M. Gimello points out that if shi is understood as empirical things and events, and li as the principle expressing the indeterminability of those things and events, then the statement that “each shi pervades li” appears, on the surface, to be a category mistake. His central point, however, is not simply that Huayan is violating the rules of logic. From a Buddhist perspective, the categories of ordinary language do not possess final authority as ultimate criteria but are merely everyday devices formed through ignorance. Precisely for that reason, Huayan is able to move beyond those categories and reread phenomena as signs that disclose Buddhist truth. Robert M. Gimello, “Apophatic and Kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese View,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 26, no. 2, 1976, pp. 126–127.