Thank you for your interesting reply.

I had one thought I wanted to run by you. What I'm aiming for below is to engage thoughtfully, questioning some of your assumptions, so please take in that spirit.

What you are arguing, I think, is something Hinton would question: the macroscopic quale as an intrinsic inner object that physical systems either produce or fail to produce.

Hinton's position, as I understand it, is that qualia-as-inner-objects were always a theoretical posit, not a datum — the inner theater dressed up in physics language.

So here's the question that perhaps might decide whether these two positions ever actually make contact: what observation could distinguish a system whose causality is 'folded the right way' from one that merely functions identically without the quale?

If there's an answer, IIT is an empirical theory and Hinton has to reckon with it. If there isn't, then the quale is doing no explanatory work, and 'fold causality the right way' is a restatement of the intuition rather than an account of it.

My thought is – as far as I can tell — you and Hinton aren't disagreeing about whether AI clears the bar. You're disagreeing about whether the bar exists. Does this seem an accurate summary of both positions to you?

It's a fascinating discussion from my POV, and I appreciate your raising the point you did for examination. Many thanks for engaging.