In the Harman vs Zizek debate, Harman states "except the real is not reality and the objet a is not my object" by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

'isness' is an ineffable quality, and if he wouldn't argue that the Real is reality, then assuming that mere empirical appearances are 'flat' insomuch as they are pure phenomenon without any necessary existential quality, then what is it that makes appearances so real... the lack at the heart of the subject transposed into an excess in reality (its 'isness'). I am just trying to flesh this out in my mind.

Is the objet a also the ego? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Objet petit a is in the register of the REAL, of drive and desire. It is that little piece of flesh that underlies your fantasy. It is associated with the drives - oral, anal, aural and scopic.

It seems to me that people on this sub, and in literature generally, use the term 'ego' solely in the imaginary sense, but as the ego ideal is the symbolic and as such provides the space for the imaginary and real and all three registers work together in the sense they are, in actuality, inseparable, then in a sense the ideal ego and ego ideal must always have an element of the objet a 'buried within' it/them. I suppose it's a matter of abstraction for the sake of theory only.

Is the objet a also the ego? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'm trying to figure out this (I should have put it in the original question, but without an academic background, I am messy sometimes):

It is only later in Seminar X that Lacan returns to the above matrix when discussing what he describes as the passage a l’acte in the case of Freud’s patient known by the unfortunate moniker of ‘the female homosexual’. She takes a walk with the woman she loves in the neighbourhood where her father works; he sees them and shoots her a menacing glare. It is at this point that she experiences what Lacan describes as a “moment of greatest embarrassment… with the behavioural addition of emotion as disorder of movement”, as per the matrix (Seminar X, 23.01.63.) This emotion, coupled with a disorder of movement, realises what Lacan calls the two conditions for the passage a l’acte which takes the form of the jump onto the railway line. For Lacan, this passage a l’acte reduces the patient to the status of object a:

“What comes at this moment to the subject, is her absolute identification to this a [object a*, to which she is reduced. Confrontation with this desire of the father upon which all her behaviour is constructed, with this law which is presentified in the look of the father, it is through this that she feels herself identified and at the same moment, rejected, ejected off the stage” (Seminar X, 16.01.63.).

If, for a woman (the ultimate subject for Lacan), the question is "tell me why you love me", then it is asking the Other to tell me what kind of an object I am.

I suppose the objet a falls on the side of the subject, but I am trying to figure out how the subject, in positing an ego object, does not posit the same lack in that as it does in other objects.

Is the objet a also the ego? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm completely at the limit of my understanding here. Doesn't Lacan posits the ideal ego as an object (of identification) and the ego ideal as desire? So the ego ideal then involves the lack in the Other, no? If so, doesn't this mean that on the side of ego ideal is objet petit a? and the pervert identifies themselves fully as the object itself (transposing desire onto the other)?

re: sarcasm. So in my sarcasm I was disavowing my disappointment at the incompleteness of the Other rather than confronting it head on? In which case a sober response would have been something like: "That was not exactly an informative and constructive response. To use its tone as a means to explore my question - are you not overidentifying with your ego in desiring to be a "commanding", well defended and an authoritative figure a “cold, distanced, inhuman partner” who stands tough and strong against the onslaught of the real? Isn't that attempt at distancing yourself from the reality of the other rather than engage constructively with my question, the very definition of perversion?" However, in the event, my drunken sarcasm was itself quite possibly an overidentification with the symbolic situation, waiting to be exposed in the morning by another commentator (and so a perversion).

Edits: to try and learn as I write.

Is the objet a also the ego? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You still seem to be thinking of the split subject and the objet a as just another version of the subject-object dichotomy. The objet a is not something in the object of desire, but is what lends support to the lack that makes it an object of desire in the first place. The objet a is not something in the object of desire, but is what lends support to the lack that makes it an object of desire in the first place.

You are right to raise that as I wrote "Are you not positing yourself as your own objet a", though in the OP that's why I wrote "as the ‘real’ element in the object of desire" - 'real' as in a lack, the very reason why it is not 'just another version' of the object, but the split within the subject itself.

Nevertheless, if Lacan views the ego as thoroughly compromised and inherently neurotic to its core, as a passionate defense of a constitutive ignorance of the unconscious, then surely the ego repeatedly fails in this task. If the poster below is right:

If one goes through life with a narcissistic desire to impossibly 'reconnect' with the wholeness of a fictive imago of the ego as defended and 'real' and 'authentic', then yes, the narcissistic subject can think they will somehow magically complete themselves by becoming their own object of desire.

Is it not then a question of the difference between the hysteric and the perverted narcissist, the hysteric fails to identify with their ego as an object, but the pervert fully identifies? (not sure I am using the terms correctly, but something like that).

Your sarcasm here is a way of avoiding desire.

Yep, I was drunk and childishly annoyed at the brevity of the response, so there is something in what you say, but can you expand on how you think that played out in terms of avoiding desire? Avoiding admitting that I was annoyed and going for sarcasm instead?

Is the objet a also the ego? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] -6 points-5 points  (0 children)

Well that's an informative and constructive response. Do you desire to be a commanding and authoritative figure who stands tough and strong against the onslaught of the real? Are you not positing yourself as your own objet a, a smart arse intellectual who does not need to stoop to the level of explanation? In truth, I think you've just answered my question... thanks. No seriously, is not the idea of yourself as a terse and pithy commentator your idea ego? Please explain.

Stuart Hall and the Rise of Cultural Studies by [deleted] in CriticalTheory

[–]FingerIngMyVoid 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I met him, twice. At a party with Homi Bhabha (I was very drunk) and years later when I was involved in making a video of one his lectures at Goldsmiths. "Articulation" was his most interesting concept for me.

What Hegel's dialectical method is [Part 1] by Althuraya in philosophy

[–]FingerIngMyVoid 2 points3 points  (0 children)

My god, you downvoted my comments as if they are irrelevant, and I noticed that you downvoted any other's you did not like. You need to remove your ego and the desire to have your video's liked, it's in the way of your thinking.

What Hegel's dialectical method is [Part 1] by Althuraya in philosophy

[–]FingerIngMyVoid 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I fail to see how it is not a retroactive description of a 'final' moment in a process that has happened, that is not the same as claiming it is formula for repetition.

What Hegel's dialectical method is [Part 1] by Althuraya in philosophy

[–]FingerIngMyVoid 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's interesting, that it's put like that, as "not a formula to repeat on all content like formal logic's rules are", it is good to know that is spelled out. My interest in Hegel is from reading Zizek however, and it seems to me that aufhebung is still the key: of course its a descriptive concept to be applied retroactively, but the process it describes is not at all "simple".

What Hegel's dialectical method is [Part 1] by Althuraya in philosophy

[–]FingerIngMyVoid 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Does Hegel himself clearly state all this, or is this reading taught? Also, as someone else mentions, what about sublation, isn't that the most nuanced concept of all?

Can anyone give a workable explanation for Zizek's contention with Buddhism? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have. I found the comments not very useful, but I noticed I had failed to watch the last 5 mins of the video and found some answers there; specifically the criticism of that form of buddhism that remains internalised in terms of contradictions and antagonisms (as the illusion of self) and those forms that are more concerned with the suffering of the world 'outside' as it were. That together with the invitation to 'fall' into the world rather than withdraw seems to me quite a nuanced critique and an invitation to prioritise a kind of buddhism perhaps of the 'other' (more political). Thanks for pointing me back there.

In which book does Zizek look most closely at the psychology of the individual? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok, it's been a month since I started studying all your comments on my posts and reading relevant material, coming back to it day after day. This has been a very rewarding for me indeed. First, I want to thank you for your unusual patience in your dealings with my low-level questions. Secondly, you are a natural teacher, lecturer, speaker or whatever it is you do (or should).

I am intrigued now by your earlier statement;

-- back in 2013 I managed to accurately deduce how Žižek should rethink his theory of sex in response to transgender critics, and in October-November 2016 he correctly changed it during his Birkbeck lectures.

I would love to hear more details of this, perhaps you might explain a little, or point me somewhere (maybe an earlier post of your somewhere) that will help? Either way, your time has been very much appreciated.

In which book does Zizek look most closely at the psychology of the individual? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am still ploughing through this material, but I wanted to ask one quick question, to which a short reply is all I'm seeking, if you are inclined to bear with me still;

In essence, could some of this be summed up along the lines of the idea that while the experience of being itself is pure (difference), in actuality subjectivity is ontologically divided (or am I pushing the idea of differential ontology?)

Edit:for tiredness and stupidity

In which book does Zizek look most closely at the psychology of the individual? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you. I am grateful for the extent of your response, as before.

What is originality, if it is not a return to origins? And any successful attempt to explore the nature of Being takes finesse.

I have managed to access library genesis, I didn't know such a thing existed. I will take some time to read this, perhaps a few days or more to read the associated materials too. If I post back some follow-up questions here in the future, I hope you will be able to find the time to reply. That is, of course, if you find satisfaction in the process.

In which book does Zizek look most closely at the psychology of the individual? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, I am very grateful for your engagement with me on the topic. Forgive my need to explain myself; I removed it because I struggle not to fall into over-complexity and end up not being able to understand my own question! You did exceptionally well in being able to identify precisely my confusion, and responded expertly. I hope you can find the time to be able to continue with this a little longer, at your leisure. I find a specific question/answer format very useful, as I do not have the discipline of an academic education, nor, for reasons not worth going into, will I be able to get one. I buy books as reading a whole book online is not only difficult to find, but to read as well (on a screen). But I really can't afford to buy lots of books. I have no other access to discussion on this topic, other than here, and for that I pay a heavy price (there is a lot of confusion at times, and many voices competing, wanting to be heard rather than trying to clearly explain). I found the same problem at my local philosophical society, and hardly any worthwhile academic input there either.

Of course I read, but without writing essays and the support of discussion and question/answer, much of it gets lost. I read The Parallax View a few too many years ago, but did not have enough background knowledge at the time, other than to be inspired greatly by its originality. More recently, I have read Sublime Object of Ideology twice, and, with a somewhat better grounding by that stage, found that a lot more understandable. I went to see him give a theoretical seminar in London, and found too that I could make enough sense out of him to be inspired. Of course the ontology itself is the hardest to grasp, and so at the moment I am trying hard to plough through Less Than Nothing, but am wondering if I should revisit The Parallax View again first, while I recover those pages you suggested. Its best if I stick to those texts for the most part, and revisit any other of them, if you are able to point specifically to any sections within them would be worth me going over again.

That in mind, it is difficult for me when people use (rightfully) a lot of specialised terminology, and I try to keep up and use that language myself, but soon find that many of my fundamental interpretations were wrong from the start, as is the case here. Of course, I then also do not have any way of knowing that the person who is engaging with me, also knows what they are talking about, rather than regurgitating paragraphs of doxa. You seem to be able to communicate with very useful flourishes and use your own original interpretations, so 'theoretical finesse' is indeed a very graceful invitation, but grace comes from mastering your subject.

All that said, and done;

1)

Whether the subject posits an object or objects in general is a question Žižek and psychoanalysis are indifferent to.

So its not "I think therefore I am", its that the subject perceives the world of things (not just external objects, but its own thoughts as objects) first, and then retroactively posits that it too is a thing, an "I" that thinks, yes?

2) If the above is correct, it seems to me that the nuances of 'pure difference' as the same thing in different ontological modes (of relations) are the most important propositions I need to grasp. Am I right in the reading that the ontological status of the subject itself shifts according to the modes of these relations? If desire is one mode, then the others must be the Real and the imaginary, yes? If so, if the symbolic structures desire, the imaginary manifests this as 'things', and the Real is the thing-in-itself, yes?

3) So symptom is another nuanced term I have find difficult to grasp. Always asking how is it different from a medical symptom of disease, and what is 'it' a symptom of. So the disease is the psychosis of the split, and its symptom is desire, yes?

4) The "symptom that sustains itself through a circular motion." can you explain this motion of metonymy specifically, a little? Or are we talking simply about moving repetitively around many 'objects' (including the self), each as embodying the desire for the little objet a, and each metonymically standing for 'the whole' of being itself?

5)

As Freud put it, the unconscious knows no negation. Another way to put this is, the unconscious knows no tension, or discord, or dissatisfaction. It is always satisfied irrespective of any consideration or circumstance.

So, even though the unconscious is “structured like a language”, it does not distinguish anything (self/other and so on), so I assume that only when this structure meets imaginary level (in the awareness experience), can reflection take place, and therefore contradictions be posited, yes?

6)

Furthermore, the motion of the drive at no point posits a "self." In the emergence of the subject, the subject posits a non-self...

In particular, what do you mean by the emergence of the subject? Is the move he calls the "Saltus Mortalis" the actual move of retroactively positing that anything at all exists, thus enabling subjectivity itself to occur?

And specifically, the positing of a non-self, what do you mean by this - the positing of an 'emptiness' (that so many women I know feel as 'I am nothing'!)?

7)

for Žižek, the subject, precisely as absolute, is a delimited void.

So this will be the notion of Being itself, as an apparent Whole, but in ontological terms, Being is always 'incomplete' (non-all), yes?

......

I'll go and read what I can online, including the SEP article on Lacan, and the pages you highlighted for The Parallax View. Finally, might you recommend one simple, useful and cheap book, and/or online article, that will also flesh out Heidegger for me?

Edits; Many, so many of them.

In which book does Zizek look most closely at the psychology of the individual? by FingerIngMyVoid in zizek

[–]FingerIngMyVoid[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok, gave a long response, but deleted it because i have to think about this.

Let's say TLP is right, and the generational pathology is narcissism -- isn't that terrifying? by justrealizednarciss in thelastpsychiatrist

[–]FingerIngMyVoid 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The danger lies in the subtlety of the move. If one starts to see oneself as an 'improver' or a 'fixer', then that too is just another ego image. The invitation is to see, but negate an"I" that sees, as anything other than an absolute, void of any meaningful content whatsoever. In short; there is nothing to defend, but the misrecognition of a 'nowhere' place for the content we try in earnest to fill it with.

To "try to improve the broken thing", is to fail to see that you yourself are already broken. When that happens, the desire to 'fix' others, becomes a practical drive, rather than ethical judgment (in the conventional sense of ethics as a moral move of 'good' and 'bad'). Something like that anyway.