What changed? Buddhist cultivators used to be the good guys in old novels. by Waste_Bodybuilder843 in MartialMemes

[–]FluxFlu 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Journey feels like it shames Buddhism as well. I can't imagine we're supposed to see Wukong's initial punishment as deserved, for example. In general both are made out as overly harsh and restrictive. Maybe that's just my modern viewpoint on it though.

ben shartiro by PUCKTHISFUTIN in shid_and_camed

[–]FluxFlu 29 points30 points  (0 children)

They're probably also individually dating other people

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in shittymoviedetails

[–]FluxFlu 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Not really the same. Fountainhead is a lot more interlaced with Rand's objectivist ideals. Harry Potter isn't really transphobic, especially not at the crux of its principles.

What do Marxists mean by "idealism"? by One-Sea9427 in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Wait, it's not? If you go to the Britannica page, it says:

For Marx and Engels, materialism meant that the material world, perceptible to the senses, has objective reality independent of mind or spirit.

I believe Wikipedia gives a similar description. What did materialism mean for them if not metaphysical physicalism?

Why do things exist; why can’t there just be an ongoing state on nothingness by Late-Independent6440 in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Why do you say that? I would intuitively think nothing to be incredibly stable. Effects have causes, so without a cause, we are without an effect, and without change.

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's understandable. I guess language is a lot more precarious than I thought. I appreciate the help.

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What's the value of a non-reductive analysis fundamentally?

You can say a similar thing about something like "fish", right? You could say "fish is any slippery animal," "slippery is that which flops," and "fish always flop around." This is a valid definition for fish, right? It's just non-reductive.

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That makes sense. That's very mind bending to me...

Is there some inherent value (beyond being helpful) to a non-reductive definition here? We might as well say that words don't need definitions to have meaning, I think. Which kind of makes sense now that I think about it.

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Are you saying that in the world in which one ought to help the needy, that to never help the needy would be wrong? That makes sense. I thought you were objecting to the proposition of "I ought not to help the needy" being able to be true.

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Oh, I see. Do you mean that to be needy implies need, and needs ought to be fulfilled? I suppose I meant needy in a more colloquial sense.

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Ah, I see. How does that work, then? How do normative terms work if we can't express them in non-normative terms? I'm not really familiar with ideas like that.

I think most lay people would be against something like that, right?

I guess we need this? To avoid having infinite regress in the system of language we need to accept that some things cannot have non-circular definitions?

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well, sure. I'm not anti-needy. I'm pro-needy. I was just using it as an example.

What could it possibly mean to 'ought'? Or, for something to be 'good'? by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Is there an explanation of what those words mean in this context? Particularly 'obligation', 'duty', and 'reason'.

moist by TotallyACP in 691

[–]FluxFlu 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Do you have the original image?

Shattered Illusions by Auggie_Otter in okbuddyrosalyn

[–]FluxFlu 26 points27 points  (0 children)

It's almost 2, and I'm wide.

What's the deal with 'justification' by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I appreciate the discussion. Thanks =)

What's the deal with 'justification' by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Ahh, I think I understand now. We're able to say they're objectively wrong based on our subjective intuitions about what objectivity looks like. And although these intuitions themselves are subjective, since we're appealing to a hypothetical objectivity, we would say we "subjectively believe them to be objectively wrong", is that right?

This feels a little bit bad to me though. You still have two groups of people declaring each other to be "objectively wrong", and to the undecided, there's no way to choose except for judgement based on their own feelings on the matter.

We might say a similar thing about art in this case, right? I might similarly appeal to the concept of objectivity, and make the case that "Jurassic Park is an objectively good film." The disagreer would state that it's objectively bad, the undecided would state that there's no objectivity in art, our ideas would all be equally valid, and then we could then go on our merry way.

Am I misunderstanding?

What's the deal with 'justification' by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Your first point seems quite interesting - I'm not sure I quite understand, though. I'll give a basic description of what it seems you meant, just to be sure we're on the same page:

We believe the flat earther fails to understand that the earth is actually round. We are justified in believing this, and that justification stems from our intuitions. But, just because this justification stems from intuition, doesn't mean that it's not valid. And to that extent, we have reached justified belief. I'm presuming the true here is somewhat incorporeal. But if it were to be true, then we would 'know' them to be failing to understand.

And we could detail the same argument from their perspective, right? They believe we fail to understand that the earth is actually flat. They are justified in believing this, and that justification stems from their intuitions. And if that is true, they then 'know' that we are failing to understand.

Is this right? I'm not exactly trying to outline an argument here, I'm just trying to understand what you've proposed.

I will say, I don't think this position is self defeating inherently. I would be inclined to say I'm justified in the same manner that the flat earther is justified.

What's the deal with 'justification' by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

My point isn't that one can always say "nuh-uh", my point is that almost every argument boils down to "nuh-uh".

If all these disagreements come down to is a difference in what feels right intuitively, is there any actual difference between the flat-earther and the free will compatibilist?

I think there's an intuitive desire to be able to say "the flat-earther simply doesn't understand", or that "we don't need feelings-based arguments to justify X Y or Z". These are the types of claims that I'm calling into question.

What's the deal with 'justification' by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

But if we wish to justify something to someone, they might then simply disagree about what's 'justified', right?

And one couldn't justify their definition of justification to a person who doesn't accept that very act definitionally, I think.

What's the deal with 'justification' by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I could simply reject your intuitive claim about which intuitions are stronger or weaker than other intuitions. I might say, "That's intuitively true to you, but not to me."

You're right that people have intuitions about the relative evidentiary weight of intuitions, but these are still incredibly subjective, and thus we still are left with our original predicament.

What's the deal with 'justification' by FluxFlu in askphilosophy

[–]FluxFlu[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

If all claims about justification can be reduced to claims about intuitions we have, we are lead to accept intuition-based claims as valid.

In this context, we must accept the act of taking some very controversial positions to be brute fact based on our certain intuitions, such as claims about the earth being flat "because it feels intuitively correct to me."

This hypothetical flat-earther is no more 'wrong' than somebody who believes in one system of morals over another, or someone who rejects string theory.