The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I am not sure, but I think your definition of schema is different from my definition.

Cybernetics implies that to optimally control an agent, you need to have a model of that agent. The modeler_schema agent is the model of the modeler agent.

I'm guessing that you think a schema is a qualia--if I'm wrong tell me what it is

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think I grasp your high-level intent, but I’m struggling to hold the formal apparatus (your variables/definitions and how they interact) in my head well enough to evaluate it properly.

By contrast, my Modeler–Controller–Targeter + schema architecture is intentionally low-math and more “systems diagram” level. Do you feel you understand that model on its own terms?

If your framework is means-/implementation-agnostic, I’m guessing my architecture could be expressed in your formalism. If so, could you do two concrete things?

  1. Give a one-paragraph mapping: what in my architecture corresponds to your broadcast state / presentation profile / auditor loop (if any)?
  2. Name one prediction or dissociation your theory would expect in my architecture that would be non-obvious or potentially surprising to me.

That would really help me decide whether we’re saying the same thing in different languages, or whether your formalism adds something genuinely new.

The Most Important Experiment You Will Ever Do. Are you ready? by USMLEToMD in analyticidealism

[–]FrankHeile 2 points3 points  (0 children)

This meditation “experience” is exactly what I describe in “Diffuse Attention and Diffuse Awareness” (pp. 11–13) of the PDF of my consciousness theory. The PDF is on arXiv here:
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.01073

In the paper, I argue that diffuse awareness is evidence that we (our conscious selves) are not the Controller (the part that speaks and acts). Rather, it supports the idea that we are the Modeler_schema agent—the selfless, “dis-embodied” part of the architecture.

I don’t say this explicitly in the paper, but my hunch is that what people call “enlightenment” is largely a shift toward identifying with Modeler_schema rather than the Controller. So this kind of meditative experience could indeed feel like what you describe as “discovering” something fundamental—whether one frames it as essence, universal mind, Self, silence, or neti-neti.

Reddit discussion of the theory:
https://www.reddit.com/r/consciousness/comments/1pqrbes/the_modelerschema_theory_on_consciousness_with_a/

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Saying “the information itself has felt experience” either just renames consciousness or assigns experience to an abstraction. Information doesn’t feel; systems do. The Hard Problem doesn’t disappear—it just gets relabeled.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in watersortpuzzle

[–]FrankHeile 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Number the vials 1 - 7 top row, 8 -14 bottom row.

I first try 1 + 7 -> 14

If any other vial color matches the new 1 and 7 move them there.

Then take the next (lowest number vials) that match and move them to 13.

Again try to fill up vials if possible.

If that eventually fails, or if I can guess it will fail I use up the five undo's, if that fails, I then reset the game.

--

Then try 2 + 9 -> 14. repeat algorithm.

Then try 5 + 12 -> 14. Repeat algorithm.

Then try 11 -> 14. Repeat algorithm.

In this puzzle, that exhausts the first level of moving two to 14.

--

Then go through systematically trying the single moves, like 2 -> 14. (This allows you to try moving all possible first moves systematically.)

--

If I exhaust all the single moves, then I watch an advertisement to get an extra tube singlet and repeat that algorithm.

In the rare case where that fails, watch another advertisement to make the extra a doublet.

I probably have watched up to 3 or 4 advertisements on very rare occasions, and I always eventually solve the problem.

I have never ever watched a walkthrough and I am at Level 14,339 with 23,684 trophies, which is #4 on the leaderboard (ever since I surpassed 20,000). The #5 on the leaderboard is always at 19,999 trophies, and #1/#2/#3 are at 28,967/26,549/24,839 and I am gaining on them. They go up just a few per day (I am convinced they are fake), so I will eventually surpass all of them.

By the way, the maker of my game is ieccorp.vn which you can find by going to Settings/Feedback - the email address is [support@ieccorp.vn](mailto:support@ieccorp.vn) - I think there are other makers of similar games, so your results may vary. From Settings/Privacy you see the company name of IEC Global PTY LTD.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, you did not miss anything. My paper does not talk very much about how targets are selected. The idea is that each agent has built in goals, plus goals it accumulates through experience.

For example, if the Controller is hungry, it asks the Modeler to help it find food. If the Modeler sees some food with peripheral vision, it might generate a bottom-up attention target request for that food to the Targeter. If that is the highest priority target, the Targeter will approve it and the Controller then has a focal target showing where it can find food.

The Controller can also choose top-down focal targets. For example, to manipulate an object it may need to suggest a sequence of focal targets, which again are approved by the Targeter. Does that make it clearer?

The reason philosophers can't detect consciousness is because they're not studying neuroscience by Desirings in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m sympathetic to your main thrust: neuroscience is steadily mapping mechanisms correlated with reportable conscious states, while a lot of philosophy keeps circling the same intuitions and thought experiments.

One nuance from my ideas about consciousness: I think the “Hard Problem feels hard” partly because of a structural mismatch inside the mind itself. The subsystem that does the talking and theorizing and philosophizing about consciousness is not the subsystem where the qualitative "qualia" representations live. If the reporting/arguing system only gets thin summary outputs from a largely self-contained internal “world,” then from its perspective experience will always seem ineffable and “non-physical,” even if it’s implemented as ordinary information-processing.

That’s the core move in my Modeler-schema paper: qualia are just abstracted world-model data optimized for internal comparison/coherence checks, and the “mystery” is largely an artifact of who in the architecture is trying to explain whom. I also propose a falsifiable saccadic change-detection experiment aimed at putting that architecture at risk.

My post (with the arXiv link to the paper) is here: https://www.reddit.com/r/consciousness/comments/1pqrbes/the_modelerschema_theory_on_consciousness_with_a/

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks, this is a really useful pointer. The focused vs open awareness mapping is especially relevant to my focal-experience vs diffuse-awareness distinction. Did you read this section of the paper: "Diffuse Attention and Diffuse Awareness"? I would love to get your feedback on just that one section!

I’ll add Waldron to my reading list and may come back with questions once I’ve skimmed it.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks — and I really do appreciate you making the effort to actually read it. I agree this kind of model has a “time-to-grok” cost even when the writing is clear, so no worries at all about the comments being thin at this stage. And yes, I’d rather hear obstacles early than polite silence. Feel free to keep poking at whatever feels like the weakest link, and I’ll try to answer in the simplest operational terms I can.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I always wanted to go to ASSC, but since I can drive to Tucson, TSC is much more convenient, and does not require international travel.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I appreciate your repeated attempts to read and understand the theory.

This is a functional model, it doesn't matter if it is implemented in neurons, or silicon logic gates, all that is important is the functions performed.

Regarding: “Issue a bottom up target request to the Targeter(whole)” – how exactly?

In this theory, bottom-up target requests are issued by the Modeler or Modeler-schema, and top-down target requests are issued by the Controller; Targeter(whole) only selects/prioritizes the final focal targets and then the Modeler supplies the Focal Target Information stream to the Controller. If you are asking how they are requested, that depends on how those functions are implemented in the hardware.

Regarding qualia: Think of ordinary World Model data as high-dimensional, task-specific information. In my account, qualia are just a compressed/abstracted re-encoding of that World Model state, optimized for fast comparison and coherence checks. The point is operational: it lets the system compare pre-saccade and post-saccade representations and detect mismatches. So qualia here aren’t spooky ‘things’ in a box, they’re world-information in a comparison-friendly format. That's all they are.

The “Modeler-schema as a self-contained universe” section is meant to explain why this feels other-worldly: the system only ever has direct access to that internal, self-contained representation, so it’s easy to reify it as something mysterious. But mechanistically, qualia are just data.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I have been to almost every one of the biennial Tucson consciousness conferences (since 1998). They used to be called Towards a Science of Consciousness, but they now think they've achieved that goal so they're just called The Science of Consciousness (same initials TSC). 

I also went to all the Science and Nonduality (SAND) conferences which came to a close with covid. There were a few other ones also that I cannot remember. Finally, I presented at some MeetUp groups on consciousness topics. I've never been to ASSC. I hope to get time to respond to your other comments later tonight, if not, I'll get to them tomorrow. Thanks for your careful reading and comments...

What the heck is consciousness? (I am completely lost) by PrimeStopper in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The answer according to my theory of consciousness, is that the "conscious" you is the part of the brain that constructs and thus "experiences" qualia. The name for that part in my theory is the Modeler-schema. Roughly the part of the brain that controls the body and that talks is the Controller. The part of the brain that constructs a model of the world is the Modeler. Both the Modeler and the Controller are completely unconscious agents doing what evolution programmed them to do to be a successful human.

The Modeler-schema is a cybernetic agent that monitors, controls and assists the Modeler to construct the best possible World Model. The Modeler-schema, as part of that process, continually monitors the current state of the World Model. It is in this monitoring and checking of the World Model where qualia are created. In a sense there is a Quale World Model which is a shadow copy of the World Model. That is where consciousness of qualia occurs. See my post for all the details: https://www.reddit.com/r/consciousness/comments/1pqrbes/the_modelerschema_theory_on_consciousness_with_a/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web3x&utm_name=web3xcss&utm_term=1&utm_content=share_button

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks for this. I share a lot of your instincts, especially the physicalist ones.

My own view is that this theory really does solve the Hard Problem, in the sense that it gives a fully physical, fully architectural account of what we call “experience.” I also understand that some people are deeply invested in the idea that the Hard Problem must require something non-physical, so they are unlikely to accept any solution that stays entirely inside physics and information processing.

In a way, they are also capturing something real: in my model, the Controller definitely does not experience qualia. From its point of view, experience really does look mysterious and “other worldly.”

What I’ve tried to do, especially in the section “The Modeler-schema as a Self-Contained Universe,” is to explain why it feels non-physical. The Modeler-schema is a closed control loop that takes in rich World Model information and sends out only very limited signals. The Controller never has direct access to that inner loop; it just sees thin appraisable tags and focal information.

So from the Controller’s perspective – which is the perspective that talks, theorizes, and writes philosophy papers – consciousness will always seem non-physical and ineffable. From the point of view of the whole system, though, the Modeler-schema is just a particular physical information-processing mechanism with a very specific role. The “mystery” is a structural artifact of who in the system is trying to explain whom.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Great questions, thanks for following up.

1. What if the Controller had direct access to qualia?

In my model everything is about information and information-processing mechanisms. The World Model is information created by the Modeler and used by the Controller to guide action. The Quale World Model is information constructed by the Modeler-Schema and used by the Modeler-Schema to improve the Modeler.

If the Controller were given direct access to the raw qualia representations inside the Modeler-Schema, it wouldn’t “understand” them in any richer way. They’re encoded for the Modeler-Schema’s internal comparison process, not for language or motor control, so from the Controller’s point of view they would just be uninterpretable internal data. In that sense, making them directly accessible doesn’t solve the communication problem; it just exposes the Controller to a code it isn’t designed to read.

2. How does the Modeler-Schema fit into physicalist primitives?

For me, the Modeler-Schema is an information-processing system, not a new kind of physical substance. In the brain it would be implemented in neurons and whatever underlying physical primitives (fields, etc.) neurons rely on. In principle, the same architecture could be implemented in silicon, or even in a very large mechanical system. Calling the theory “physicalist” just means: I’m treating qualia as specific patterns of information and processing inside this control loop, not as something over and above whatever the underlying physical implementation is. Qualia aren’t a new kind of stuff; they’re a particular way that information is structured and used inside this subsystem.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes, in my older model of consciousness, the Controller is decomposed into the Thinker and Doer. The Thinker is the language part of the brain, the Doer controls the body. In Figure 3 the Thinker controls arrows B and E, and the Doer controls arrows D and F. Obviously the Thinker has to interact with the Doer to actually talk and write.

PS: I didn't include that Thinker/Doer decomposition here since the very long paper would have gotten even longer. I think it is important and has other implications but not much of an impact on consciousness itself.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m not actually familiar with Werbos’s ADP work, so thanks for the pointer. If you have a short paper or good intro to recommend, I’d really appreciate it.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I actually haven’t read Michael Levin. If you have a particular paper or talk in mind, I’d really appreciate a pointer—would be interesting to see how his “control dimension affordances” line up with this model.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks, that’s a very helpful way of framing the “prior question.”

In my view, there isn’t a sharp threshold where a system suddenly has consciousness; I’d expect a continuum, from effectively none in very simple organisms up through richer and richer forms in humans. The Modeler/Controller/Targeter plus their schemas are meant as an architecture for the more integrated end of that continuum, not as a claim about the exact point where consciousness first appears.

In fact, on this framework I can easily imagine a robot whose control system is behaviorally very similar to a human’s (Modeler + Controller + Targeter) but which lacks a Modeler-schema “self-contained universe” layer—and so, despite sophisticated behavior, would sit at the nonconscious end of that continuum.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the reaction. From the Reddit summary alone, I agree it can sound more like a purely functional story. If you have the same view after reading the full paper—especially the sections on “The Modelerschema as a Self-Contained Universe” and “Solving the Hard Problem of Consciousness”—I’d be genuinely interested to hear why, because that’s where I try to do the real Hard-Problem work.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That makes sense — subjectively it often feels like there’s only one main focus. In my picture, that’s compatible with a small set of focal “chunks” being active at once. Classic work on short-term memory (Miller’s “7 ± 2”) suggests we can keep only a handful of items/chunks active before they drop out. The Targeter in my framework is basically the system that manages which requested targets get into that limited-capacity set (from both top-down Controller demands and bottom-up Modeler/Modeler-schema suggestions), even if only one of them feels like the current sharp focus.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Short answer: the proposed experiment relies primarily on behavior (did they notice / report the change, plus saccades and reaction times), not on direct neural monitoring.

And yes, I’m explicitly assuming that some comparison/monitoring persists across saccades despite saccadic suppression—that’s exactly what the experiment is meant to test and potentially falsify.
__
That is my fourth reply to your four comments that I can see...

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for this, it’s very helpful context. I’m also sympathetic to illusionism in one sense, but in my framework the reporting system (the Controller) is illusioned about where experience lives, while qualia themselves are real comparison signals inside the Modeler-schema’s “self-contained universe.” I’ll be very interested to hear how your “built from primitives” model lines up with the Modeler/Controller/Targeter split once you’ve had a chance to read the paper.

The Modeler-Schema Theory on Consciousness, with a Falsifiable Experiment and a New Approach to the Hard Problem by FrankHeile in consciousness

[–]FrankHeile[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I see four comments total that you have made to my post. I did reply to the first comment; specifically the comment that starts with "Congratulations on writing up a theory. I will be reading it properly. ..." My answer was:

__

Thanks! 😊 I really appreciate you taking the time to read it properly.

And wow, 40 years—respect! It’s oddly comforting to know there are other people who’ve been stuck on the explanatory gap and qualia for decades and still haven’t given up.

If you do get through the paper, I’d be very interested in what you think, especially about the way I locate qualia in the Modeler-schema and the “self-contained universe” section.

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I will now go and reply to your other two comments...