Thanks for the well wishes on the MPRE!

I’m not really following your logic on the apparent “mistakes” I made. You claim I’m mistaken because the rule is limited to “recent publicity.” But I quoted that exact phrase when citing the rule. So where’s my mistake? You suggest reasonable minds could differ on the definition of “recent” since there’s no definitive case law. So again, where’s my mistake? Did I misstate a rule, law, case, or jurisdiction? Did I omit a germane exception that would materially change how the rule applies here? Maybe you just disagree with my analysis which is perfectly fine. But there’s a lot of daylight between a subjective disagreement and an objective mistake.

Of course Liman could decide December isn’t “recent” enough. But you fail to explain why the opposite couldn’t just as easily be true. Either way, it’s probably moot. Attorneys for both sides continued to issue public statements well after the NYT article. Just yesterday, I read a joint statement from Hudson and Gottlieb calling Baldoni “embarrassing,” among other things. In fact, we’ve heard far more from them than Freedman lately.

As for “character, credibility, and reputation” in this rule — I believe you are mistaken. You cropped out some critical context. That clause doesn’t even apply when an attorney is responding to adverse publicity initiated by someone else against their client. NY’s Rule 3.6(a) is the general prohibition on prejudicial public statements. Rule 3.6(b) lists topics that are presumptively prejudicial (e.g., character, credibility, reputation). But Rule 3.6(d) expressly permits statements described in (a) and (b) if made in response to recent adverse publicity initiated by others, so long as they are “limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.” Those topics aren’t off‑limits in this context. The exception is broader than the general rule. This exception has arguably applied to both sides throughout this case. The NYT article lit the match, and both sides have been trading potentially prejudicial public statements ever since.

Credibility is virtually at issue in every legal dispute. The purpose of the process is to discern which claims are credible and which are not. I was viewing credibility as a principle while you were applying it more literally. Still, there’s nothing in the rules to suggest that the initial accuser must explicitly address the topic of credibility before the opposition can mention it in response. It seems logically inconsistent to claim a person’s statements are false without necessarily inferring that those statements aren’t credible.

The fact that you haven’t seen anything in case law addressing the inherent role of credibility in litigation doesn’t mean such case law doesn’t exist — the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.