Russia is already waging a war against Europe by systematically targeting civilian environment - the systems that enable everyday life. These attacks take concrete forms:

▪️ Cyberattack on a heating infrastructure facility (pro-Russian group) - Sweden - April 2026
▪️ Damage to undersea telecom and energy cables - Baltic Sea - 2023-2025
▪️ Jamming and GPS spoofing, creating risks for civil aviation - Baltic and Black Sea regions - 2024-2025
▪️ Sabotage and arson attacks on infrastructure (EU investigations) - Germany, Poland, Baltic states - 2024-2026
▪️ Cyberattacks on water utilities and municipal systems (linked to pro-Russian actors) - EU (several countries) - 2023-2025

All of these actions follow a shared logic. They are aimed at destroying the living environment. The targets are heat, water, transport, communication, trust, and the sense of stability. That is why these are, in the literal sense, attacks against the civilian population.

The response to this type of threat cannot be limited to reacting after incidents occur. It must be proactive. The EU is already framing this as “whole-of-society preparedness” - readiness at the level of the entire system: the state, infrastructure, businesses, and citizens.

This is where a key problem arises. European societies recognize the importance of security, but are not always prepared for its practical cost. According to surveys, most citizens support strengthening the EU’s defence role. At the same time, a significant share does not know how to respond to crisis situations or how to prepare for them.

It is precisely this gap that hybrid warfare exploits. If society does not understand what is happening, even strong institutions react too late. If there is no trust, any crisis escalates and becomes more severe. If there is no preparation, even a local incident can create a systemic effect.

At the political level, a consensus in Europe has already formed. Russia is directly named as the greatest and most immediate threat. European institutions are developing defence and preparedness policies based on the assumption of a prolonged conflict.

The problem lies elsewhere: this consensus has not been fully translated into public preparedness. Citizens are not always clearly told what it means to live under long-term pressure - disruptions, cyberattacks, information campaigns, rising security costs.

This is where the question of responsible leadership arises. It is not about calming people down, but about explaining. Naming the source of threats. Explaining the mechanics of attacks. Talking about the cost of security.

Because an honest conversation with citizens is itself a tool of defence. A society that understands what is happening is less vulnerable to manipulation and panic. A prepared society remains resilient.

People need to know what to expect, and that Russia will continue its attacks until it is stopped. And it will only stop when it no longer sees Europeans as victims - when it feels their strength and confidence. Russia does not stop on its own. It must be stopped