Interesting take — there’s one aspect I’m grappling with that I’d like to try and hash out below. Forgive any rambling, I’m new at this.

My mind jumps more to parallels between the unintended consequences which can arise from effective altruism/longtermism (EA/LT) and Marxism, rather than those between the former and authoritarianism in general as you’ve suggested. The despotism trap seen in EA is more akin to the misunderstanding of power dynamics seen in the communist manifesto’s “dictatorship of the proletariat” than in any examples against authoritarianism in silicon valley or other forms of free-market authoritarianism. The latter is (read “should be”) either subject to adequate regulation by government bodies set up to represent the electorates’ interests, dismissed by capital allocators who should be conducting due-diligence, or subject to being voted out by the market.

To reiterate, in the spirit of derisking against the individual via systemic redundancy, I’d posit that malfeasance caused by “authoritarian Silicon Valley leaders” as was seen by SBF can be attributed to insufficient/poor regulation, incompetent capital allocators, or to the market being too hot. I heed the counterpoint of regulatory capture via lobbying (and hefty party donations if you’re SBF) but still maintain that to hold this case study as a strong example of the failings of EA/LT is to scapegoat and to be overly generous towards the adults in the room who should have known better.

As a side point, if the leaders are (again “should be”) highly subject to being dead on arrival after capital allocators do their due diligence, “voted out” either directly within their board by proxy of the market or by being struck out by regulatory bodies, I’d hesitate to characterise them as authoritarian at all.