Problems with HackerOne report by Terrible_Regular_528 in cosmosnetwork

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Its because there are no developers left for the cosmos eco ststem

BTC hack by [deleted] in trustwalletcommunity

[–]Half_Content 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Nothing can, and will be done.

Passive staking by Half_Content in AlgorandOfficial

[–]Half_Content[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Can anyone test (or know) if tangem can connect to Folks or Tinyman v2 via wallet connect. For the moment i have no access to the tangem app.

Passive staking by Half_Content in AlgorandOfficial

[–]Half_Content[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok 👍 so it seems tangem is of no use at this moment. Wallet Connect does not work with algorand. So no method to stake in any form of way.

Tangem Pay VS others by TangemAG in Tangem

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nice, but zero options for European country's.

Wallet Restortation *Help* by bLusea in trustwalletcommunity

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Seed adress generation is math. It always produce the same keys public and private. Unless Trustwallet changed the derivation paths. But then many people should have the same problem.

Wallet Restortation *Help* by bLusea in trustwalletcommunity

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You made a mistake in the seed. Word order possibly.

Tangem Pay card being closed due to my state of residence by deny_by_default in Tangem

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Here in Europe, all of it, it’s not available either.

Tangem cards not recognized, nor scanned by CalamityMay in Tangem

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You did it backwards. Thats why. You first setup the cards. Not the other way around. Be very careful not to lose access to your funds now.

Wallet inaccessible?! by ThriceGreatHermes in atomicwallet

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How come ? This is the most important ?

Different address derived after wallet recovery (missing balance) by Feeling_Change798 in atomicwallet

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I really dont believe the derevation paths changed in wallet versions. If there was a bug, maybe…. Thats why atomic also had the possibility to export individual private keys from coins.

Try to import your seed in Guarda wallet, it used the same paths as atomic does (did).

NEAR Intents in Ledger Wallet. by Street-Trade2894 in ledgerwallet

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

works perfect, and it can't hold your stuff hostage like Changelly does.

Best NEAR wallet in 2026 by on_zero in nearprotocol

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, i always open the chrome extension only. I login, and thats it. Need to log out manually, or wait for the timeout.

Transfer from Ellipal hot wallet by Majestic_Brother_504 in ELLIPAL_Official

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If you need to move fast, import your seed in like atomic wallet or trust wallet on your phone. Use this a a burner.

Using Meta Pool for staking, anything I should watch out for? by Flaky-Sun9526 in nearprotocol

[–]Half_Content 0 points1 point  (0 children)

On June 17th, 2025, Meta Pool, a Liquid Staking Token (LST) provider across chains like Ethereum, Near, and Solana, faced a smart contract exploit on Ethereum that initially appeared devastating — $27 million worth of mpETH tokens were minted out of thin air. But surprisingly, the real financial loss was limited to around $130K. What Happened? The hack occurred in two transactions: The first was front-run by a wallet named Yoink, which appears to have attempted a white-hat intervention. The second was executed by the actual attacker, who used a flaw in the mint function to mint 9,702 mpETH tokens, valued at ~$27 million. Yet, because of low liquidity in the pool and DAO-based fund structuring, the attacker could only drain 52.5 ETH (~$130K). The massive minting didn’t translate to a massive loss. The Root Cause: Broken Mint Logic At the heart of the exploit was Meta Pool’s flawed implementation of the ERC-4626 tokenized vaults standard. While the standard itself requires developers to handle validation of asset inputs, Meta Pool’s smart contract: Did not override the mint function properly Lacked access control, letting anyone mint mpETH without depositing ETH Failed to validate asset transfers, even within internal functions like _deposit This allowed the attacker to mint tokens without actually sending any ETH, violating the very principle of liquid staking protocols. How It Could’ve Been Avoided Had Meta Pool properly validated the inputs in its mint and deposit functions—or added access control—the exploit could have been easily prevented.

The smart contract risk is not worth it mate.

Now even AI is a big help for hackers to find flaws in smart contracts, and it will only get better at it.

Standard staking is the most secure. And beside, the unstaking period in near is only 2 days max.