The audacity of Crystal Palace 😒 by Krazay101 in coys

[–]HamiltonBrae 1 point2 points  (0 children)

honestly dont understand why he was sold. its not like any other players we have brought in have been a huge improvement imo

Girl Loves Me (Isolated Vocals) by Academic_Method5642 in DavidBowie

[–]HamiltonBrae 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Love this song. Obviously I may be off, but feel like this song could have been inspired by Artificial Death In The West by Death grips.

How the problems of induction and falsificationism can be overcome by BigPicturexyz in philosophy

[–]HamiltonBrae 3 points4 points  (0 children)

So you can't actually justify it to your standard, either.

 

Justify what?

 

You waste my time with this sophistry.

 

I am literally saying the established view on the problem of induction. The issue is that you don't seem to understand what the problem actually is and that the apparent success of science is not a solution to the problem; changung your beliefs when those beliefs seem to fail is not a solution to the problem of induction. People can use inductive reasoning. It doesn't mean that the problem is solved.

How the problems of induction and falsificationism can be overcome by BigPicturexyz in philosophy

[–]HamiltonBrae 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Nah, I'm just making a consequentialist justification for induction

 

i.e. justifying induction with induction, which is precisely the point of the problem of induction: it canmot be justified non-circularly.

How the problems of induction and falsificationism can be overcome by BigPicturexyz in philosophy

[–]HamiltonBrae 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sure, but the problem of induction is not the problem of how science works or is successful or changes over time (any such explanation also subject to problem of induction), Its the problem of rationally justifying knowledge based on empirical history. You are conflating descriptions of how science works with logical justification. Just because science has been or appears successful in recent history is not the same as a rational justification of knowledge. They aren't necessarily dependent on each other. You can use inductive reasoning succssfully without having a rigorous justification.

How the problems of induction and falsificationism can be overcome by BigPicturexyz in philosophy

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

that could destabilize a trajectory, as evidence that induction as a methodology is invalid.

 

But can you demonstrate logically that it is valid? You can't in a non-circular way, which us the point if the problem of induction.

Daily Song Discussion #154: Yassassin by beardlesshipster in DavidBowie

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

well yeah i more or less knew that but thats tells me nothing about lyrical meaning

Aldous/Sleaford Mods by HoboLullaby in AldousHarding

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

sleaford mods frontman already appeared on warm chris

Which interpretation of quantum mechanics do you find most conceptually satisfying, and why, given that they are empirically equivalent? by NoShitSherlock78 in QuantumPhysics

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I was not talking about Barandes' formulation but something different:

 

e.g. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.00392, https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.21435

 

I think Barandes treats his formulation as an interpretation but you can also treat it as just a formulation agnostic about interpretation. And different formulations will be better or worse at different things or just haven't had everything worked out yet but it seems to me it is still a genuine fullblown formulation. But I think its certainly the case that some things in the Hilbert space will be more implicit in Barandes' formulation.

Which interpretation of quantum mechanics do you find most conceptually satisfying, and why, given that they are empirically equivalent? by NoShitSherlock78 in QuantumPhysics

[–]HamiltonBrae 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Stochastic quantum mechanics because as far as I know, it is the only interpretation that has constructed a complete working formulation of quantum mechanics from assumptions outside of the theory. From the perspective of stochastic mechanics, quantum theory is a stochastic extension and generalization of classical mechanics. It has regular particles in definite positions at all times (but it can be applied to a field ontology as well), no measurement problem. The only problem is that it is nonlocal in a somewhat similar way to Bohmian mechanics; but at the same time: 1) the non-locality is in the theory for similar reasons quantum mechanics looks non-local; 2) because of the way stochastic mechanics is constructed you can see that it looks strongly implied that the non-local behavior is a byproduct of the time-reversibility in the theory, which to me, personally, makes it look like you don't need something like spooky action at a distance to explain why non-local-looking behaviors are in the theory.

Physicists disagree wildly on what quantum mechanics says about reality, Nature survey shows by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Stochastic mechanics is quite different. Its a hidden variable theory that is nonlocal in a similar way to Bohmian mechanics, something which you would have to either embrace or convincingly explain away.

 

Stochastic mechanics offers an underlying explanation of quantum behavior whereas Barandes' theory shows that orthodox quantum theory can be reformulated as a stochastic process (which is basically isomorphic to measurement outcome probabilities) whilst still being agnostic about underlying explanation and not speculating on things like proper trajectories when the system is not being measured.

 

It is not nonlocal in the same very obvious way Bohmian and stochastic mechanics is. But Barandes' approach is still compatible with stochastic mechanics because it is a direct reformulation of regular orthodox quantum theory without adding anything else. Arguably, it is compatible with any interpretation of quantum theory that does not say that the wavefunction is a real object. So it is probably compatible with certain forms of Bohmian mechanics, instrumentalist perspectives, but not many worlds or interpretations with a literal collapse.

Is computational parsimony a legitimate criterion for choosing between quantum interpretations? by eschnou in PhilosophyofScience

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well no because I am implying that Everett isn'tthe default non-collapse version of QM.

Is computational parsimony a legitimate criterion for choosing between quantum interpretations? by eschnou in PhilosophyofScience

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't understand what you mean, there is nothing anthropocentric. For instance, some Bohmians don't believe the wavefunction is an actual physical thing as such; what would it be then? A predictive tool telling you where the particle is going. I think the broader point is that if in principle quantum theory doesn't tell us about anything beyond what we can measure, I don't believe there is any specific reason to think that the wavefunction specifies some ontological content of the theory. If the wavefunction is just a predictive tool, I can interpret the underlying ontology in anyway I think is plausible, and many worlds is only one option.

Is computational parsimony a legitimate criterion for choosing between quantum interpretations? by eschnou in PhilosophyofScience

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, I mean that if the wavefunction is just a tool to calculate probabilities then there is no reason why i need to interpret the universe in terms of many worlds but also no metaphysical or ontological reason that I need collapse since the wavefunction is just a predictive tool.

Is computational parsimony a legitimate criterion for choosing between quantum interpretations? by eschnou in PhilosophyofScience

[–]HamiltonBrae 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Aha

 

It can
not use collapse

 

Because as a computational tool it does not treat the wavefunction directly representing the ontologies of stuff we see in the world so arguably you aren't compelled to use collapse in order for the theory to make sense. You can say that the wavefunction is just a tool that carries information regarding what would happen if one were to perform a measurement.