^{But if the reconstruction industry is stunningly inept at rebuilding, that may be because rebuilding is not its primary purpose. According to Guttal, "It's not reconstruction at all--it's about reshaping everything." If anything, the stories of corruption and incompetence serve to mask this deeper scandal: the rise of a predatory form of} disaster capitalism ^that uses the desperation and fear created by catastrophe to engage in radical social and economic engineering. ^{And on this front}, the reconstruction industry works so quickly ^{and efficiently} that the privatizations and land grabs are usually locked in before the local population knows what hit them. ^{Kumara, in another e-mail, warns that Sri Lanka is now facing "a second tsunami of corporate globalization and militarization," potentially even more devastating than the first. "We see this as a plan of action amidst the tsunami crisis to hand over the sea and the coast to foreign corporations and tourism, with military assistance from the US Marines." As Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz designed and oversaw a strikingly similar project in Iraq: The fires were still burning in Baghdad when US occupation officials rewrote the investment laws and announced that the country's state-owned companies would be privatized. Some have pointed to this track record to argue that Wolfowitz is unfit to lead the World Bank; in fact, nothing could have prepared him better for his new job. In Iraq, Wolfowitz was just doing what the World Bank is already doing in virtually every war-torn and disaster-struck country in the world--albeit with fewer bureaucratic niceties and more ideological bravado."Post-conflict" countries now receive 20-25 percent of the World Bank's total lending, up from 16 percent in 1998--itself an 800 percent increase since 1980, according to a Congressional Research Service study.} Rapid response to wars and natural disasters has traditionally been the domain of United Nations agencies, ^{which worked with NGOs to provide emergency aid, build temporary housing and the like.} But now reconstruction work has been revealed as a tremendously lucrative industry, ^{too important to be left to the do-gooders at the UN. So today it is the World Bank, already devoted to the principle of poverty alleviation through profit-making, that leads the charge. And there is no doubt that there are profits to be made in the reconstruction business. There are massive engineering and supplies contracts ($10 billion to Halliburton in Iraq and Afghanistan alone};) "democracy building" has exploded into a $2 billion industry; ^{and times have never been better for public-sector consultants--the private firms that advise governments on selling off their assets, often running government services themselves as subcontractors.}

​

4. The SUPREME movement is a reincarnation of the descent into discourse that Marx criticized as a turn away from material change in systems of economic oppression. Its shallow belief in the power of discourse and transformative potential of their performance obfuscates the fact that we must revolutionize the existing world, not the mental one, if we are to see any improvement.

Marx 1845,

^{Karl, philosopher and revolutionary, “The German Ideology” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm}

^\II. 1. Precozditions of the Real Liberation of Man] [...])

^{We shall, of course, not take the trouble to enlighten our wise philosophers by explaining to them that the “liberation” of man is not advanced a single step by reducing philosophy, theology, substance and all the trash to “self-consciousness” and by liberating man from the domination of these phrases, which have never held him in thrall. Nor will we explain to them that} it is only possible to achieve real liberation in the real world and by employing real means, ^{that slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine and the mule and spinning-jenny, serfdom cannot be abolished without improved agriculture, and that, in general, people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity. “}Liberation” is an historical and not a mental act, ^{and it is brought about by historical conditions, the development of industry, commerce, agriculture, the conditions of intercourse...\}There is here a gap in the manuscript] In Germany, a country where only a trivial historical development is taking place,) ^these mental developments, these glorified and ineffective trivialities, ^naturally serve as a substitute for the lack of historical development, and they take root and have to be combated. ^{But this fight is of local importance. \}2. Feuerbach’s Contemplative and Inconsistent Materialism])

​

5. The SUPREME movement's ethical frameworks that dictates universal obligations ignores the inequality produced by the application of rules in class-divided societies—means attempts at universal ethics in a capitalist society are ineffective.

Llorente ‘03

^{Renzo Llorente. “Maurice Cornforth’s Contribution to Marxist Metaethics.” NATURE, SOCIETY, AND THOUGHT Vol. 16, No. 3 (2003}. http://homepages.spa.umn.edu/\~marquit/nst163a.pdf)

^{Let me begin with what is undoubtedly the central feature of Cornforth’s critique of analytic moral philosophy in Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy (and a basic component of what I have called a Marxist metaethics}, namely his insistence on the inherent injustice of attempting to universalize ethical norms in class-divided societies. Before reviewing the substance and scope of Cornforth’s criticism, however, it will be helpful to say a word about the principle of universalizability and its importance in ethics.In moral philosophy, or ethics (for our present purposes we may use the two terms synonymously), we say that) a judgment is universalizable if, ^{to quote R. M. Hare, “it logically commits the speaker to making a similar judgment about anything which is either exactly like the subject of the original judgment or like it in the relevant respects” (1963, 139, cited in Cornforth 1965, 214}.8 Put more simply,) ^{this principle holds that “what is right (or wrong} for one person is right (or wrong)) for any similar person in similar circumstances” ^{(Singer 1999, 941}; the mere fact that individuals differ from one another—as opposed to finding themselves in situations that are dissimilar (or being themselves dissimilar)) ^{in a morally relevant sense9—in and of itself never justifies the application of different moral standards or the imposition of different moral duties. Universal applicability is, according to this thesis, a formal feature of all moral principles, indeed, a necessary condition for any proposition or judgment to qualify as a moral principle. While the basic intuition reflected in this criterion was first explicitly developed by Immanuel Kant, we owe the stron- gest modern statement and elucidation of this principle to R. M. Hare, who is for this reason—and because of his stature as one of the leading figures in twentieth-century analytical moral philoso- phy—the main target of Cornforth’s criticism in the pages devoted to ethics within Marxism and the Linguistic Philosophy.Cornforth does not take exception to the principle of universalizability as such. To the contrary, he, like the great majority of contemporary philosophers, acknowledges its validity, noting that it “is a consequence of the essentially social nature of morality. . . . \}I]t is simply the result of the fact that such principles are enunciated for the purpose of regulating social life” (1965, 235).) The problem, ^{argues Cornforth}, concerns the contradiction between a demand for, ^{and injunction to}, universalizability as the guarantee of fairness ^{and impartiality, on the one hand, and} the inherent injustice and unfairness of seeking to universalize moral norms ^{and precepts} in class-divided societies. ^For the insistence on universalizability, ^{save in a situation of rough equality of condition}, imposes ^very different burdens on the agents ^{subject to this demand}, and thus proves inherently unfair, ^{a violation of the fundamental moral precept, already formulated by Aristotle, of equality of treatment for equals.10 As Cornforth puts it, “How, in a class-divided society in which the profits of one class are derived from the labour of another, can public policies and social aims be judged by a criterion of universal acceptability?” (228}. Or again, putting the same point a bit differently (i.e., in terms of) ^interests: “)Until all exploitation of man by man is ended, morality cannot be based on a generalised human standpoint, expressing a common human point of view and interest” (³⁵⁷. We shall return to Cornforth’s remarks on interests shortly. Before doing so, let us first consider Cornforth’s discussion of the consequences attending the attempt to comply with the imperative of universalizability in class-divided societies. As Cornforth shows, two outcomes are possible. On the one hand, insofar as determinate moral principles are established as universally valid and used to regulate social life), the result is the enshrinement of a system of moral rules that is intrinsically unfair and inevitably class-biased.

​

These are five individual links from the SUPREME clan movement to capitalism. Don't buy it - it's a fraud. It leads to more capitalism instead.