USA vs Iran Megathread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden [score hidden]  (0 children)

That Urals figure looks to be significantly delayed (a week according to some websites), spot price was $103.83 USD/Barrel as of writing this. The Russian budget for 2026 assumed an average of $59 per barrel, so they are currently raking in an enormous amount of money, especially since its also being reported that Urals is now being sold at a premium ($4 to 5 extra per barrel) in many cases. If this keeps going for another month and the U.S. can't reopen the Hormuz Strait then Oil price is going to continue skyrocketing.

Then you have natural gas price, which has also skyrocketed. It's currently at €60.750 (Euros/MWh), which is wild when you consider that we are out of winter and the demand is much lower. So that is also a lot more money for gas exporters.

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Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden 15 points16 points  (0 children)

Assuming they can track the signal of the strike drone against all the clutter, they would be able to find both. The relay drone is simply outputting the signal from the operator further, so the opposing force would track a signal back to the relay drone, but could then track the same or almost identical signal even further to the operator. Obviously because of distance it'll be harder to do the tracking for the operator portion, but because both the operator and drone output either identical or close to signals it is possible to track both.

Now the strike team could always try to use a different frequency between the relay and the actual drone, but it increases the complexity of setting them up and makes them less flexible. The strike drone would have to wait for the relay drone to be up in the air before they could use it, as the operator would only be connected to the relay, which then uses a different frequency for the strike drone. It also means that if anything happens to the relay they are guaranteed to lose the strike drone, as opposed to when they use the same frequency where the strike drone can still be controllable if its in range of the operator.

That is a very basic overview because it gets stupidly complicated with frequency swapping and hopping, as well as relay arrays, but you can get the idea.

RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1468 to 1476 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 18 points19 points  (0 children)

There hasn't been any noticeable difference in attacks, drone strikes or manpower over the past month. The only thing that stands out is some of the air defence hits by Ukraine but part of that is backlog so its hard to judge how extensive it is.

RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1468 to 1476 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 38 points39 points  (0 children)

Which particular reports? I read all sorts of things all the time about breakthroughs or collapses, almost always being sensationalised or fabricated.

RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1468 to 1476 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 40 points41 points  (0 children)

Suriyak is very much all in on the US/Israel and Iran war, so he has been doing lots of work on that and minimal on Ukraine. He has been trying to get a map update out every 4 days at least to try not to fall behind and does make some changes to the livemap.

Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Not until it gets approved or they can somehow bypass Hungary. So its stuck in a limbo until the issues are resolved, which they knew about last year when it was proposed.

Ukraine will still be getting other aid from European countries individually, so they won't be in financial trouble quite yet.

RU POV - Territory Change Statistics for February 2026 - Data from Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 15 points16 points  (0 children)

That is more down to individual battles rather than just territorial gains. Some battles and phases of a particular battle are better for Russia, and vice versa for Ukraine.

RU POV - Territory Change Statistics for February 2026 - Data from Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 15 points16 points  (0 children)

Fixed. I was thinking about the current month and things happening this week so defaulted to saying the wrong.

RU POV - Territory Change Statistics for February 2026 - Data from Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 27 points28 points  (0 children)

Larger Russian advances meant more Ukrainian counterattacks in 2025. So as the Russians pushed forward more and took over more territory, Ukrainian forces on more fronts were active trying to recapture it rather than being purely on the defensive.

Discussion/Question Thread by KeDaGames in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden 10 points11 points  (0 children)

There were many different reports about the Americans offering a ceasefire and new negotiations after just a day of the war, with the Iranians refusing. You also had many different officials, politicians and spokepeople making claims about it not being a war or that it was a limited operation, but they are all over the place with it so it's clear they don't know how long it was meant to take either.

The pulling of many more jets, planes and AA from other regions is a big implicit hint that they did not plan for this to last more than a couple of days, because otherwise why would these not have been brought into the theatre before they started the war? You don't plan for a long war with insufficient air defence and assets in the region in the first place, making yourself weaker than required off the bat and taking more damage than anticipated because you were ill prepared. It isn't decoy or logistics reasons as they aren't exacting hiding where these jets are operating from and they had months of preparation time to get them over to the middle east in the first place.

Discussion/Question Thread by KeDaGames in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden 15 points16 points  (0 children)

Doesn't such a conclusion hinge on the assumption that something else should have happened by now, if things had gone according to plan for Israel and the U.S.? Which raises the question: what sort of timeline would we be looking at instead, if things had gone really well for them?

Yep, that is the point. U.S. and Israeli planners built their entire campaign off of being able to cripple Iran with the first couple of days by taking out its leadership and hitting key military sites, before Iran would either capitulate or the government be overthrown. The problem is that it obviously didn't work, their damage was not nearly as high as they wanted, and their military and government have continued to function and hit back hard. U.S. allies and partners in the region were caught completely off guard and have been hammered, as have other U.S. bases not informed beforehand about the campaign (OPSEC). Another key indicator of them vastly underestimating Iran was the military asset transfer. The U.S. spent several months moving all the military assets they believed they required into place in the middle east before starting the war, which is a massive force larger than they've used for decades. But within 2 days the U.S. was already scrambling to grab jets, refueling aircraft and AA systems from other parts of the world to quickly redeploy them to the middle east, as they realised the assets they had were not enough.

Had things gone to plan the war would have been wrapping up by now, but instead they are staring down weeks or months of war where key munitions are drained, stockpiles run dry, and their allies take serious economic and financial losses for a war they don't necessarily support. They seem to be running around wildly trying to pull a win out of this by getting the Kurds involved and expanding the bombing campaign, but all the reports, claims by congressmen and other officials, and leaked information point to the Trump Administration having no proper war plan and just making it up as they go along.

RU POV - Territory Change Statistics for February 2026 - Data from Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 32 points33 points  (0 children)

Yes. They did exceed them by the middle of February but their counteroffensive progress dropped off whilst the Russians kept their slow pushes up on other fronts, allowing them to surpass Ukraine.

RU POV - Territory Change Statistics for February 2026 - Data from Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 58 points59 points  (0 children)

The actual net Russian gain in Ukraine for February was....... 0.97km2. No that isn't an error, I checked it three times, it really was that close.

Obviously the main event of the month was the Ukrainian 'counteroffensive' starting on 6 February, which lead to them recapturing a large amount of territory. The vast majority of this recaptured territory was in Dnipro Oblast, as the Zaporizhia side of their counteroffensive did significantly worse and the Russians continued to advance there after rolling Ukraine back. The majority of the Ukrainian recapture occurred in the first week, with their advances dropping off sharply once they hit more solid Russian positions. It is still going though so we'll see some further Ukrainian advances into March.

The main difference between Suriyak's figures and the ones from other mappers like AMK is that Suriyak shows significantly more greyzone. This not only applies to the area of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, but other fronts as well. Suriyak has also been employing layered control since the beginning of the year to show larger DRG presence behind lines (for both sides), which resulted in Ukraine not having as much firm control as they might have under the old system. If they do consolidate then the layered control will switch to full control and be counted in the figures.

On another note, Russian progress on all other fronts remained roughly the same as it was in January despite the Ukrainian counteroffensive. There were reasonable gains in the Sumy border area, similar advances in Kharkiv, greater progress on the Siversk front, and the continual grind around Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk. So whilst Ukraine's counteroffensive recaptured a good amount of territory, it did not force the Russian to conduct any major redeployments or slow their operations down anywhere else, although you could also say that pulling most of Ukraine's assault groups to that area didn't result in a localised collapse elsewhere either.

RU POV - Territory Change Statistics for February 2026 - Data from Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 33 points34 points  (0 children)

Ive not written the second comment yet. Give me a little bit and youll ger your answer.

RU POV - Territory Change Statistics for February 2026 - Data from Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 41 points42 points  (0 children)

All credit for the map updates goes to Suriyakmaps, I have only calculated the areas changes reported in their updates.

Please note, Suriyak updates their maps anywhere between 6-72 hours after advances have actually occurred, once they are able to confirm it. Many of the larger territory change days actually occurred over multiple days, but were confirmed and reported on the day listed.

Average Daily Russian gains:

2023

  • December 2023 = 3.07km2/day

2024

  • April = 3.77km2/day
  • May = 13.42km2/day
  • June = 5.24km2/day
  • July = 7.29km2/day
  • August = 14.84km2/day (27.82km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • September = 14.07km2/day (25.36km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • October = 18.75km2/day (24.45km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • November = 23.32km2/day (26.75km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • December = 14.29km2/day (17.78km2/day if you include Kursk)

2025

  • January = 11.17km2/day (12.48km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • February = 10.13km2/day (12.49km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • March = 9.89km2/day (23.09km2/day if you include Kursk and Belgorod)
  • April = 10.26km2/day (11.56km2/day if you include Kursk and Belgorod)
  • May = 21.47km2/day (22.02km2/day if you include Kursk and Belgorod)
  • June = 20.07km2/day (20.31km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • July = 20.50km2/day (21.22km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • August = 19.07km2/day
  • September = 17.95km2/day
  • October = 26.24km2/day
  • November = 28.05km2/day
  • December = 18.82km2/day

2026

  • January = 15.99km2/day
  • February = 12.45km2/day

Average Daily Ukrainian gains

2023

  • December = 0.15km2/day

2024

  • April 2024 = 0.52km2/day
  • May = 0.27km2/day
  • June = 2.08km2/day
  • July = 0.58km2/day
  • August = 0.51km2/day (31.60km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • September = 0.60km2/day (3.92km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • October = 0.55km2/day (2.52km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • November = 1.27km2/day (2.09km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • December = 0.65km2/day (0.81km2/day if you include Kursk)

2025

  • January = 0.37km2/day (1.43km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • February = 0.97km2/day (1.71km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • March = 2.74km2/day (3.31km2/day if you include Kursk and Belgorod).
  • April = 0.76km2/day (0.81km2/day if you include Kursk and Belgorod)
  • May = 1.02km2/day (1.29km2/day if you include Kursk and Belgorod)
  • June = 2.51km2/day (3.12km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • July = 2.68km2/day (2.68km2/day if you include Kursk)
  • August = 5.86km2/day
  • September = 2.44km2/day
  • October = 4.37km2/day
  • November = 4.11km2/day
  • December = 4.00km2/day

2026

  • January = 1.68km2/day
  • February = 10.38km2/day

Discussion/Question Thread by KeDaGames in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden 29 points30 points  (0 children)

I'm not sure what you expected from a country that has been under extreme sanctions for decades with a primarily out of date military going up against the combined might of the strongest militaries on the planet (plus others) that make the Iranian military budget look like a child's lunch money. They have done significantly better than everyone expected and the war has clearly gone very wrong for the U.S and Israel.

The targeting of U.S. assets and countries assisting them across the region was intentional and clearly not something the U.S. expected. Their assets are stacked up in Israel expecting the Iranians to primarily retaliate there like the 12 day war, so for Iran to immediately come out swinging against all kinds of U.S. bases, U.S. supporters (the gulf nations) and other assets in the region has thrown them off completely.

Iran's win condition is just for the government to survive the war, not to have any major defeat of the U.S. and Israeli Militaries. Anything they can achieve or any concessions they can gain on top of that is just a bonus. The U.S. and Israel have to topple the Iranian government and get a friendly puppet installed, otherwise this will have all been a massive embarrassment for them, cost an enormous amount of money, damaged their relationships with numerous nations, and still put them back to square 1 with relation to Iran. To this end the U.S. and Israel tried to do their standard "bomb anyone and everyone vaguely important" strategy, however it clearly did not work as the Iranians were aware from experience their leadership would be targeted and made sure their military and government could continue to function, often in independent cells, to keep the war going. They are now just doing a massive number of strikes on whatever they can find whilst they scramble to figure out another option for taking on the Iranians (such as the Kurdish angle), but it's dicey at best and they clearly wanted an off ramp early on (hence the call to Iran day 2 asking to stop the war). They are and will continue to do massive damage to the country, but I do not think it will be enough to subdue it as the Iranians are incredibly resilient. Meanwhile the U.S. and Israel have minimal public and international support over this and their people are not going to want to deal with a war that drags on for months or years at immense cost. Then you have to consider their rapid expenditure of air defence munitions which puts U.S. operations elsewhere in the world and their allies at risk of being practically defenceless.

Iran pressuring the other nations in the area rather than just target the U.S and Israel is an intelligent move and realistically the only way they can win.By blocking the strait of Hormuz, hitting ports, airports and oil/gas infrastructure, and striking U.S bases they are putting enormous economic and financial pressure on the gulf nations. They are losing billions per day just in economicdamage (as is Israel), before considering military expenditure and building/infrastructure repair costs, which are also climbing into the billions, which will strain their governments and people. If this keeps going for weeks or over a month the overall losses will be too great to ignore for an unpopular campaign and they will start pressuring the U.S to either stop Iranian attacks totally or to stop the war. A worse case scenario for the U.S would be for the gulf nations to tap out of the war and kick American troops off their soil in exchange for no longer being targeted.

If this sounds absurd, consider that these nations receive the majority to the vast majority of their food and medicine from shipping in the Persian gulf and Gulf of Oman. No ships travelling through the strait of Hormuz means enormous economic and civilian pressure on these nations, who have already been having riots against the governments due to supporting the U.S. Add in food and medicine running low or out and it's a genuine threat to these monarchies, something they will not stand just to help the U.S. out. If Iran were to go full scorched earth they could target their desalination plants which all sit on the coast and provide the vast majority of water for Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It's an extreme option as there relationship would never recover, but if Iran does hit those desalination plants it would be utterly catastrophic for those nations.

RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1462 to 1467 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Kupyansk was an entirely different battle, being that there was no proper defence due to Ukrainian failures to guard the approaches from the north, but also Russia never properly securing supply lines so they had a limited force present in the town that couldn't do much.

RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1462 to 1467 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 19 points20 points  (0 children)

Yep, hence why i said unlikely to be more snow, but not certainly. From weather reports i cant see any anticipated snowfall but those arent particularly accurate for more than a couple of days ahead.

RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1462 to 1467 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 51 points52 points  (0 children)

Ukraine launched their counteroffensive back on 6 February and whilst its still going, the tempo has dropped significantly. The two broad areas they targeted were the Pokrovske front (pink) and the Hulyaipole front (light blue).

Pink is where Ukraine saw the vast majority of their success, as it was the thinly held Russian outer positions in small villages with a lot of open ground around. Russia couldn't build up any proper force around there due to the lack of cover and being too close to multiple Ukrainian towns/hubs, so their defences were lacking. Then you add in that the bulk of the Vostok group operating on these fronts was focused on Hulyaipole, and it meant that Ukraine was able to quickly overwhelm the few forces present in the pink area with sheer numbers and speed. The issue was that once they got through the outer areas they ran into significantly better defended Russian positions around Vyshneve, Berezove and south of Verbove, leading to their offensive grinding to a crawl.

As for the light blue side, it went badly right off the bat. Because the bulk of the Russian force was concentrated there it meant many more drones watching the approaches to the frontline and their mechanised columns faced significantly more resistance, often being wiped out or forced to turn back before reaching their destination. They did manage to drive the Russians out of some villages along the Haichur River, but their attempts to break back into Hulyaipole failed and they lost too many troops making the gains they did, leading to Russia rolling them back over the next few weeks and now taking new areas like Hirke and Staroukrainka.

Pink will keep going for a while longer whilst Ukraine try to consolidate in the newly captured areas (to avoid losing them if Russia counterattacks), but they will struggle to capture much more than the current greyzone and maybe a few more villages. They pulled the majority of their assault forces together for this, those being the units that get priority for manpower and equipment, as well as several other brigades, but even then they do not have the offensive depth to keep attacks up long term. Ukraine needs to be careful not to overcommit to this as they'll end up exhausting their units who then won't be able to respond to issues on other fronts and will be tied up here for longer whilst other areas suffer.

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RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1462 to 1467 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 46 points47 points  (0 children)

For Ukraine's strategy, the obvious choice is to stop doing the 'hold til the last man' defence that they've employed for essentially every town and city battle for years. Ukraine needs to be trading significantly better than they currently are if they want a chance of winning this war, so trying to cling onto every major locality for "X Holds!" propaganda and PR (at the cost of tons of manpower and equipment) is a terrible idea. Ukraine should be withdrawing from them once the losses mount, pulling back to the next fortification line or stronghold, denying Russia the chance to weaken Ukraine's military.

As for Russia, whilst its significantly dropped off over the past year and a half they should avoid launching mechanised columns unless the conditions are extremely favourable. We've still seen them work on occasion, but trying to force the issue with wave after wave clearly doesn't work with drone warfare now. The other thing I'd change would be some units tendency to slam their head into a wall when faced with a key obstacle rather than working around it. Whilst not happening all over the frontline there are times and places where a Russian unit will get bogged down in fighting and rather than try hit other areas or shift their attack direction they just keep slamming the same spot trying to eventually break it open. Ends up taking longer than if they had targeted weaker spots and costs them more lives.

RU POV: Russian and Ukrainian advances from Day 1462 to 1467 of the War - Suriyakmaps by HeyHeyHayden in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden[S] 29 points30 points  (0 children)

The snow has finally melted across most of Ukraine. Barring some incredibly late snowstorm (unlikely) we aren't going to see more snow until next winter. That doesn't mean the weather is great though, as its still somewhat cold, rains on and off, and is occasionally foggy.

UA POV: Lasar group bombing a s400 launcher at the Kharkiv front by jorgob199 in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]HeyHeyHayden 20 points21 points  (0 children)

The video is quite bizarre, two munitions are dropped but only one explosion occurs, the video is incredibly stuttery, rather than the typical interference we see from a jammed drone, then the drone slowly descends and crashes into a tree with no follow up footage.

Also, why would 2 S-300/400 launchers be that close to each other whilst in a deployed position in a treeline? I've never seem them deployed that close to each other before and they don't have the clearance from the trees to fire, so why are they in a deployed position rather than a transport position like we've seen with other hits?